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Abstract 
 
Contemporary developments in cognitive neuroscience are having a profound impact on 
the philosophy of mind as philosophers work to understand the implications of these 
advances for appreciating what it means to be a human person. At the same time, a recent 
consensus has formed among contemporary theologians around the thesis that Jesus 
Christ is the revelation of what it means to be truly human. Unfortunately, very few 
thinkers have made any concerted effort to bring these two developments into dialogue 
with one another. This study addresses this lack by drawing on the anthropological 
insights of Karl Barth and bringing them to bear on certain aspects of the contemporary 
discussions regarding the mind/brain relationship.  
 
The thesis thus comprises two major sections. The first develops an understanding of 
Karl Barth’s theological anthropology focusing on three major facets: (1) the centrality 
of Jesus Christ for any real understanding of human persons; (2) the resources that such a 
christologically determined view of human nature has for engaging in interdisciplinary 
discourse; and (3) the ontological implications of this approach for understanding the 
mind/body relationship. The second part of the study then draws on this theological 
foundation to consider the implications that understanding human nature christologically 
has for analyzing and assessing several prominent ways of explaining the mind/body 
relationship.  
 
This study, then, is an exercise in understanding the nature of a christocentric 
anthropology and its implications for understanding human ontology. While it will 
devote significant attention to the theology of Karl Barth and various contemporary 
philosophers of mind, its fundamental aim is to draw together these apparently disparate 
fields of inquiry by engaging both theology and philosophy in a vital dialogue on the 
nature of the human person as revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Recentering Theological Anthropology 
 
1. Who Are We?: The Anthropological Question and the Ontology of Human Beings 
 
What is man that you are mindful of him, 
And the son of man that you care for him? (Ps. 8:3, ESV) 
 
On five different occasions the biblical authors raise this fundamental query, 
what we might call the “anthropological question” (see also Job 7:17; 15:14; Psa. 144:3; 
Heb. 2:6). In so doing, they participate in humanity’s ongoing pursuit to answer such 
basic questions as: Who are we? What are we? What are we supposed to be doing? Who 
are we in relation to everything else? This is a pursuit with decisive implications: 
 
So much depends on our conception of human nature: for 
individuals, the meaning and purpose of our lives, what we ought to 
do or strive for, what we may hope to achieve or to become; for 
human societies, what vision of human community we may hope to 
work toward and what sort of social changes we should make. Our 
answers to all these huge questions depend on whether we think there 
is some 'true' or 'innate' nature of human beings. If so, what is it? 
(Stevenson and Haberman 1998:3) 
 
Although the anthropological question thus seems a simple query, it is one with “the 
greatest philosophical [and theological] ramifications” (R. Taylor 1983:8). 
Located within this broader pursuit for anthropological insight, a long tradition of 
inquiry has sought to understand the ontological constitution of human persons. Thinkers 
of all disciplines have striven to determine the proper way to construe the nature and 
number of the composite elements (e.g., mental, physical, spiritual, etc.) of a human 
being—i.e., a single, physical substance (physicalism), a single, non-physical substance 
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(idealism), or two distinct substances (dualism).1 While this debate, often referred to as 
the mind/brain or body/soul debate,2 has a long and storied history, the implications 
raised by recent scientific and philosophical developments have given the ontological 
debate a vitality and a focus that has seldom been seen before (Jeeves 2004b:vii). Indeed, 
in the latter part of the twentieth century the achievements of the “brain sciences” (e.g., 
neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, cognitive science, etc.)3 and the rapid rise of 
philosophy of mind to a place of prominence among the philosophical disciplines4 were 
so remarkable that the 1990s were officially declared “the Decade of the Brain”5 and the 
2000s have subsequently been dubbed “the Decade of the Mind” (e.g., Borenstein 2001). 
Thus, according to Joel Green, “quantum leaps in our understanding of the brain in the 
last three decades are rewriting our understanding of who we are” (2005:6).  
The tremendous possibilities, challenges, and potential liabilities generated by 
these and other late-twentieth century advances like human cloning have caused 
contemporary thinkers to ask the anthropological question “with renewed urgency” 
(Price 2002:1-2). Spanning multiple disciplines, these implications encompass a wide 
range of issues—e.g., determining the relationships and distinctions that obtain between 
humans, other animals, and machines; understanding human agency, moral 
responsibility, and free will; making sense of our traditional affirmations of human 
                                                 
1 As we will see with respect to physicalism and dualism, there are a variety of different ways in 
which each of these can be formulated. 
2 Since a large portion of this thesis focuses on contemporary philosophy of mind, I will tend to 
use the more common (in that field) mind/body label rather than the more theologically oriented body/soul. 
For more on the shift from soul-talk to mind-talk, see Jeeves 2004c.  
3 We will briefly survey some of these developments in chapter 6. For useful summaries see 
Jeeves 1998, 2004c. 
4 Although philosophical thinking about the nature of the human person and, more specifically, 
humanity’s mental aspects can be traced back to the dim recesses of ancient philosophy (cf. Humphrey 
1999; Crane and Patterson 2000; Wright and Potter 2000; MacDonald 2003), Jaegwon Kim points out that 
modern philosophy of mind really begins with the publication of seminal essays by U. T. Place (1956), 
Hebert Feigl (1958), and J. J. C. Smart (1959) (1998a:3-4). He does recognize that the origins of 20th 
century philosophy of mind could be identified with earlier studies by C. D. Broad (1925) and Gilbert Ryle 
(1948), but he argues that neither was responsible for the shape of the modern debate in the way that these 
three essays were. 
5 In 1990 the U. S. Congress, followed by President George Bush, made this an official 
designation in an effort “to enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain research” (cf. 
House Joint Resolution 174 and Presidential Proclamation 6158).  
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dignity and value; and responding rightly to the rapid technological advances on display 
in areas like human cloning and artificial intelligence. In addition, we must recognize 
that the way in which we formulate our understanding of human ontology bears directly 
on a variety of theological questions: What does it mean to say that humans are created 
in the image of God? What does it mean to be saved? What is the nature and locus of sin 
in human life? How does ones neurophysiological makeup affect her spiritual growth 
and well-being? What role does physicality play in worship and prayer? What happens to 
the human person after death? Philosophical, ethical, and theological questions such as 
these indicate the seriousness with which we should approach the task of developing a 
proper understanding of what it means to be a human person.  
As we will see in the later chapters of this study, however, the tremendous 
complexity of both the relevant problems and the proposed solutions comprises a serious 
obstacle to providing an adequate account of human ontology. Indeed, the debate has 
raged for so long and the various arguments are, at times, so convoluted that one 
wonders whether any attempt to provide such an account is “hopelessly ambitious” 
(Polkinghorne 1994:10). Consequently, rather than attempt to unravel this labyrinthine 
debate in all of its philosophical, theological, historical, and scientific complexity, this 
study will explore the possibility of approaching the issue from a decidedly different 
direction.  
 
2. “Ecce Homo”: Recentering Theological Anthropology 
2.1. The Christocentric Turn in Theological Anthropology 
Although we have seen that the biblical authors were keenly interested in the 
anthropological question, it is important to realize that they did not regard this as an 
unanswered question. Instead, these authors consistently placed the anthropological 
question within a theological framework that provided the basis for its answer (cf. Miller 
2004). The Old Testament authors thus ask, “What is man that you magnify him?” (7:17), 
“What is man that you take thought of him?” (Ps. 8:3), “What is man that you take 
knowledge of him?” (Ps. 144:3).6 At each point, then, the very nature of the question 
points the reader toward humanity’s covenantal relationship with its Creator. For these 
                                                 
6 Even Job 7:17, where the theological reference point is not immediately stated, asks the question 
within the overall context of humanity’s relation to God and God’s righteous requirements.  
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biblical authors, humanity is not an undefined term awaiting conceptual clarity. Instead, 
it refers to a creature clearly defined and delineated by its standing in relation to God.7
This covenantal answer to the anthropological question receives even sharper 
focus in the New Testament. In Hebrews 2:6, the focal point for the question is not 
humanity in general but the person of Jesus Christ.8 Paul also grounds an understanding 
of humanity in Jesus. Although Genesis 1:28 identifies all human persons as being 
created in the image of God, Paul makes it clear that Jesus alone is the proper image of 
God (2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15); other humans share in the expression of that image only 
insofar as they are united with Christ and transformed into his image (Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 
15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18).9  
The significance of this christological shift in understanding the human person 
cannot be overstated. Indeed, a growing number of Christian theologians locate 
modernity’s inability to understand human nature in the fundamentally misguided 
attempt to derive a complete picture of the human person independently of the 
perspective provided by the person of Jesus Christ. Such an attempt is necessarily 
flawed, according to these theologians, because only Jesus Christ reveals who and what 
human persons truly are. Thus, Ray Anderson argues, only “the humanity of 
Christ...discloses the radical form of true humanity” (1982:19).  Others similarly contend 
that Jesus is “the mystery of man” (Zizioulas 1975:433), “true humanity” (Sherlock 
1996:18), the “archetype” of humanity (Nellas 1987:33), and the revelation of “what 
human nature is intended to be” (Erickson 1998:532). Indeed, this commitment to a 
“Christological perspective” (Grenz 2004:626) on the human person has become so 
pervasive that theologians can speak of a “broad theological consensus” (McFarland 
2001:6) and a “shared conviction” (A. Torrance 2004:208) regarding the centrality of 
Jesus Christ in any attempt to understand the nature of human persons. 
                                                 
7 We will discuss the covenantal determination of humanity more fully in chapter 2.  
8 Barth thus argues that “What is man?” is a question that ultimately has a christological answer 
(1956, III/2, 20). Throughout this study, all page numbers will be understood to refer to volume III/2, 
unless otherwise indicated. All other references to the Church Dogmatics will be by volume and part 
number (e.g., IV/1).  
9 Although Paul can speak in Col. 3:10 of human persons being renewed into the image of their 
creator, it is clear from other passages (cf. esp. Col. 1:15) that Paul views Jesus as the one in whom the 
imago is fully realized. Consequently, others come to image God mediately through participation in him.   
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Consequently, according to these theologians failing to view humanity from this 
christological vantage point can only result in a distorted picture. But, as Wolfhart 
Pannenberg argues, this is precisely the error of “most contributions to modern 
anthropology” (1985:15; cf. also Loder 1994). Similarly, John Haldane observes the 
rarity of any significant encounter between theology and philosophy of mind; a state he 
regards as unfortunate given the potential such a conversation would have for 
enlightening our understanding of human persons (1991). Robert Jenson contends that 
the difficulties we have with such basic concepts as death, consciousness, freedom, and 
even reality itself stem from a failure to understand them from the perspective provided 
by the Trinity and the incarnation (2003). Indeed, John Macquarrie (1979) and Thomas 
Morris (1984) have separately argued that many modern thinkers are guilty of inverting 
the process entirely; instead of understanding the human person in light of the 
incarnation, they attempt to understand the incarnation in light of a non-christological 
picture of the human person. Such an approach can only distort our view of both Jesus 
and human persons in general.  
 
2.2. The Christocentric Turn and the Mind/Body Debate 
Despite the widespread consensus on the determinative significance of the 
incarnation for understanding the human person and the tremendous impact of recent 
scientific and philosophical investigations into the nature of the brain and the mind, it is 
striking that contemporary theologians have made relatively little effort to understand the 
latter development in light of the former.10 That is, while contemporary theological 
anthropology is marked in many ways by a commitment to viewing the human person 
christologically, the same cannot be said for its considerations of human ontology. 
Although one finds occasional assertions to the effect that Christology, especially a 
particular view of the incarnation, supports some anthropological ontology,11 one rarely 
encounters any sustained attempt to think through the implications of this christological 
                                                 
10 This is particularly surprising given that many of those who are actively involved in the 
mind/body discussion are keenly aware of the theological issues involved.  
11 For example, some dualists argue that the incarnation provides implicit support for substance 
dualism (e.g., Taliaferro 1994:242-243; Goetz 2005:33-34) while others argue the same for physicalism 
(e.g., Thatcher 1987:183-184). 
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framework for understanding human ontology.12 Indeed, some theologians seem more 
concerned with moving in the opposite direction. For example, Nancey Murphy has 
recently noted that positions on the mind/brain discussion may have “implications for 
thinking about the person of Christ” (1998a:23), but she never reverses the directionality 
of her query to consider the implications of Christology for her understanding of the 
mind/brain relationship. If Jesus Christ is the revelation of true humanity, however, 
would it not seem reasonable to consider every aspect of human existence, including 
human ontology, in light of his person and work?  
We can certainly attribute this lack of christological reflection on the mind/body 
discussion to a number of different factors. For our purposes, however, three stand out as 
the most significant. First, although we have seen that contemporary theologians are fond 
of stating that Jesus Christ is the revelation of true humanity, one finds little sustained 
reflection on why this is the case, what it means for understanding human persons, and 
how one goes about drawing anthropological conclusions from this christological starting 
point.13 Rather, such affirmations are often isolated from these methodological 
considerations. But, without a more robust framework for understanding the ground and 
methodology of a christocentric anthropology, it becomes very unclear how one should 
approach any anthropological issue, let alone one as convoluted and controversial and 
the mind/body debate.  
Secondly, many theologians seem implicitly to limit the scope of the 
christological perspective. This is seen most clearly in the tendency to limit 
christological reflection on the human person to what Jesus reveals as the exemplar of 
true human living. While this exemplarist strategy has some biblical support (e.g., 1 Pet. 
2:21) and a long history in both theology (e.g., Thomas à Kempis’ The Imitation of 
Christ) and popular Christianity (witness the “What Would Jesus Do?” phenomenon), it 
                                                 
12 Thus, for example, even a theologian like Ray Anderson, who is firmly committed to a 
christological approach to theological anthropology and is well aware of the significance of the 
contemporary mind/body discussion, makes little attempt to approach the mind/body or body/soul issue 
christologically (cf. R. Anderson 1982). 
13 These issues often receive more sustained attention from those who are critical of the 
christocentric perspective than those who espouse it (e.g., Berkouwer 1962; TeSelle 1975; Knitter 1983; E. 
Johnson 1991; Shults 2003; cf. also the essays in Vander Goot 1981). 
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seems a remarkably limited lens through which to view humanity christologically.14 If 
Jesus is the manifestation of true humanity, it would seem reasonable to consider the 
implications that Christology has for the full range of human existence.15 Even when a 
more robust appreciation of the christological perspective is embraced, however, one 
finds that its scope is often limited to ostensibly theological loci (e.g., soteriology, 
ecclesiology, etc.) to the neglect of such issues as the nature of human consciousness, the 
relationship of the mind to the brain, psychophysical determinism, and other concerns 
raised by philosophers of mind.  
And third, many philosophers and theologians would probably suspect any 
attempt to approach the mind/body discussion from a christological perspective as an 
illegitimate intrusion of theology into the domain of science and philosophy.16 
According to this objection, such an approach would require an unacceptable move 
toward making Christology the point of departure for interpreting the data of the 
neurosciences and for arbitrating philosophical debates. For many thinkers, this is a role 
that theology cannot play without instantiating a theological ghetto, isolated from all 
other forms of discourse by its “totalizing” theological framework (Trigg 1998). In the 
course of this study, however, we will see that this perception is a result of 
misunderstanding the nature of the christocentric perspective. Indeed, we will discover 
that the christological perspective is well-suited to engaging in significant dialogue with 
                                                 
14 Indeed, the exemplarist approach itself is susceptible to critique. As Nellas rightly argues, the 
imitatio Christi should be understood primarily in terms of being conformed to Christ (i.e., 
“Christification”), rather than a merely “external imitation” (1987:39; cf. also pp. 136-139, 153-154). 
Thus, he argues, imitation is more ontological than moral (cf. Schwöbel 1991). 
15 This is not to say that every detail of true humanity can be positively determined through 
christological contemplation. As several theologians have pointed out, the nature of new being has been 
decisively but not comprehensively revealed in Jesus Christ (Sherlock 1996; McFarland 2001). As we will 
see, a christocentric anthropology begins with Christology but not in such a way as to collapse 
anthropology into Christology.    
16 Alternately, one might contend that this approach entails an illegitimate reliance on 
metaphysical speculation (see Grenz 2005:2) that is inappropriately applied to matters like these. 
Budenholzer rightly points out, however, that “if the history of modern philosophy…has taught us 
anything it is that any understanding of reality has its own scientific presuppositions….It is impossible to 
make foundational statements about the nature of physical theory without making statements about the 
basic nature of reality, that is, without making metaphysical assertions” (2003:63). The question, then, is 
not whether metaphysical presuppositions are appropriate in a consideration of human nature, but which 
set of metaphysical presuppositions one will adopt and whether one will do so in an intentional manner.  
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other disciplines. There is, therefore, no necessary connection between a christological 
approach to anthropological issues and the ghettoizing of theology. If such is the actual 
result of any particular theology, then, it stems from an inadequately applied Christology 
rather than something inherent to the perspective itself.  
Together these three issues suggest that the christocentric approach to theological 
anthropology, indeed to reality in general, has not yet been sufficiently “filled out and 
analyzed” (Nellas 1987:27). Any attempt to understand the nature of human ontology 
from a christologically determined vantage point will, therefore, need to be grounded on 
a more adequately developed methodological framework. It is with these concerns in 
mind that we turn to the christological anthropology of Karl Barth.    
 
3. Who is He?: The Centrality of Jesus Christ in the Theological Anthropology of Karl 
Barth 
Given the concerns mentioned in the previous section, Barth’s theological 
anthropology would seem well (or, possibly, uniquely) qualified to serve as the 
touchstone for our study. First, Barth’s theology is well known for its “radically 
christocentric” orientation (Balthasar 1992:30). That is, he “interprets all secular and 
worldly relations and realities in terms of Gods self-interpreting Word, Jesus Christ” 
(ibid.). Barth thus seeks to ensure that his theology is “Christologically determined” (I/2, 
123) throughout. This christological orientation is vividly on display in his consideration 
of the human person. For Barth, “The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the 
problem of human nature” (III/2 136).17 Thus, according to Ray Anderson, “Karl Barth, 
more than any other theologian of the church, including the Reformers, has developed a 
comprehensive theological anthropology by beginning with the humanity of Jesus Christ 
as both crucified and resurrected” (1982:18).  
Second, despite (or, more properly, because of) this christological emphasis, 
Barth does not fail to attend to the anthropological dimension. Indeed, the third volume 
of the Church Dogmatics is primarily devoted to understanding the relationship between 
God and humanity, the nature of human persons, and the character of human existence. 
The very nature of the anthropological question, however, has to be revised. Barth is 
keenly interested in understanding the nature of the human person, but he views this 
                                                 
17 Alan Torrance thus rightly points out the significance of the “Who” question throughout 
Barth’s theology (1996).  
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pursuit as a primarily christological endeavor. Thus, the anthropological question is 
significant, but it is secondary to the christological question: Who is Jesus Christ? Given 
this twofold emphasis on the centrality of Jesus Christ and the importance of theological 
anthropology, Barth would seem well positioned to serve as a model of the kind of 
christologically focused theological anthropology we have been discussing.   
Third, unlike many theologians who affirm the christological perspective on the 
human person, Barth commits a significant portion of III/2 to considering the 
methodological issues involved in such an approach.18 Barth thus addresses such issues 
as the impact of sin on human knowledge, the implications of Christ’s particularity for 
understanding human nature in general, and the significance of Jesus as both fully God 
and fully man for drawing conclusions about human persons. In this way Barth raises 
and clarifies many of the obstacles that a christocentric anthropology must surmount if it 
is to avoid some of the difficulties and excesses to which it can be susceptible. 
In addition to thinking through the methodological issues internal to the 
christological perspective, Barth also considers the implications that such an approach 
has for interdisciplinary dialogue. Although Barth’s theology has often been criticized at 
precisely this point,19 we will see that he is well aware of both the need for and the 
difficulties involved in recognizing and interacting with the insights and perspectives of 
other anthropological perspectives.20 Given the nature of the present project, Barth’s 
willingness to engage the implications of a christocentric anthropology for 
interdisciplinary dialogue stands out as particularly useful.   
Fifth, as we noted earlier, while many theologians affirm the christological 
approach to anthropology, few if any take up the question of human ontology and the 
body/soul relationship. Barth, by contrast, devotes an entire section of III/2 to precisely 
                                                 
18 Labeling Barth’s christocentrism as an “approach” should not be understood to imply that Barth 
believes that there are a number of different ways in which human persons, and reality in general, can be 
legitimately understood and that he simply adopts Christology as the clearest or most theologically tenable. 
Rather, as we will see in the next chapter, Barth views Christology as the only vantage point from which to 
view true human nature.  
19 See chapter 3. 
20 Of course, as Webster points out, Barth “did not consider it the task of church theology to 
follow paths other than those indicated by the Christian gospel or to identify common ground between 
Christian faith and other views of life” (2000b:10). But, this does not mean that Barth’s theology is 
necessarily opposed to an open dialogue with other disciplines when their contributions touch directly on 
theological concerns (see esp. III/2, 71-131).   
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this issue.21 Taking Christ as the starting point, Barth seeks to follow “the logic of the 
gospel” (T. Torrance 1986:294; cf. also Webster 2001b) and to allow that perspective to 
determine what theology ought to affirm about human ontology. Consequently, although 
we will see that Barth does not approach the mind/body discussion from the perspective 
of an ostensive “problem” in need of a theoretical solution (see chapter 4), Katherine 
Sonderegger is right to note that his theological perspective has not “blinded him to 
modern concerns in the field” (2000:64). Barth is, therefore, well aware that his 
christological starting point will have considerable implications for understanding the 
mind/body question and directly engages many of the pertinent issues.  
Finally, not only is this aspect of Barth’s theology worth studying for its unique 
ability to raise a host of methodological and material issues that are pertinent to the 
present study, but also because Barth’s approach to the mind/body question has been a 
decidedly underappreciated aspect of his theology.22 To date there are no English-
language studies of Barth’s anthropological ontology. Indeed, apart from a few general 
surveys, very few works engage §46 in more than a cursory fashion.23 This is 
unfortunate since, as we will see, the themes and ideas expressed in this section have a 
significant bearing on Barth’s understanding of a wide range of theological and 
philosophical issues.24 In this area, then, as in many others, Barth remains “a massive 
                                                 
21 Although we will see in chapter four that Barth was not primarily interested in developing a 
particular theory of human ontology, the nature and extent of his discussion indicates that he was 
concerned to develop a proper (i.e., christologically determined) understanding of the general structure of 
human ontology.  
22 According to McLean, “Barth's anthropology is buried in the doctrine of creation (CD III/2), 
and is, therefore, often skipped over in the reader's eagerness to get to the more central doctrine of 
reconciliation (CD IV). Thus is overlooked one of the richest discussions of anthropology in the western 
theological and philosophical tradition and also, perhaps more importantly, one of Barth's most detailed 
expositions of his content and method in relation to a subject available to our common experience and 
reflection” (1986:115; cf. Price 2002:6).  
23 Cf. Soucek 1949; Prenter 1950; Brunner 1951; Ebneter 1952; Friedmann 1972; Frey 1978; 
McLean 1975, 1981; Stock 1980; Whitehouse 1981; Krötke 2000. Among more recent studies, Price 
covers the mind/body relationship to some extent, but this is clearly peripheral to his main concerns 
(2002).   
24 The continued underappreciation of Barth’s contribution to understanding human ontology may 
well be the result of significant differences between Barth’s approach to theology and the analytic tradition 
of philosophy that dominates contemporary philosophy of mind. In an insightful autobiographical 
comment, Simon states, “I am a philosopher, trained in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. That 
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Christian thinker whose contribution to Christian theology is in many respects still 
waiting to be received” (Webster 2000a:1-2).  
Thus, by engaging Barth’s careful commitment to a christological vantage point 
and the implications that it generates for understanding human ontology, Barth’s 
theological anthropology provides a unique opportunity for developing an intriguing 
interdisciplinary dialogue.    
 
4. The Mind/Brain Debate Today, A Wide Open Field? 
At this point, then, it may be useful to make some brief comments on the current 
state of the mind/body debate. As we noted earlier in this chapter, the latter part of the 
twentieth century was marked by significant scientific and philosophical developments. 
These developments in turn contributed to a decisive shift in the modern understanding 
of the human person. While previously, some form of substance dualism had been the 
predominant view of human ontology, from the middle part of the twentieth century on, 
anthropological ontologies turned in a decidedly physicalist direction (cf. Burge 1992; 
Boyd 1998; Kim 1998a, 2004; Haldane 2000). The earliest forms of physicalism 
presented a highly reductive view of the human person as something that could be 
comprehensively understood within the parameters of the physical sciences alone (see 
chapter 5). This reductive stance, however, quickly gave way to more nonreductive 
approaches that portrayed the human person as a wholly physical being, but one that 
exceeds the conceptual grasp of the physical sciences alone.25 Despite this trend toward a 
less reductive understanding, the ontology of late-twentieth century philosophers of mind 
retained their pervasively physicalist character. Indeed, some like Daniel Dennett 
concluded that modern science had decisively refuted all forms of substance dualism 
such that this was no longer “a serious view to contend with” (1978).  
The end of the ontological debate, however, could not be declared so easily. First, 
despite the progress of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                
training is little help, and perhaps a handicap, in developing the amount of sympathy necessary for 
understanding the theology of Karl Barth” (2004:143). To which, John Webster can only remark, “Where I 
come from, the analytical philosophers are of a rather more obdurate frame of mind when it comes to 
Barth, whom they regard as a joke in several volumes” (2004a:159).  
25 Of course, reductive approaches did not give way entirely and are still promoted by thinkers 
like Paul and Patricia Churchland, Daniel C. Dennett, and Stephen P. Stich, among others.  
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twentieth century and especially in the “Decade of the Brain,” their accomplishments 
should not be overstated. Specifically, while these new disciplines have provided a 
wealth of information about the neurological underpinnings of human mentality, we 
remain limited in our ability to provide a theoretical framework for interpreting that 
information. As Steven Rose notes, “we are still data-rich and theory-poor” (2004:5). In 
other words, we have come to understand much about the nature of the brain, but we still 
possess only a very limited knowledge of the mind.26 We can see this theoretical 
limitation at work in the variety of ontological theories claiming the moniker 
“physicalism” and yet differing substantially in how human ontology should be 
understood—e.g., nonreductive physicalism (Van Gulick), dual-aspect monism (Jeeves), 
constitutional materialism (Corcoran), and emergent monism (O’Conner), as well as the 
more reductive forms that continue to have significant supporters (e.g., Dennett, 
Churchland, etc.). 
Another reason that we should not declare the end of the debate on human 
ontology, however, is the simple fact that non-physicalist theories have not gone away. 
Shortly after Dennett’s declaration of dualism’s demise, other thinkers were recognizing 
the true complexity of the debate (cf. Kripke 1980; Shoemaker 1984a). The latter part of 
the twentieth century saw a variety of philosophers step forward to defend various forms 
of substance dualism (e.g., Swinburne, Foster, Robinson, Hywel Lewis, Eccles, Lowe, 
and Plantinga). Indeed, the last several decades have witnessed the development, or 
rediscovery, of a number of non-physicalist ontologies that continue to resist the 
monistic impulse of physicalism—e.g., emergent dualism (Hasker), holistic dualism 
(Cooper), naturalistic dualism (Chalmers), integrative dualism (Taliaferro), and 
Thomistic dualism (Moreland), as well as other ontologies that do not fit easily into the 
physicalism/dualism framework like idealism (Foster), pluralism (Cartwright), and 
Aristotelian hylomorphism (Nussbaum). The continued vitality of non-physicalist 
understandings of the human person strongly suggests that even though a majority of 
contemporary philosophers would classify themselves as espousing some form of 
                                                 
26 Indeed, that is precisely why many called for a “Decade of the Mind” to follow the “Decade of 
the Brain” (cf. Borenstein 2001).  
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physicalism, the mind/body debate is still very much in question (see Corcoran 2001a; J. 
Green 2005).27
 
5. An Exercise in Christocentric Anthropology 
In this study, then, we will use the theological anthropology of Karl Barth as a 
springboard for exploring the implications of a christocentric anthropology for 
navigating the various theories involved in the contemporary mind/body debate. More 
specifically, the following chapters will seek to answer the following questions: What is 
a christocentric anthropology and what are its methodological and formal constraints? 
What resources does such a theological anthropology have for engaging in 
interdisciplinary dialogue? What implications can be drawn from a christological 
anthropology for understanding the ontological constitution of human persons? And, do 
those implications provide any assistance in understanding the complex array of 
proposals on display in contemporary philosophy of mind?  
In chapter two, then, we will focus on the formal and methodological parameters 
of Barth’s theological anthropology as expressed primarily in the opening paragraphs of 
Church Dogmatics III/2. Tracing Barth’s discussion will lead to a clearer understanding 
of how he determines that theological anthropology is grounded on Christology but in 
such a way that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. In this chapter, then, we will 
look at the formal and methodological implications raised by Barth’s understanding of 
the relationship between these two doctrinal loci.  
Chapter three advances the discussion by considering the extent to which such an 
anthropology can engage in interdisciplinary dialogue. Despite the concerns and 
objections of many theologians, we will see in this chapter that Barth’s christocentric 
approach to theology does not necessarily preclude such dialogue. Instead, we will see 
that it is precisely Barth’s commitment to his christological perspective that enables the 
                                                 
27 Haldane, however, points out that the debate is far more constricted than is often appreciated. 
He asserts, “Anyone who reads extensively within contemporary philosophy of mind and reflects upon 
what they have been studying should feel the discomfort of intellectual claustrophobia. Notwithstanding 
that the subject is widely and actively pursued its content is remarkably confined. The boundaries of 
possibility are taken to stand close to one another and the available options are correspondingly few” 
(1991:92). While this may be true, the divide between physicalist and dualist approaches remains a 
contentious one.  
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possibility of a conversation in which the particularity of the various conversation 
partners is valued and their insights recognized.  
Having established the possibility of interdisciplinary dialogue, chapter four will 
lay out the ontological implications of Barth’s christocentric anthropology that will be 
the necessary components of any christologically adequate view of human persons. As 
we will see, Barth was well aware that his image of Jesus as the “true human” should 
have direct bearing on our understanding of what the ontology of true humanity entails. 
Specifically, his christologically driven analysis of human ontology entails, at least, that 
human ontology is characterized by selfhood, phenomenal consciousness, continuous 
personal identity, personal agency, mental causation, freedom, embodiment, and 
ontological contingence. These commitments will, therefore, serve as the criteria by 
which the christological validity of any particular theory of human ontology must be 
evaluated.  
Finally, the last two chapters will apply these ontological criteria to several 
ontological theories that are prominent in contemporary philosophy of mind. First, in 
chapter 5, we will consider a variety of proposals that view the human person as a 
physical being, but not one that can be reductively understood in terms of the physical 
sciences alone. After defining the nature of such physicalist ontologies and surveying 
some of the specific proposals that constitute nonreductive versions of physicalism, we 
will consider three ways in which these theories could be susceptible to critique from a 
christological perspective: mental causation, phenomenal consciousness, and continuity 
of personal identity. Chapter six comprises a similar investigation with respect to dualist 
ontologies; specifically those that espouse a more holistic approach to the human person 
than is traditionally associated with Cartesian dualism. Consequently, the chapter first 
explores the more traditional understanding of dualism and then contrasts it with the 
more holistic approaches generally espoused by modern dualists. The chapter then 
moves into a consideration of three areas of potential critique: mental causation, personal 
embodiment, and the contingent status of human persons.  
Through the course of these last two chapters, we will see that the christological 
perspective and the ontological commitments entailed by a christocentric anthropology 
have direct bearing on the questions being asked by contemporary philosophers of mind. 
We will not find any “knockdown arguments” for or against any of the various 
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proposals.28 We will, however, move the discussion forward in two ways. First, we will 
establish on the basis of a christological analysis of human nature the paradigmatic 
framework within which any particular anthropological theory must function. Although 
the details of this framework will be very familiar to anyone working in philosophy of 
mind, indeed, they roughly correspond to what might be considered the “common sense” 
understanding of humanity, we will have established this framework on the firm 
theological ground of Jesus’ person and work. Second, we will identify various strengths 
that each of the ontological proposals brings to the table as well as several prominent 
weaknesses that must be addressed in future proposals if these are to remain 
christologically viable candidates for an anthropological ontology.  
Given the wide-ranging nature of this study, we will need to establish carefully 
the parameters of the discussion in three areas. First, a large number of studies have been 
devoted to the biblical material related to the ontological constitution of the human 
person.29 Although the majority of recent biblical scholars have argued in favor of a 
physicalist depiction of the person in the Bible,30 there is no shortage of scholars 
contending for a more dualistic conception (e.g., Osei-Bonsu 1987; Cooper 1998, 2000; 
Wright 2003). In this study, however, since our focus will be on drawing christological 
implications for human ontology, we will not engage these exegetical debates directly. 
Without diminishing the importance of these exegetical discussions, we will concur with 
a number of recent scholars that the depth and complexity of the issues involved in the 
mind/brain debate are unlikely to be resolved at the level of biblical interpretation 
alone.31  
                                                 
28 Indeed, as Joel Green argues, “whether one is thinking, say, of Scripture or human experience, 
we find no knockdown arguments favoring one view to the exclusion of another” (2005:23).  
29 Among the classic older studies are Eichrodt 1951; J. Robinson 1952; Bultmann 1955; Kümmel 
1963; R. Jewett 1971; Wolff 1974; and Gundry 1976.  
30 In a number of recent articles, Joel Green convincingly demonstrates and exemplifies the 
predominantly physicalist orientation of most contemporary biblical scholars (cf. 1998; 2002a; 2002b; 
2004a; 2004b); a point that is not disputed by dualist biblical scholars (c.f., Cooper 1988:19).  
31 As many theologians have pointed out, the Bible makes no attempt to present a theoretically 
rigorous view of human ontology (e.g., Cooper 1982:15; Moreland and Rae 2000:33; L. Baker 2004:336). 
But, as Barth rightly notes, “Dogmatics must have the freedom to take up questions and concerns which 
cannot be answered directly either by individual scriptural phrases or by reference to specific biblical 
contexts of thought, and which cannot be those of exegesis, because they arise only in the Church which 
listens to the voice of Scripture and teaches on this basis” (I/2, 821-822).  
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A second set of parameters must be put into place with respect to Barth’s own 
writings. Given the size, range, and depth of his various books, our study will focus its 
attention primarily on Barth’s extended discussion of theological anthropology in III/2. 
This does not mean, of course, that we will ignore Barth’s other writings.32 On the 
contrary, the various aspects of Barth’s theology are “developed at such depth and 
breadth that it is now impossible to give a definitive exposition of any one part…without 
making some reference to almost every other part” (Come 1963:71; cf. also Sykes 
1979b:2; Hunsinger 1991:28; Jenson 1997:28; Hauerwas 2001:180-181; Webster 
2000b). Thus, although our study will focus primarily on III/2, we will find it necessary 
to draw on Barth’s discussions elsewhere in his writings in an effort to present an 
adequate understanding of his anthropology. 
Finally, the vast quantity of material written on the mind/body relationship in 
philosophy, science, and theology would swamp any individual study. Even the material 
written just in the last twenty years comprises a daunting mountain of information. The 
focus of our discussion in chapters five and six must, therefore, be carefully 
circumscribed. To that end, we will limit our discussions to two sets of theories that 
together comprise the physicalist and dualist approaches adopted by the majority of 
contemporary philosophers, focusing specifically on several key areas in which those 
proposals might be seen to be in tension with a christological perspective. We will 
address other issues only insofar as it is necessary to clarify the questions and concerns 
of our study.33  
Fundamentally, then, this study is an exercise in understanding the nature of a 
christocentric anthropology and its implications for understanding human ontology. 
Since the approach that has been laid out will require us to devote considerable attention 
both to the theology of Karl Barth and to a number of contemporary philosophers of 
                                                 
32 Friedmann rightly warns against the dangerous imbalance often resulting from an undue focus 
on just one of Barth’s many writings (1972:13).  
33 Several recent philosophers have questioned the practice of adopting a physicalist/dualist 
framework for addressing the mind/body problem and have argued for a form of ontological pluralism that 
seeks to transcend the limitations of the dipolar approach (e.g., van Gelder 1998; Cartwright 1999; Gillett 
2003).  Although this criticism is worth considering, this study adopts the physicalist/dualist framework for 
the simple reason that most contemporary philosophers still fall into one of these two categories. This does 
not mean, however, that ontologies which do not fit neatly into this dipolar scheme will be ignored. Rather, 
we will use this dipolar framework to raise the most fundamental philosophical issues involved in the 
development of any ontological theory. 
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mind, this study can be appreciated as contributing (1) to the ongoing project of 
understanding Karl Barth by providing an analysis of an underappreciated aspect of his 
theology and (2) to contemporary philosophy of mind by clarifying, analyzing, and 
evaluating a number of recent proposals regarding the mind/body relationship. 
Fundamentally, however, this study aims to draw together these apparently disparate 
fields of inquiry by engaging both theology and philosophy in a vital dialogue on the 
nature of the human person as revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  
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Chapter 2 
From Christology to Anthropology: 
The Ontological Determination of Humanity in Karl Barth’s Theological 
Anthropology  
 
1. Christology and Anthropology: The Christocentric Shape of Barth’s Theological 
Anthropology 
Barth’s understanding of humanity in its relation to God has long attracted 
attention as one of the most creative, ground-breaking, and influential aspects of his 
theology. T. F. Torrance referred to it as “in some ways the most arresting aspect of 
Barth’s theology” (1990:22) and according to Herbert Hartwell it “is revolutionary in 
content” (1964:123). Barth himself recognized that his theological anthropology 
comprised such a serious departure from traditional theology that he thought it deviated 
even more than his famous doctrine of predestination (p. ix).1   
The point at which this divergence originates is the consistency with which Barth 
carried out his christocentric conviction in developing his theological anthropology. As 
Hartwell describes it:  
 
 The traditional dogmatic way of thinking is here once more 
radically reversed. He does not start from the phenomena of the human in 
general as they present themselves to the philosopher or the scientist. He 
does not begin, as the anthropology of traditional Christian dogmatics 
usually does, with the problem of the constitution of man’s being, of 
man’s existence [Dasein] and nature [Sosein] in order to proceed from 
there to the human nature of Jesus Christ in particular. On the contrary, he 
derives his concept of man, of real man, from the human nature of the one 
particular man Jesus Christ who, because He is shown to be the revealing 
Word of God also in respect of the true nature of man, is treated as the 
source of our knowledge of man as God created him. (1964:123) 
 
                                                 
1 We will see, though, that the substantial departure evidenced in his anthropology is grounded in 
his unique understanding of election and, thus, the two departures cannot be so neatly distinguished.  
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This summary raises a number of important questions for understanding the 
nature of Barth’s task in III/2. Why does Barth approach anthropology christologically? 
Does he understand this methodology exclusively or are there other avenues to 
anthropological knowledge? Who is Jesus and what exactly does he reveal about the 
human person? How can any particular individual play this constitutive role given the 
tremendous diversity of human nature and reality? What is the precise relationship 
between Christology and anthropology as theological loci? Is this christological 
approach sufficient to engage the difficult questions faced by real people or is it a merely 
idealistic system abstracted from everyday realities? Questions like these raise some of 
the interesting formal and material issues that need to be answered if we are to appreciate 
fully Barth’s christocentric theology. Although complete answers to these questions lie 
beyond the scope of this study, the next two chapters will explore some of the 
implications involved as they analyze the manner in which Barth develops and supports 
his understanding of human ontology in the context of the anthropological discussions of 
III/2.2  
While Barth divided III/2 into five paragraphs, the work actually addresses three 
main issues: the method, the form, and the content of a christological anthropology.3 
                                                 
2 While Barth’s anthropological discussions are found throughout the Dogmatics (particularly in 
the other parts of vol. III as well as IV/1 and IV/2), III/2 can usefully serve as the staging point of any 
analysis of his anthropology as the one place where Barth develops it as a doctrinal locus in its own right. 
The scope of this work precludes any attempt to address or even to summarize adequately its entire 
presentation and all the corresponding difficulties. Indeed, as Soucek noted, “the work is so vast, so full of 
complex views and illustrations and so subtly shaded, that any attempt to summarise it…must run the risk 
of inadequate and inaccurate interpretation in some respect” (Soucek 1949:75). But, an understanding of 
the method and form of Barth’s anthropology is absolutely necessary for understanding the content of his 
anthropology and thus for any meaningful engagement with his approach to human ontology. So, the next 
two chapters will risk the inadequacies that accompany any attempt to summarize Barth’s theology as 
necessary for the discussions that will follow later in the study. 
3 There is a danger to characterizing Barth’s theology in this way if it is understood to indicate a 
division rather than a distinction between form and content. As the following discussion should make 
clear, an inseparable relationship obtains between the formal elements of Barth’s theology and more 
material considerations.  As Stuart McLean observed, for Barth “form and content are bound up together 
and should be separated only for the purpose of speech. Even then, speech itself must constantly attempt to 
reveal that they are together” (1981:12; see also Balthasar 1992:47-55 and McCormack 1999:476-477). 
The distinction indicated here, then, is not intended to deny this inseparability but rather to recognize that 
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Barth lays out his basic methodological moves in the first paragraph (§43), “Man as a 
Problem of Dogmatics.” There he articulates the methodological principles that will 
guide the development of the entire work. The form of Barth’s anthropology is the topic 
of the second paragraph (§44), “Man as the Creature of God.” There Barth considers the 
person and work of Jesus and the corresponding revelation of the basic criteria for true 
humanity. Finally, Barth lays out the content of his anthropology in the final three 
paragraphs covering, respectively, humanity’s essential relationality (§45), the human 
person as the soul of her body (§46), and the temporality of human existence (§47).4
In order to understand his discussion of human ontology in §46, then, it will be 
necessary to appreciate the formal, material, and methodological moves that he makes in 
the earlier sections. Consequently, in the next two chapters we will consider (1) the basic 
shape and methodology of Barth’s christological anthropology and (2) the nature of 
Barth’s christocentrism and its relationship to interdisciplinary dialogue.   
 
2. The Theanthropological Twist in Barth’s Doctrine of Creation 
Understanding Barth’s theological anthropology requires placing it in the context 
of his overall doctrine of creation. In his development of this doctrine, Barth argues 
counterintuitively that the proper object of a theology of creation cannot be creation 
itself. There are three important steps in the way Barth formulates this proposition. First, 
he contends that the concept of a creation in itself is an improper abstraction with no 
concrete reality since term creation necessarily implies a creator (p. 3). As Barth argued 
extensively in III/1, “The Work of Creation,” all creation receives both its existence and 
essence as “an absolute gift of God” and thus stands in a relationship of “absolute 
dependence” to God and is necessarily determined by His grace (III/1, 15).5 The 
                                                                                                                                                
in III/2 Barth addresses primarily formal issues (the methodology and criteria of anthropology) before 
moving on to more properly material ones.  
4 The discussion of the content of Barth’s theology in chapter 3 will be limited to Barth’s 
consideration of human ontology in §46. There are a number of other studies of Barth’s theology that 
provide useful insights into his understanding of humanity’s essential relationality (e.g., Deddo 1994:183-
222; Price 2002; McLean 1981; and Miell 1989: 541-555) and his arguments for the necessary temporality 
of the human person (e.g., Roberts 199; Camfield 1950; Runia 1958; and Jenson 1969). 
5 Of course, as Balthasar points out, Barth’s notion of “absolute dependence” is markedly 
different from Schleiermacher’s well-known approach (1992:225). And according to Webster this 
dependence should not be understood in terms of a “continuous creation in which the created realm has no 
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essential relatedness of creation to God means that creation cannot be properly 
understood apart from its revelation in the Word since no phenomenological 
consideration of creation can reveal this necessary determination (ibid., 3-41).6 True 
knowledge of creation—i.e., knowledge of its absolute dependence on the Creator—is, 
therefore, an act of faith. Knowledge of God is prior to knowledge of creation: theology 
proper before theology of creation.7
That creation in itself is not the proper focus of a theology of creation, however, 
involves a second important point for Barth: “in practice the doctrine of creation means 
anthropology” (p. 3). Barth devoted the second paragraph of III/1 to an extended 
discussion of the relationship between creation and covenant. In it, he famously argued 
that creation is “the external basis of the covenant” (III/1, 94), and covenant “the internal 
basis of creation” (ibid., 95). In other words, God’s decision to establish a covenantal 
relationship between himself and something other than himself stands as the eternal 
ground for the creation and continued existence of all creaturely reality. Creation, 
therefore, exists as the corresponding “presupposition” on the basis of which and the 
“theatre” within which this covenantal relationship becomes a reality (ibid., 96-99). 
However, the covenantal love of God, though encompassing all of creation (ibid., pp. 
363-364),8 finds its “centre” (ibid., 20) and clearest expression in humanity who alone 
was created to be God’s true covenantal counterpart (ibid., 184) and thus “represents the 
                                                                                                                                                
substance of its own” but as a relationship whereby God “evokes and sustains” the real existence of the 
creature (2001a:61-62).  
6 Barth thus argues that even one’s knowledge that heaven and earth are created realities is part of 
the “credo” and thus an act of faith (III/1, 3).  
7 George Hendry argues that Barth exhibits a dependence on Kant’s philosophy at this point, but 
fails to demonstrate anything more than a formal similarity (1984: 219-220).  
8 The rest of creation has its own relationship with the creator but the “inner mystery” of this 
relationship has not been revealed to humans and can only be extrapolated on the basis of the God-human 
relationship (III/2, 18). The fact that the Creator-creation relationship is actually manifested 
theanthropically, however, means that the doctrine of creation is not lost but is rather established on a solid 
basis “as a doctrine of man” (ibid., 19). Some have indicated that this inversion of the relationship between 
the doctrines of creation and anthropology indicates a denigration of creation (cf. C. Green 2004). On the 
contrary, however, he strongly affirms that other creatures have “their own dignity and right” as they exist 
“in the secret of their own relation to the Creator” (ibid., 4). Our approach to creation cannot be 
characterized by “blindness, indifference, or disparagement” in a misguided attempt to abstract humanity 
from its essential relationship to creation (ibid.), even as we recognize the distinction between them 
revealed through humanity’s role as God’s covenantal counterpart. 
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secret of the creature” (ibid., 18). The logic of Barth’s argument is rather simple: if 
creation can only be understood on the basis of the covenant and if the covenant centers 
on God’s relationship with humanity, then creation can only be understood in terms of 
this theanthropic relationship (cf. Barth 1982a:11).9 This means that, contrary to 
common practice, anthropology cannot be approached as a subset of a larger theology of 
creation but must rather be its focal point.10
The theanthropic turn in Barth’s argument, though, is itself grounded in the third 
and most fundamental aspect of his methodology; as a theology of creation is grounded 
in theanthropology, so theanthropology is grounded in Christology. As creation cannot 
be understood apart from Creator neither can humanity be abstracted from its 
relationship to God.11 For Barth, “man must be understood as a being which from the 
very outset stands in some kind of relationship to God” (p. 72). Similarly he states, “The 
being of man is from its very origin and basis a being with God, because man is made 
and determined for covenant with God” (p. 344).12 This means that humanity “is 
ontically and therefore noetically dependent on the fact that he is not without God” (p. 
345).13 But, as will be addressed later in this chapter, the relationship between God and 
                                                 
9 Webster notes that, although some argue that this theanthropic turn took place late in Barth’s 
theological development, it actually predates the Dogmatics by at least a decade (2001c:58).  
10 It is at this point that Barth engages in his famous polemic against cosmological world-views 
(III/2, 4-13). He contends that theology is not properly concerned with cosmologies (theories on the 
structure and dynamics of the total universe), but with the relationship between humanity and God, which 
is the primary theme of Scripture (ibid., 19). Although cosmological accounts are necessary aspects of our 
understanding of the world, even the Bible adopted the cosmological beliefs of the surrounding cultures 
(ibid., 7-8), theology must critically appropriate such world-views without sanctioning them or becoming 
overtly identified with them (ibid., 8-10). 
11 Indeed, it is only in encounter with the Word that the human person “becomes clear to himself” 
(I/2, 705).  
12 Barth’s contention that covenantal relationality is of constitutive significance for understanding 
human nature plays a prominent role in his understanding of the imago Dei. He argues that humans are 
made in the image of God inasmuch as they are beings-in-relationship and therefore model the intra-
relationality of the Triune God (see III/1, 184-191). Humanity’s creation as male and female, according to 
Barth, is the ultimate demonstration of humanity’s relationality (ibid., 288-310; cf. also III/2, 285-324) and 
is thus the “climax and conclusion” of creation (ibid., 288) as the primary model of the covenantal 
relationship between God and humanity (ibid., 311-321).  
13 The fact that, for Barth, ontic dependence necessitates noetic dependence is one of the key 
elements of his theology in general, and thus his anthropology in particular. R. Brown, however, disputes 
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humanity is fully revealed only in the person of Jesus, who is the unique union of true 
deity and true humanity.14 Thus, it is in the person of Jesus Christ alone “that God 
Himself has revealed the relationship between Creator and creature—its basis, norm and 
meaning” (III/1, 25). While Barth can affirm that the human person, as God’s 
counterpart, is “at the heart of the cosmos” (ibid., 28), it is ultimately Jesus who is the 
full revelation of the God-creature relationship.15 Jesus alone is “the Fulfiller of the 
covenant” (ibid., 332) and thus “the meaning and end of creation” (ibid., 377). This 
christocentric turn indicates that as creation cannot be understood apart from the 
knowledge of the God-creature relationship manifested in humanity, neither can 
humanity be understood apart from the God-human relationship manifested in Jesus 
Christ. So, for Barth, “the man Jesus…is the source [Quelle] of our knowledge of the 
nature of man [menschlichen Wesens] as created by God” (p. 41).16 This “means nothing 
more nor less than the founding of anthropology on Christology” (p. 44).17
 
                                                                                                                                                
that there are any good exegetical, logical, or metaphysical reasons for maintaining the necessity of this 
connection (1980:533-549). Though he makes some good points suggesting that the connection between 
ontic and noetic dependence may not be as strong as Barth believes them to be, Brown’s argument that this 
constitutes a decisive undermining of Barth’s view on natural theology is less convincing. Even without 
basing noetic dependence on ontic dependence, it seems perfectly reasonable to maintain Barth’s view that 
the sovereign freedom and mystery of God necessitate noetic dependency (see II/1, 63-254).  
14 Even a brief consideration of the substance of Barth’s Christology lies outside the scope of this 
thesis. I will thus follow Hunsinger’s account of the basically Chalcedonian nature of Barth’s Christology 
(2000b:131-147). Hunsinger disagrees with studies that find Barth’s Christology to be essentially 
Alexandrian (e.g., Hartwell 1964:78-79; and Waldrop 1984]) or Antiochene (e.g., McIntyre 1966, esp. pp. 
154f.). According to Hunsinger, Barth believes that the nature of the incarnation is such that humans 
cannot conceptualize both Christ’s full deity and his full humanity at the same time. Consequently, it 
becomes necessary to juxtapose both an Alexandrian and an Antiochene approach in an attempt to do 
justice to the Chalcedonian faith.   
15 Barth balances the epistemological orientation of this argument by noting that Jesus is also the 
ontological ground of creation as its creator and preserver (ibid.).  
16 Whether he is the only source of such knowledge is a question that will be addressed in the next 
chapter.  
17 As Alan Torrance summarizes, “If theological anthropology is to be grounded in a proper 
understanding of creation, of the relation of the Creator to the creature, and if it is to concern authentic 
human existence, it begins neither with the self-understanding of humanity in general nor with generic 
accounts reflecting naturalistic observations. Rather, Barth believed, it can begin only with the one who is 
truly human, that is, with Jesus Christ, the Second Adam” (2004:205-206). 
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3. The Ontological Determination of Human Persons In Jesus Christ 
Barth’s conviction that anthropology must be founded on Christology is clearly 
evidenced in III/2 where each section begins with an explicit consideration of God’s self-
revelation in Jesus and its import for anthropology.18 While the human person might be a 
mystery to herself, the Word provides true and reliable insight into her nature and the 
reality of her existence. On this basis Barth begins developing the constructive element 
of his theological anthropology by stating his central anthropological principle: 
 
The ontological determination [ontologische Bestimmung] of 
humanity is grounded in the fact that one man [Menschen] among all 
others is the man [der Mensch] Jesus. So long as we select any other 
starting point for our study, we shall reach only the phenomena of the 
human. We are condemned to abstractions so long as our attention is 
riveted as it were on other men, or rather on man in general, as if we 
could learn about real man [wirklich Menschen] from a study of man in 
general, and in abstraction from the fact that one man among all others is 
the man Jesus. In this case we miss the one Archimedean point given us 
beyond humanity, and therefore the one possibility of discovering the 
ontological determination of man. Theological anthropology has no 
choice in this matter. It is not yet or no longer theological anthropology if 
it tries to pose and answer the question of the true being of man [des 
Menschen Sein und Wesen] from any other angle. (p. 132) 
 
Thus, the question of Psalm 8, “What is man?” is answered in Christ, and he 
alone must be the focus of any attempt to see humanity as it really is, “in concreto” (p. 
41). Human nature, therefore, is not something that can be known as “a neutral point 
[neutraler Punkt]” but rather must be “explained” by Jesus as it is manifested in his 
concrete existence (p. 59). 
 
                                                 
18See Shults 2003:120.  
 24
3.1. Grounded in the Decree: The Subject and Object of the Eternal Decree of 
Election 
 What does it mean to say that “the ontological determination of humanity is 
grounded” in the man Jesus? For Barth this means first that humanity is ontologically 
determined by election: “the being of man as a being with Jesus rests upon the election 
of God” (p. 142).19 “To be a man is thus to be with the One who is the true and primary 
Elect of God” (p. 145).20 An understanding of the ontological determination of humanity 
will therefore require an understanding of Barth’s doctrine of election.21  
Barth developed his rather unique approach to the doctrine of election primarily 
in II/2.22 His “fundamental thesis,” according to Bruce McCormack, was that “Jesus 
                                                 
19 Berkouwer comments that the epistemological centrality of Christ has been a common 
approach to theological anthropology, but that the real turn in Barth’s anthropology is this turn to the 
ontological centrality of Christ’s humanity (1962:92). He goes on to argue, however, that Barth is not 
consistently christological on this point. He contends that Barth grounds his anthropology both on its 
ontological determination in Christ and on the idea of its absolute creaturely dependence (ibid., 94-95). But 
it is not clear that Barth would be able to distinguish so neatly between creaturely dependence and 
christological determination with respect to the human person such that he would perceive them to be 
independent grounds for his anthropology. The criticism also fails to realize that Barth’s christocentrism 
requires all anthropological thinking to begin with Christology, not that it must remain there.  
20 John Thompson points out that even though Barth understands election christocentrically we 
should recognize the significant pneumatological aspects of his presentation as well (1991:34-35).  
21 As Ebneter rightly notes, then, Barth’s anthropological christocentrism cannot be understood in 
isolation from his doctrine of election (1952:11). Our task at this point, however, cannot be a detailed 
analysis of election itself, as this lies beyond the scope of the study. Rather, we sill simply summarize 
Barth’s understanding of election as a means of understanding how he develops and applies it in III/2. For 
more comprehensive discussions of Barth’s doctrine of election see Cunningham 1995; McCormack 
1999:470-493 and 2000:92-110; F. Clark 1984:229-245; Colwell 1989; McDowell 2003a; O’Neill 
2004:311-326. 
22 In the preface to this work, as in III/2, Barth acknowledged that his view of election left “the 
framework of theological tradition to a far greater extent” than the earlier parts of his doctrine of God (II/2, 
x). But he felt this was necessary both because of his reading of Scripture (see II/2, 35; cf. also 
Cunningham 1995:11) and because he thought that even when earlier theologians acknowledged both the 
importance of election and of thinking christologically about election, they failed to carry through this 
christological interpretation sufficiently (II/2, 60-76; 147-154). They thus ended up with a doctrine of 
predestination that was mired in mystery at both ends: the decretum absolutum of a hidden God and an 
unknown and unknowable (humanly speaking) number of elect (II/2, 158-161). On the contrary, he 
asserted that a true knowledge of both God and humanity is only possible through the theanthropic 
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Christ is both the Subject of election and its Object, the electing God and the elect 
human” (2000:93).23 Affirming Jesus as the “Elected” meant not only that the man Jesus 
had been elected as Messiah and that his election was soteriologically foundational to 
that of other human beings, who are also among the elect, but, more importantly, that 
Jesus was “the sole Object [der Gegesntand] of this good-pleasure” (II/2, 104) such that 
all others are only ‘elect’ in so far as they are “united in Him and represented by Him” 
(II/2, 105).24 So, “Jesus Christ…is not merely one of the elect but the elect of God. From 
the very beginning (from eternity itself), as elected man He does not stand alongside the 
rest of the elect, but before and above them as the One who is originally and properly the 
Elect [der ursprünglich und eignetlich Erwählte]” (II/2, 116). “In the strict sense only He 
can be understood and described as ‘elected’ (and ‘rejected’). All others are so in Him, 
and not as individuals” (ibid., 43). By affirming that Jesus is also the “Elector” (ibid., 
105), Barth argued for the pre-existence of the man Jesus in union with the eternal Logos 
and thus as the subject of God’s act of election.25 Since the man Jesus is the eternal act 
of election, he exists in an eternal union with the Logos and as such is the Subject as well 
as the Object of election (ibid., 94).26  
                                                                                                                                                
relationship grounded in the eternal election of Jesus Christ. Barth thus argued that we cannot know God 
properly apart from his eternal decision to relate himself to something external to himself (II/2, 6) and that 
Jesus Christ is himself the eternal and irreversible self-determination of this relationship (II/2, 7). 
23 See II/2, 9-11; 94-145, esp. 103-105. 
24 For Barth, understanding Jesus as the primary object of election was required by the evn auvtw/| of 
Eph. 1:4 (II/2, 105). So he argues: “From the very beginning (from eternity itself), there are no other elect 
together with or apart from Him, but, as Eph. 1:4 tells us, only ‘in’ Him. ‘In Him’ does not simply mean 
with Him, together with Him, in His company. Nor does it mean only through Him, by means of that 
which He as elected man can be and do for them. ‘In Him’ means in His person, in His will, in His own 
divine choice, in the basic decision of God which He fulfils over against every man. What singles Him out 
from the rest of the elect, and yet also, and for the first time, unites Him with them, is the fact that as 
elected man He is also the electing God, electing them in His own humanity” (ibid., 116-117).  
25 Barth supports the pre-existence of the man Jesus primarily through his exegesis of John 1:1-2 
(II/2, 95-99). There he contends that the ou-toj of v. 2 refers proleptically to the incarnate Word (v. 14) 
about whom John testified (v. 15) and that this, therefore, identifies the man Jesus in a pre-nativity union 
with the eternally existing Logos (ibid., 98). For a good discussion of some of the objections that have 
been raised to Barth’s understanding of the pre-existence of the man Jesus see J. Thompson 1976:261-264.  
26 This is the basis of Barth’s famous rejection of a Logos asarkos (cf. IV/1, 52-53; see also J. 
Thompson 1976:256). 
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Both of these points are important for understanding the constitutive relationship 
between Jesus’ election and the rest of humanity. Jesus is the ontological determination 
of humanity because “His election includes ours within itself and because ours is 
grounded in His. We are elected together with Him in so far as we are elected ‘in Him’” 
(ibid., 120). Thus, the God-human relationship that is determinative for what it means to 
be human is eternally grounded in “this one man Jesus” whom “God puts at the head and 
in the place of all other men” (ibid.).27 He alone is able to ground humanity in this 
relationship and to secure it from surrendering this essential determination.28 The 
ontological decisiveness of Jesus as Elect, however, is itself grounded on his status as the 
Elector. That Jesus’ election is ontologically decisive and not simply the epistemological 
manifestation of a general election is established by the fact that “He Himself is the One 
who elects us” (ibid., 115). Without his status as Elector, Barth argued, we would not be 
able to maintain the ontological decisiveness of his election:  
 
Now without our first assertion we cannot maintain such a 
position. For where can Jesus Christ derive the authority and power to be 
Lord and Head of all others, and how can these others be elected ‘in 
Him’, and how can they see their election in Him the first of the elect, and 
how can they find in His election the assurance of their own, if He is only 
the object of election and not Himself its Subject.” (ibid., 116) 
 
Barth thus concludes that Jesus is “the original and all-inclusive election; the 
election which is absolutely unique,” but that this election is only “universally 
                                                 
27 According to Jüngel this “primal decision constitutes the primal relationship of God to man and 
in this primal relationship there takes place the ‘primal history’ in which God already has a relationship to 
man before all creation” (2001:88-89; cf. II/2, 12-13).  
28 As Barth says elsewhere, “In Christian doctrine...we have always to take in blind 
seriousness…that our life is hid with Christ in God. With Christ: never at all apart from him, never at all 
independently of him, never at all in and for itself. We as human beings never at all exist in 
ourselves….We exist as human beings in Jesus Christ and in him alone….The being and nature of human 
beings in and for themselves as independent bearers of and independent predicate, have, by the revelation 
of Jesus Christ, become an abstraction which can be destined only to disappear” (II/1, 149). 
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meaningful and efficacious, because it is the election of Him who Himself elects” (ibid., 
117).29  
 
To the extent that he is with Jesus and therefore with God, man 
himself is a creature elected in the divine election of grace, i.e., elected 
along with or into Jesus. He is elected to the extent that he derives from 
God, which means concretely that his being rests upon the election of 
God, namely, the election of the one man Jesus….He is elected to the 
extent that as man he is a creature whom the election of the man 
Jesus…immediately concerns. (III/2, 145) 
                                                 
29 A number of concerns have been raised regarding Barth’s doctrine of election. O’Neill usefully 
summarizes three of the most common as (1) its Scriptural basis; (2) its universalistic implications; and (3) 
concerns about whether it vitiates human history and agency (2004:311). With respect to the first, 
Cunningham correctly asserts that at the very least we must recognize that Barth’s primary concern was to 
remain exegetically faithful (1995: cf. esp. p. 9-11). And as John Thompson points out, even if one 
disagrees with Barth’s exegesis, it must be acknowledged that his interpretation is at least exegetically 
tenable (1976:266). Regarding universalism, despite Barth’s strong disavowals of a necessary universalism 
in his theology (e.g., II/2, 295, 416-419, 476-477), his theology has been consistently accused of resulting 
in just such a position (e.g., Berkouwer 1956:262-296; Brunner 1951:123-135; Ebneter 1952:37-38; and 
more recently McGrath 1997:456). A number of studies, however, have argued convincingly that Barth’s 
doctrine of election is quite consistent with his agnostic position on the apokastasis question (cf. esp., 
Bettis 1967:423-436, Colwell 1989:231-269, and O’Neill 2004; cf. also T. Torrance 1990:319-320 and 
Hartwell 1964:110-112). The final concern involves that of “narrowing” everything to Christology such 
that it vitiates creaturely history and agency of real meaning (Balthasar 1992:242; cf. also Come 1963:152-
157; Willis 1971:236ff.; McGrath 1986:105-106; Muers 1999:268-269; Deegan 1961; and Biggar 1993:5). 
Colin Gunton suggests that the problem is an imbalance in Barth’s theology caused by inadequate 
Trinitarian and pneumatological views and a certain level of unsophistication in his development of human 
freedom (1989:55ff.; cf. Macken 1990). A number of studies, however, particularly those by John 
Webster, have demonstrated rather convincingly that the problems revolve around a failure to appreciate 
the dialectic involved in Barth’s redefinition of human freedom as a determinate correspondence of 
freedom for God (see McLean 1981:60-62; McCormack 2000:106; J. Webster 1995; 1998). Several 
theologians also argue that this criticism misses Barth’s understanding of the “enhypostatic” nature of 
humanity’s relationship to Jesus; as Jesus’ human nature exists enhypostatically in union with the Word so 
all human nature exists enhypostatically in union with Jesus (e.g., Dalferth 1989:29; Webster 1998:88-89; 
I. Davidson, 2001:129-154; and Tanner 2001:56-58). The ontological determination of the human person 
in Christ, therefore, does not vitiate human freedom any more than the incarnation vitiates the freedom of 
Jesus (see Webster 1989:89 n. 39, for resources on the anhypostatic/enhypostatic formula).  
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 The christological orientation of Barth’s doctrine of election, thus establishes 
Jesus’ election as the ontological determination of all humanity. 
In III/2 the ontological decisiveness of Jesus’ election serves as the cornerstone 
for Barth’s christological anthropology: “The formal definition that the being of man 
[menschliche Sein] derives from God is given a first and material content when we recall 
the gracious divine election of the man Jesus” (p. 145). Barth grounds the centrality of 
election for theological anthropology on the premise that since Jesus is (1) the primary 
object and subject of election, and thus the primary revelation of the relationship 
between God and humanity, and (2) Jesus alone has lived a sinless life in response to and 
fulfillment of that relationship, then Jesus is the sole revelation and guarantor of human 
nature. Having already unpacked the first of these premises to some extent, we shall 
move on in the next section to consider the significance of the second. 
 
3.2. Continuing in Sin: The Covenantal Faithfulness of Christ as the Guarantor of 
Human Nature 
Barth’s understanding of Christ’s ontological decisiveness involves more than 
just his doctrine of election. Jesus is also ontologically decisive in that his sinless human 
nature provides the epistemological and ontological basis for the postlapsarian continuity 
of human nature. 
Barth is very clear that all humans are sinners and thus stand in contradiction to 
their created essence; the human person is a “corrupter [Verderber] of his own nature” 
(p. 26). Humanity, for Barth, is thoroughly sinful in that “his thoughts, words and works 
are evil and his nature corrupt” (p. 28). The “perversion and corruption” [Verkehrung 
und Verderbnis] (p. 26) of sin affects human nature at such a deep level that no aspect of 
human existence can escape its influence and it must be addressed in any attempt to 
understand humanity: “The fact and knowledge of sin are far too important for us to try 
to abstract from it in any way….To do so we should have to see human nature very 
differently from the way in which it is disclosed to us by the divine revelation” (p. 36).  
However, Barth is also very clear that despite the overwhelming reality of sin, 
God’s gracious love ensures that, despite sin, humans are and will always remain human. 
Because human nature has been created by God for relationship with himself, it cannot 
be destroyed and made “unreal”—human nature is thoroughly corrupt but it cannot be 
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annihilated (p. 27). The gift of humanity cannot be “blotted out” (III/1, 53) by sin as 
though sin were capable of destroying God’s creation and making some new creature. 
And therefore 
 
…if we are attentive and loyal to the Word of God, we must not 
suppose that in describing him as a sinner we have spoken the first and 
final word about this real man. For it is not the case that because the 
creaturely being of man may be known by us only in its sinful 
determination, it is not real and knowable in any other way, as though 
human nature had been changed into its opposite, and by sinning man had 
in some sense suffered a mutation [umgeschaffen] into a different kind of 
creature. (p. 37) 
 
Barth was always careful to affirm that sin is more than a merely accidental 
attribute of human nature.30 For Barth, however, the grace of God always remains the 
primary category for understanding humanity; sin is always secondary (p. 32). Though 
we must consider humanity in its sinfulness, “we must not absolutise sin” (p. 37). God’s 
gracious love thus ensures that humanity continues to be humanity even after it has fallen 
into the “self-contradiction [Selbstwiderspruch]” (p. 31) of sin.31
The emphasis on grace for the postlapsarian continuity of human nature, 
however, leads ultimately to the incarnate Christ as the ultimate expression of God’s 
grace. The continued existence of human nature, despite its pervasive sinfulness, is 
grounded in the faithfulness of the man Jesus to the covenantal relationship for which he 
has been eternally elect (Ebneter 1952). Regardless of the ramifications of sin, Jesus 
remains the one human who has not fallen into the self-contradiction of sin and thus 
                                                 
30 Barth was thus in basic agreement with Matthias Flacius that sin could rightly be viewed as a 
substantial rather than merely a merely accidental characteristic of the human person (p. 27). Although we 
will see that Barth was careful not to conclude from this that postlapsarian humans were of a different 
nature and that sin had thus ‘created’ a new entity (something that sin is completely unable to do), he 
nonetheless wanted to view sin as having serious ontological (rather than merely existential) ramifications 
(p. 28; Ebneter 1952). 
31 Although Barth affirms the ontological continuity of human nature after the fall, this does not 
constitute its epistemological availability and thus cannot be used as the basis of a natural theology. As we 
will discuss later in the chapter, the problem of sin constitutes a humanly insurmountable block to human 
self-knowledge (cf. pp. 29-41). 
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continues to be rightly related to God as his covenantal partner (i.e., human).32 He alone 
“is not a sinner, but the man who honours His creation and election by God, not breaking 
but keeping the covenant of grace” (p. 48). “Thus,” Barth argues, “human nature in Jesus 
is the reason and the just foundation for the mercy in which God has turned to our human 
nature” (ibid.). This covenantal faithfulness means that Jesus is the only human being in 
whom we can see “a continuum unbroken by sin, an essence which even sin does not and 
cannot change” (p. 43). 
Christ’s sinlessness has both epistemological and ontological significance for the 
determination of true humanity. Epistemologically, Jesus is the one in whom we see true 
humanity unspoiled by sin: “Always and in every respect it is primarily and originally in 
this man that we see God’s attitude to sinful man to be of such a kind that it maintains 
and discloses the interrelation of sin and grace” (p. 42). Similarly, 
 
The attitude of God in which the faithfulness of the Creator and 
therefore the unchanging relationship of the human being created by Him 
are revealed and knowable is quite simply His attitude and relation to the 
man Jesus; His election of this man; His becoming and remaining one 
with Him. (p. 41) 
 
So, “true man, the true nature behind our corrupted nature [die Natur in unserer 
Unnatur], is not concealed but revealed in the person of Jesus, and in His nature we 
recognise our own, and that of every man” (p. 43). The sinlessness of Christ thus 
establishes him and the sole source of any real knowledge about the nature of true 
humanity.  
                                                 
32 Barth does not see Jesus’ sinlessness as an ontological difference between his humanity and 
ours—such a difference would mean that he was not human as we are—but rather affirmed that Jesus took 
on our human nature as it stands under the contradiction of sin (I/2, 151ff). Nevertheless, Jesus, as 
empowered by the Holy Spirit, lived a truly human life in relationship to God as his covenantal partner and 
so lived a sinless life, though standing in solidarity with the human race under God’s judgment on sin, (see 
J. Thompson 1978:29). Von Balthasar notes that the sinlessness of Jesus thus “guarantees human nature an 
unbroken continuity” and ensures that man does not fall into irredeemable chaos (1992:116). It is, 
therefore, the continuity of human nature manifest in the covenantal faithfulness of Jesus Christ that 
ensures the continued availability of real human nature for theological consideration. 
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His sinlessness, however, has ontological significance as well. As “the 
penetrating spearhead [eingedrungene Spitze] of the will of God,” Jesus is not only the 
one in whom “the will of God is already fulfilled and revealed” but also the one who 
guarantees that there will be a “wider fulfilment of the will of God and its final 
consummation” (ibid.). Jesus became the guarantor of a humanity that is free of the self-
contradiction of sin and is, therefore, “secure from non-being [Nichtsein]” (p. 144) as it 
rests in the ontological determination of Jesus’ election. “He alone is the archetypal man 
[der Erste] whom all threatened and enslaved men and creatures must follow. He alone is 
the promise for these many, the Head of a whole body” (ibid.). Jesus, therefore, does not 
simply reveal the will of God and the nature of true humanity but guarantees, despite the 
depravations of sin, that these will be realized. “In virtue of the exoneration from sin 
validly effected in Jesus, we may count on this nature of ours and its innocence as we 
could not otherwise do. This judicial pardon gives us the courage and shows us the way 
to think about man as God created him. It is the true ground of theological anthropology” 
(p. 49). 
 
3.3. Confronted by the Other: The Summons to Being  
There is one last factor that must be taken into account in understanding the 
ontological decisiveness of Jesus Christ for all human beings. Not only is he the 
“primarily and originally” elected human being (p. 42) and the one human being who 
maintained the covenantal faithfulness of his relationship to God and thus secured human 
nature against the threat of non-being, but he is also the summons by which God 
encounters human beings and constitutes them as his covenantal co-partners.33
 Jesus is the incarnation of the Word of God.34 As such, he is in his very 
existence the “divine Counterpart [Gegenüber] of every man” (p. 134) and the 
declaration of God’s gracious response to the danger of non-being surrounding humanity 
                                                 
33 To be sure, Barth’s exposition of the summons and its determinative significance occurs 
entirely within his discussion of the content of anthropology and is an issue that he does not at all raise 
with respect to its methodological or formal implications. But, given what he says about the summons and 
its relationship to election, it seems proper to include a brief discussion of this topic here.  
34 Eschewing ensarkos and asarkos language, Barth describes the incarnation in terms of an 
analogia relationis: “All this is concretely expressed in the fact that the man Jesus is the Word of God; that 
He is to the created world and therefore ad extra what the Son of God as the eternal Logos is within the 
triune being of God” (p. 147). 
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(pp. 148-149). That “this One” has entered the sphere of humanity means that all humans 
“are confronted by the divine Other [Gegenüber]” in an ontologically decisive way (pp. 
133-134).35 Thus, “To be a man is to be in the particular sphere of the created world in 
which the Word of God is spoken and sounded” (p. 149). This means that our 
understanding of humanity has to be oriented around the fact that, “When we say ‘man’ 
[Mensch] we have to remember above all that there is one man among many who is this 
Word, and in respect of the many that it is in their sphere that this Word is to be found” 
(ibid.). The divine summons that is an inseparable aspect of Jesus’ existence claims all 
humans as the sphere within which all humans are encountered by the divine Other (p. 
134). Humanity must, therefore, be defined as “the creaturely being which is addressed, 
called and summoned by God” (p. 149).  
For Barth, the ontologically decisive nature of this summons is such that 
humanity must be understood from the very beginning as that which has been 
summoned:  
 
Man is the being which is addressed in this way by God. He does 
not become this being. He does not first have a kind of nature which he is 
then addressed by God. He does not have something different and earlier 
and more intrinsic, a deeper stratum [tiefere Schicht] or more original 
substance of being [ursprüngliche Substanz], in which he is without or 
prior to the Word of God. He is from the very outset, as we may now say, 
‘in the Word of God.’ (pp. 149-150) 
 
Humanity cannot be properly understood, then, apart from an understanding of 
the subject and content of the divine summons. The subject being God himself 
addressing humanity through His Word and the content being the declaration of God’s 
graciousness and covenantal faithfulness in his desire to establish a relationship with that 
which is other than himself in and through Jesus Christ. 
 In Barth’s theology, then, Jesus Christ is of decisive significance as the 
determination of all human beings. In this section we have explored the ontological 
                                                 
35 According to Barth, this encounter means that “every man in his place and time is changed, i.e., 
he is something other than what he would have been if this One had not been man too” (p. 133).  
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decisiveness of Jesus Christ for the human race in Barth’s theology.36 He grounds this in 
(1) the primordial election of Jesus Christ as both Subject and Object in which other 
humans are included insofar as they are in union with him; (2) the covenantal 
faithfulness and corresponding sinlessness of Jesus Christ which establishes, both 
epistemologically and ontologically, the postlapsarian continuity and security of human 
nature; and (3) the summons of the divine Word by which humans are constituted as 
humans insofar as they are the recipients of the divine address. Having thus arrived at an 
understanding of what it means for Barth that Jesus is “the ontological determination of 
humanity,” it remains in the next section to consider how this proposal shapes Barth’s 
actual approach to theological anthropology.  
 
4.  The Methodological Framework for a Christological Anthropology 
This christocentric orientation constitutes the basic theological and 
methodological presupposition of Barth’s theological anthropology. But it still remains 
to determine the precise nature of Barth’s anthropological methodology. This section 
will thus seek to determine the significance of Barth’s christocentrism for the actual 
construction of his theological anthropology. Since the task of the next chapters will be 
to discuss the application of this methodology, this section will merely provide its basic 
outlines as a framework for understanding the later discussions. 
   
4.1. Like Us, But Different: Jesus’ Unique Relation to the Father 
Throughout the Dogmatics Barth consistently maintains that Jesus Christ is both 
fully divine and fully human.37 The full and true humanity of Jesus and its ontological 
decisiveness for all humans, as we have seen, is the guiding idea of Barth’s theological 
anthropology, the heart of his entire exposition. Methodologically, however, Barth must 
                                                 
36 It should be clear from this discussion that the “ontological connection” between Jesus and 
humanity holds for all human persons and not simply those who are members of the Christian community 
(IV/2, 275). 
37 Barth has occasionally been understood to mean that Jesus’ full humanity was a general rather 
than a particular human nature (e.g., Muers 1999:265-280). I. Davidson attributes the origin of this 
interpretation to F. W. Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus. Das Beispiel Karl Barths [Munich: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1972], 265-275), but he contends that Barth’s depiction of the autonomous character of 
Jesus’ humanity precludes such an interpretation 2001:144-145; cf. also Diem 1976:121-138).  
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address the fact that “there can be no question of a direct equation of human nature as we 
know it in ourselves with the human nature of Jesus, and therefore of a simple deduction 
of anthropology from Christology” (p. 47). Although Jesus is fully human, theology 
“must not fail to appreciate how different are His nature and ours” (p. 49).  
Barth grounds this difference ultimately in the fact that the human nature of Jesus 
“is determined by a relation between God and Himself such as has never existed between 
God and us, and never will exist” (ibid.). It is true that God has eternally chosen to exist 
in relationship with human beings and that this relationship is decisive for human nature, 
but that relationship is mediated through Jesus such that our fellowship with God utterly 
depends on our fellowship with Jesus Christ (ibid.). As discussed earlier, Jesus alone is 
“primarily and truly” the elect of God who fulfills the covenantal relationship to which 
all humans have been summoned; thus, “If we too are elected, we are only the members 
of His body” (ibid.). So, Jesus stands in a relationship with God that is completely 
unique to him and not shared, except mediately, by any other human being.  
Barth traces the difference between Jesus’ humanity and ours established by this 
unique relationship along three lines. Since each of them is based on considerations 
addressed in previous sections, we will deal with them rather briefly. First, since our 
essential relationship with God, and thus our very nature as humans, is mediated through 
Jesus, he stands as the original of which we are merely copies (p. 50).38 It is with respect 
                                                 
38 Berkouwer objected to Barth’s presentation of the ontological decisiveness of Jesus on the basis 
of the biblical portrayal of the incarnation: “The Incarnation is described as consanguinity with us. Barth, 
however, formulates the matter in the opposite way, so that Jesus does not participate in our nature, but we 
in His” (1962:95). He probably raises this objection in light of Barth’s statement that Jesus does not 
“partake of humanity” but that “humanity must partake of him” (III/2, 59). But Barth elsewhere states 
rather explicitly that the incarnation “means first and generally that he became man, true and real man, 
participating in the same human essence and existence, the same human nature and form, the same 
historicity that we have” (I/2, 147). Even after his assertion in III/2 he speaks of Christ assuming human 
nature in its historical and sinful existence (IV/2, 25). It thus appears that Barth has no problems speaking 
of the Word assuming and participating in ‘our’ nature. The important point is to realize that Barth 
understands human nature primarily in terms of a being’s concrete relationship to God (cf. W. Johnson 
1997:157). To become human, then, is to enter into the history of God’s covenantal relationship with that 
which is other to himself. Barth’s concern in III/2, however, is to be clear that Jesus cannot be understood 
in terms of the “specific determinations and features of humanity” as though they formed “a neutral point” 
from which we can understand him. Contrarily, he is the one who “reveals and explains” that those 
features constitute the possibility of true humanity. Barth, then, is not denying what he elsewhere affirms 
so clearly, i.e., that Jesus assumes true human nature. What he is denying is that this assumption can be 
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to Jesus that “the decision was made who and what true man is” and he is thus the 
“prototype [Vorbildlichkeit]” of true humanity (ibid.).39   
Second, Jesus’ humanity is differentiated from ours by virtue of his sinlessness. 
Human nature as we know it is characterized by “self-contradiction” and “self-
deception” (p. 47) while human nature revealed in Jesus demonstrates “the peace and 
clarity which are not in ourselves” (p. 48). Thus “although He becomes what we are, He 
does not do what we do and so He is not what we are” (ibid.). In the incarnation, the 
“rent” in our human nature is healed and “there now remains only the pure and free 
humanity of Jesus as our own humanity” (ibid.).  
The difference signaled by Jesus sinlessness, however, does not signify “any 
special quality of His humanity by which He is as it were physically incapable of sin” (p. 
51). He is not protected from sin by virtue of some “special capacities or 
potentialities…such as must make Him a totally different being [andersartigen Wesen] 
from us” (p. 53).40 “Even in Him human nature would not have been capable of this [sin] 
of itself” (p. 51). What preserved Jesus in his sinlessness was “the eternal mercy of God 
which refuses to be limited and suspended, but wills to maintain itself in vulnerable 
human nature” (ibid.). The difference thus lies not in his human nature but in the fact that 
“as the Bearer of humanity He was Himself its Lord, the Creator God active within it” 
(ibid.). His is still the “same human nature as ours” but it is different from ours in its 
sinlessness by virtue of its unique relationship with God (p. 52). 
Thirdly, Barth contends that Jesus’ human nature is different from ours by virtue 
of its revelatory function: “in Him human nature is not concealed but revealed in its 
original and basic form [urbildlichen und ursprünglichen Gestalt]” (ibid.). Jesus is ‘the 
true Word about man as well as God” (ibid.) that becomes available to us, not through 
our interpretations, but as “He discloses and explains Himself to us” in his encounter 
with us (p. 53).  
                                                                                                                                                
construed in such a way that Jesus is understood through an ‘objective’ and therefore abstract analysis of 
human nature.   
39 Barth’s use of ‘prototype’ language suggests that at this point he is very close to the Eastern 
Orthodox depiction of Jesus in terms of an “archetype” as “that which organizes, seals and gives shape to 
matter, and which simultaneously attracts it towards itself” (Nellas 1987:33).  
40 Barth argues that any attempt to view Jesus’ human nature as constitutionally different from 
ours is a docetic position that ultimately denies his true humanity (p. 54). 
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Barth maintains, then, that Jesus’ human nature is different from human nature as 
we know in that he is the sinless prototype who reveals true humanity whereas we are the 
sinful copies who hide true humanity in self-contradiction. So, “Jesus Christ is man in a 
different way from what we are,” but we must recognize that “He is so in a complete 
equality of His manhood with ours” (IV/1, 131). The difference does not vitiate the 
similarity since he is “utterly unlike us as God and utterly like us as man” (ibid.).41 But 
this means, “All the otherness to be noted here is rooted in the fact that as man He is also 
God; his humanity, therefore, has “a different status but not a different constitution” than 
ours (p. 53).  
 
4.2. The Starting Point, But Not the Ending Point: The Impossibility of Reducing 
Anthropology to Christology 
The similarities and dissimilarities mentioned in the previous section carry 
methodological consequences. Positively, the similarities indicate that we can derive an 
understanding of true humanity by considering the humanity of Jesus. Since, “To be a 
man is to be…like [Jesus]” (p. 145), theologians must “concentrate on the one man 
Jesus” (p. 53), seeking to understand human nature in the light of his reality. Anything 
incompatible with this picture is “ipso facto non-human” (p. 226). This methodology can 
easily be traced through the rest of III/2 as Barth begins each section with an explicit 
consideration of who Jesus is and the significance that this carries for our knowledge of 
human nature. 
There is a negative dimension, however, that must also be considered. Since 
Jesus’ humanity is substantially dissimilar to ours by virtue of its unique relationship to 
God, it is not possible to move directly from an examination of his nature to truths about 
                                                 
41 Trevor Hart seems to miss Barth on this point when he argues that “the primary reason for 
Jesus’ humanity being essentially other than ours” is “not that it is a snapshot of God, and made-over to 
‘look like’ God; but rather that it is the firstfruits of a new, redeemed humanity in correspondence with 
God” (1999:22). If the difference lay solely in the fact that Jesus’ humanity was “a new, redeemed 
humanity” and ours is not, it would be possible to derive an understanding of true humanity directly from 
Christology. But Barth clearly argues that the “irremovable difference” between the man Jesus and other 
humans is “primarily and decisively the mystery of His identity with God” (III/2, 71). While Jesus is 
different from us by virtue of his status as the new human and this difference must be taken into account, 
the primary difference that necessitates an indirect inference from Christology to anthropology is his 
divine identity. 
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the rest of humanity. “There can be no question, therefore, of a direct knowledge of the 
nature of man in general from that of the man Jesus” (p. 71). So, Barth states explicitly, 
“Anthropology cannot be Christology, nor Christology anthropology” (ibid.). 
For Barth, then, anthropology must be founded on Christology but “it cannot be 
deduced from it directly” (p. 512).42 We must rather “infer from His human nature the 
character of our own” (p. 54) as we seek “to know indirectly who and what we are from 
the fact that we live in the same world and have the same humanity as this man” (pp. 71-
72).43 This means that Barth’s anthropological methodology always involves an indirect 
extrapolation from Jesus’ humanity comprising two moments:  
 
in our exposition of the doctrine of man we must always look in the 
first instance at the nature of man as it confronts us in the person of 
Jesus, and only secondarily—asking and answering from this place 
of light—at the nature of man as that of every man and all other men. 
(p. 46).  
 
Jesus’ humanity is different from ours but it is in that very difference—i.e., in 
virtue of his unique relationship with God—that the likeness is “disclosed” thus making 
a christological anthropology possible (p. 54). 
Barth’s christological methodology is thus grounded on the humanity of the man 
Jesus insofar as it stands in continuity with all other human beings by virtue of their 
common human nature and yet in discontinuity by virtue of its unique relationship with 
                                                 
42 Because of Barth’s emphasis on the methodological implications of Jesus’ unique humanity, 
Gibbs argues that Barth’s theology should be viewed as having two foci: Christology and anthropology 
(1963:132-135). He contends that Barth’s way of maintaining the unlikeness of Jesus’ humanity is to note, 
through a comparison of human persons with each other, the ways in which Jesus is different from 
humanity in general. Thus Barth’s anthropology must focus on both Jesus and other humans in order to 
function effectively. While it is certainly true that Barth’s methodology requires that attention be paid both 
to Jesus and other humans, Gibbs argument downplays the fact that the two moments in Barth’s 
methodology are sequential and hierarchical. The christological move holds ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological primacy over the anthropological move and we should, therefore, be very cautious 
about picturing them as two foci in the same elliptical system. 
43 For Barth, this is less interpretation than revelation:  “It is not that we interpret Him, but that He 
discloses and explains Himself to us, that through and in Himself He manifests His nature to us as our own 
true nature” (p. 53).  
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God. A properly theological anthropology, therefore, though beginning with a 
consideration of Jesus’ humanity, cannot remain there. In a second move, theological 
anthropology must extrapolate from truths so derived to truths about the nature of true 
humanity in general.44 In the final section, we will see how Barth works through these 
two moments to establish the basic criteria of a properly theological anthropology.  
 
5. The Criteria of a Christological Anthropology 
With §44 Barth moves from the more explicitly methodological concerns of §43 
into his exposition of “the outline and form” of his anthropology. His intent is to develop 
“the minimal requirements essential in all circumstances for a concept of man which can 
be used theologically” (p. 72). Given the sinful obscurity of human nature, these minimal 
requirements cannot be ascertained through any “known and accepted picture of man” 
(p. 226)45 but only “by our Christological basis” (p. 72). Recognizing, however, that the 
uniqueness of Jesus’ humanity necessitates an indirect approach to ascertaining the basic 
criteria of humanity in general, he sets his sights on developing a christological 
“foundation” (p. 71) from which he can derive “the criteria” by which we can “pose the 
question of the nature of man” (p. 72). In this section, we will follow the two moments of 
his christological methodology as he first considers the person of Jesus and then infers 
from his existence to the existence of human nature in general.  
 
5.1. Christological Discernment: The Person and Work of Jesus Christ as the 
Framework for Theological Anthropology 
The basic premise by which Barth analyzes Jesus’ humanity in order to determine 
the criteria for a theological anthropology is that the nature of humanity  
                                                 
44 Barth’s commitment to the primacy of the particular over the general is what Hunsinger refers 
to as Barth’s particularism and notes as one of the fundamental motifs of his theology (1991:32-35; cf. 
III/1, 602).   
45 Barth thus rejects any of the contemporary non-christological accounts of the human person as 
valid pictures from which we can “read off that which corresponds and is similar in the man to the 
humanity of Jesus” (p. 226). Such a methodology would imply that the picture of humanity is “the constant 
and certain factor” against which we juxtapose “a variable and uncertain” interpretation of Jesus (ibid.). By 
contrast, Barth consistently maintains that the humanity revealed in Jesus is “the primary text” that judges 
and invalidates all other pictures (ibid.). 
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 is to be observed and established in its history as determined by Him, 
in its continuous progress as resolved and executed by Him, through 
a series of conditions, actions, experiences, in the recurrence and 
confirmation of its identity through all these active modifications of 
its being. (p. 55) 
 
So, the question “Who is Jesus?” (along with the corresponding question “What 
is humanity?”) is best answered by looking at the person of Jesus as revealed “in His 
work and history” (p. 58).46  
 For Barth, however, a consideration of Jesus’ work means specifically his 
saving work since “the work of Jesus is the work of the Saviour” (ibid.). This is because 
the scriptural portrayal of Jesus’ life focuses almost exclusively on its soteriological 
dimensions, indicating that his work as Savior comprises the entirety of his existence 
(pp. 63-64). He does not deny that other aspects of his human existence including his 
“inner life” (e.g., his thoughts, emotions, desires, etc.) and his “physical life” (e.g., his 
birth, development, everyday activities, etc.) are necessary and important to his humanity 
(pp. 328-331). Nonetheless, they can never be an “autonomous theme in the New 
Testament” because they are only disclosed to us through his public activity in his work 
as Savior (p. 209).47 As a result, Barth derives the christological criteria of true humanity 
                                                 
46 Barth is very cautious with the traditional division between Christ’s person and his work (cf. 
pp. 61-62). While he recognizes that the distinction is useful “for the purposes of exposition” he is 
concerned that theology often acts “as if this were a real distinction” thereby losing the inseparable relation 
between them (p. 61). 
47 Barth has been repeatedly criticized on this point for so stressing the soteriological work of 
Christ that he ignores Jesus’ human life thus diminishing the validity and significance of everyday 
realities.  So Baillie famously characterized Barth’s theology as a “Logotheism” because he emphasized 
primarily the Word of God rather than the “the Word made flesh” (see Deegan 1961). This same criticism 
has been leveled more recently by Ng’weshemi who thinks Barth goes so far in this direction that his 
theology ultimately leads to a docetic understanding of the incarnation (2002:146; cf. Gunton 1989:60; and 
J. Thompson 1978:75). While such criticisms may well have been true of Barth’s earlier theology (cf. 
McCormack 1997:321), they should take into account more carefully Barth’s later comments on the 
significance (albeit of a secondary nature) of the particularities of Jesus’ human existence (cf. Deegan 
1961:125).  They also fail to consider Barth’s understanding of humanity primarily in terms of its 
covenantal relationship with God where the particularities of human life (e.g., eating, drinking, sleeping, 
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primarily, if not exclusively, from a consideration of what Jesus’ work as Savior reveals 
about the nature of his humanity. 
On this basis, Barth derives six criteria that will comprise the foundation of his 
christological anthropology (pp. 68-71:48
 
1. Jesus is “the one in whose identity with himself we must 
recognise at once the identity of God with Himself.” 
2. God’s presence in union with this man is not an abstract state 
but is “an action with meaning and purpose” directed toward the 
salvation of humanity. 
3. God’s action toward humanity in union with this man “does not 
infringe His own sovereignty” but is rather “an exercise and 
demonstration of His sovereignty.” 
4. Since God’s action in union with this man is an expression of 
His divine sovereignty, the man Jesus “exists in the Lordship of 
                                                                                                                                                
sex, religion, thought, emotion, etc.) serve as the “field on which human being either takes place or does 
not take place as history, as the encounter of I and Thou” (III/2, 249). These particularities are important 
and may be analyzed in their own right. But they cannot contribute to a definition of true humanity, only to 
a definition of the possibility of true humanity. Finally, these criticisms fail to appreciate the significance 
of Barth’s statements about the particularities of humanity as “the gift” of God which comprises its special 
endowment from God with which humanity’s election stands in continuity and not contradiction (cf. Barth 
1982b:52-54).  
On a similar note, John D. Zizioulas questions whether such an exclusively christocentric 
orientation can provide any real help for “each man in his particular existential situation” (1975:440). 
While it is true that III/2 focuses primarily on the formal and material development of an account of true 
humanity rather than its application to existential realities, we must recognize the close connection 
between this account and its ethical application in III/4. Zizioulas is apparently not convinced that Barth 
was successful in making this application vitally useful, but we must recognize that existential concerns 
are not lacking from Barth’s anthropology and we should note, along with a number of more recent 
studies, the prominent role that such concerns played through Barth’s theology in his consideration of 
ethics (e.g., Biggar 1988; 1993; Webster 1995; 1998).  
48 Some recent theologians have argued for a christological approach to anthropology, but one in 
which the corresponding anthropological conclusions are remarkably limited (e.g., Watson 1997; 
McFarland 2005). This is, however, markedly different from Barth’s approach, which affirms that 
theological anthropology must and can be christologically grounded in a variety of very specific ways.  
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God…in the fulfilment of the divine act of lordship which takes 
place in it.” 
5. As the one who “lives within the lordship of God,” the man 
Jesus is himself the history of God’s gracious action towards 
humanity. 
6. This man is thus the one who is supremely “for God” in the 
totality of his existence. 
 
These six principles thus form the first moment in Barth’s christological 
methodology: a consideration of the unique humanity of Jesus Christ..49
 
5.2. Anthropological Inference: Moving from Christology to Anthropology 
Barth’s christological methodology has now provided the basic criteria by which 
an exposition of human nature in general may properly take place. These criteria are thus 
“the limits within which we shall always have to move in our search for a theological 
concept of man” (p. 74). So, he is now ready to move into the second moment of his 
methodology whereby he seeks to extrapolate from the human nature of Jesus to human 
nature in general. In the case of each of these six criteria, he thus moves from the 
criterion unique to Jesus’ human nature to the formulation of a criterion that will be true 
of all other humans. Given the prominent role that these criteria of human nature in 
general will play in the development of Barth’s anthropology, his criticism of other 
anthropological perspectives, and our own examination of his understanding of human 
ontology later in this thesis, it may prove useful to quote these criteria more fully. 
                                                 
49 Unfortunately, Barth opens himself to criticism at this point by insufficiently demonstrating 
more clearly the manner in which he derives these principles. It is clear that the principles flow logically 
from one to the other and fit coherently within Barth’s broader theology. It is also clear that Barth feels 
them to be biblically justified, although one has to turn elsewhere for the biblical support since he does not 
address the biblical texts here. But, it seems reasonable to ask Barth to justify why these principles and not 
others have been chosen. That these are significant aspects of Jesus’ life as revealed through his 
soteriological work is indisputable. But, it is not self-evident that these are the only possible principles or 
even that they are the best ones for the purposes at hand. Given the foundational role that these principles 
will play in the development of Barth’s anthropology, one would expect a more explicit exposition and 
defense of these particular principles.   
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 1. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that in His humanity 
we are confronted immediately and directly with the being of God, then 
necessarily…every man is to be understood, at least mediately and 
indirectly, to the extent that he is conditioned by the priority of this man, 
in his relationship with God.... 
2. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that the presence and 
revelation of God in Him is the history of the deliverance of each and 
every man, then necessarily…every man is a being which is conditioned 
by the fact that…every man as such must exist and have his being in a 
history which stands in a clear and recognisable relationship to the divine 
deliverance enacted in the man Jesus. 
3. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that in the divine 
action in favour of each and every man in Him it is also a matter of the 
freedom, the sovereignty and the glory of God, then necessarily…the 
being of every man…is not an end in itself, but has its true determination 
in the glory of God…. 
4. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that He exists in the 
lordship…, then necessarily…it must be said of every man that it is 
essential to him that as he exists God is over him as his Lord and he 
himself stands under the lordship of God the Lord….50
5. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that his being 
consists wholly in the history in which God is active as man’s Deliverer, 
then necessarily…the being of every man must consist in this history. Not 
only his actions but his being will consist in his participation in what God 
                                                 
50 The concept of obedience plays a prominent role in Barth’s understanding of true humanity. 
Grounded in the election of Jesus to be the ‘Royal Man’ (IV/2, 154-264; cf. Jüngel 1986:127f.), Barth 
understands humanity to be “actualized by faith and obedience” (McCormack 2000:107) as realized 
primarily in prayer (ibid., cf. also Webster 1995:208-212). To some extent, then, Barth can argue that we 
“choose and realize” ourselves in and through our actions (III/4, 13; cf. also W. Johnson 1997:81 and 
Sondregger 2000:258-273). But, as Webster argues, we must also realize that Barth’s understanding of the 
determinacy of human nature and agency “relativises our acts, preventing them from assuming absolute 
status in the definition of personhood” (1995:75).   
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does and means for him. His freedom will be his freedom to decide for 
God; for what God wills to do and be for him in this history.… 
6. If the man Jesus is for God…, then necessarily, the being of no 
other man can be understood apart form the fact that his existence too…is 
an event in which he renders God service, in which he for his part is for 
God…. (pp. 73-74) 
 
On the basis of these six criteria we can say that, for Barth, true humanity must 
be understood as (1) being constituted by the ontological priority of Jesus in his 
relationship with God; (2) being conditioned by the salvation enacted by Jesus; (3) 
having his “true determination” in the glory of God; (4) existing under the Lordship of 
God; (5) freely corresponding in his proper action to the divine deliverance; and (6) 
freely rendering service to God as a being who is for God.  
These six criteria will serve as the standard by which Barth critiques other 
approaches to anthropology (§44.2) and various ways of construing human ontology 
(§46). They also constitute the basis upon which Barth develops his understanding of the 
human person as the being who exists in relationship with God and his fellow-human 
(§45) as the soul of his body (§46) in his allotted time (§47). The extent to which Barth 
has been successful in developing a christological anthropology will, therefore, depend 
significantly on the extent to which he is successful in applying these six criteria to both 
their critical and constructive tasks.  
 
6. Conclusion: The Assumption behind All Assumptions 
In III/2, Barth has endeavored to develop an anthropology that is based only on 
Christology as “the assumption behind all our other assumptions” (p. 571). This is not an 
assumption that we can make based on our experiences or our recognition of the inherent 
liabilities of all other presuppositions, but instead “it ought to be clear by now that we 
can recognise and accept it and count on it and start from it, only as one which has 
already been made for us” (ibid.). As the presupposition that has been revealed to us in 
the Word, a properly theological anthropology must rest on this presupposition and seek 
to develop its account of the human person from that perspective alone. 
We have seen how Barth develops his understanding of this presupposition 
through his groundbreaking approach to election and his corresponding understanding of 
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the ontological decisiveness of Jesus Christ for all humanity. On this basis, theology can 
not help but recognize the need to ground anthropology on Christology and seek 
knowledge of ourselves from the one source where true humanity has been revealed.  
This does not mean, however, that theology can make a facile move from the 
human nature of Christ to the nature of humanity in general. Theology can not resolve 
the problems of anthropology “merely by introducing the word ‘God’ into the discussion 
and treating it as an Open Sesame to every problem” (p. 551). The hard work of 
developing a theological account of true humanity lies in the twofold inferential 
movement from the person and work of Jesus Christ to general truths of human nature. 
Both moments are essential. Lacking either, theological anthropology fails to be properly 
theological.  
Barth is convinced that this christological approach to the human person not only 
reveals the nature of true humanity but also “gives rise to a definite anthropology” (p. 
552). The christological form of Barth’s argument is not an empty shell that merely 
adopts a christological framework within which the theologian can develop largely non-
christological elements. Rather, Barth understands this christological form to be 
inseparably related to the christological content of a theological anthropology. The 
remaining sections of III/2 bear out this conviction as Barth seeks to develop the content 
of his anthropology through a consideration of humanity’s essential relatedness with both 
God and other human beings, the ontological nature of the human person as one 
constituted as the soul of his body by the Spirit, and the necessary temporality of human 
life as it has been determined by the eternal God. It remains for us in the next chapters, 
then, to consider the extent to which the implications of Barth’s christocentric 
anthropology come to bear on contemporary attempts to understand the human person.   
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Chapter 3 
Conversing with the Enemy? 
The Phenomena of the Human and the Nature of a Christologically Determined 
Dialogue 
 
1. Engaging the Persistent Rivals of a Christological Anthropology 
In the previous chapter we explored Barth’s basic anthropological thesis that as 
the “ontological determination of humanity” (p. 132) Jesus is “the source of our 
knowledge of the nature of man as created by God” (p. 41). This, however, brings to the 
forefront of our study the question of the proper source(s) for theological anthropology, 
and thus the relationship between theology and the non-theological disciplines.  
These other disciplines, for Barth, constitute “a very persistent rival” for theology 
which utilize significantly different methods, sources, and results (p. 21). Aware of the 
implications raised by these potential rivals, Barth himself poses the question as to 
whether theological anthropology can “profit” by the “methods and results” of these 
other disciplines (p. 22). He thus devotes an entire section (§44.2) entitled “The 
Phenomena of the Human” to summarizing and analyzing the contributions and insights 
of various other approaches to understanding the human person.  
The question to ask here, then, is whether Barth views these other approaches 
merely as “rivals” against whom a christocentric anthropology can only declare a 
decisive “No,” or whether there remains a possibility for meaningful dialogue. That is, 
does Barth’s christocentric approach entail that a properly theological anthropology must 
derive everything that it has to say about the human person from its christological 
premises, and that it therefore has very little room for significant dialogue with other 
anthropological perspectives? Given Barth’s christological focus, what can we say about 
other attempts to understand the human person?  
Given that many non-theological disciplines have devoted considerable attention 
to the ontological issues that we will address in the following chapters, the goal of this 
chapter will be to come to grips with Barth’s understanding of what role, if any, the 
methods and insights of these other disciplines should play in developing a properly 
theological account of the human person. This chapter will thus comprise three main 
sections. In the first, we will take a closer look at exactly what it means to refer to Barth 
as a ‘christocentric’ theologian. By clarifying this term in the face of some significant 
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ambiguity, we will come to a better appreciation of his christocentric methodology and 
the opportunities for interdisciplinary dialogue that his theology might offer. In the 
second section, we will look directly at Barth’s discussion of “the phenomena of the 
human,” paying particularly close attention to his analyses of non-theological 
anthropologies in §44.2. Finally, having viewed how Barth actually interacts with these 
other disciplines, we will draw some conclusions regarding the implications of this 
paragraph for understanding (1) how Barth actually uses his christological criteria in 
interacting with and evaluating the contributions of non-theological anthropologies and 
(2) the extent to which Barth is open to dialoging with and learning from these other 
disciplines. 
 
2. The ‘Radically Christocentric’ Nature of Karl Barth’s Theology 
Given the clear emphasis that Barth placed on the centrality of Jesus Christ in 
Christian theology, describing him as a ‘christocentric’ theologian would seem like a 
fairly straightforward proposition. To serve usefully as a prominent characterization of a 
particular theology, however, as it does with respect to Barth’s theology, one would 
reasonably expect that the term be fairly well defined and understood. But, as J. K. 
Riches points out, there is an unfortunate ambiguity inherent in the term, which, unless 
clarified, hinders its usefulness as a theological descriptor and, with respect to Barth’s 
theology especially, results in widespread misunderstanding (1972).  
Consequently, in this section we will address the nature of the ambiguity that 
underlies the application of this term to Barth’s theology. We will see how any attempt 
to identify Barth’s theology as christocentric must address both the ambiguity of the term 
and the specific characteristics of Barth’s particular form of christocentrism.  
 
2.1. Clarifying the Center: The Ambiguity of the Term ‘Christocentric’  
As Bruce McCormack points out, understanding any form of christocentrism 
requires that we take into account the difference between its formal and material aspects: 
 
Formally, it simply means that a Christology stands at the 
approximate centre of a particular theology, giving to it its characteristic 
shape and content. That much is true of all so-called 'christocentric 
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theologies'. Materially, however, the meaning of the term can differ 
widely for the simple reason that the doctrine of Christ which is placed at 
the centre of theology differs form one christocentric' theologian to the 
next. (1997:453) 
 
Thus, there may be theologies that could be designated christocentric in a formal 
sense that is not reflected in its more material considerations (e.g., Schleiermacher).1 
Equally, there may be multiple theologies with equal right to the christocentric label on 
both the formal and material levels but still differing markedly in terms of their material 
development. The significance of this can be seen in the fact that christocentric is a term 
commonly associated not only with Barth’s theology, but also that of Ritschl, Harnack, 
and Herrmann.2 In addition to the differences that can arise with respect to formal and 
material centricity, one should also note methodological variations—e.g., the differences 
between a central starting-point that enables one to incorporate other modes of discourse 
and a more deterministic center that establishes a definite circumference beyond which 
one may not reach. Clearly, then, merely labeling some theological system 
‘christocentric’ will lead to significant ambiguity unless some attempt is made to clarify 
the extent to which it is or is not christocentric with respect to these formal, material, and 
methodological issues.  
The ambiguity of the term becomes particularly prominent when we consider 
some of the different ways in which Barth’s christocentrism has been interpreted.  The 
                                                 
1 As Hunsinger points out, Schleiermacher’s theology (and arguably that of most 19th century 
theologians) was ‘formally but not substantively christocentric’ (2000d:283; see also T. Torrance 
1990:35). Balthasar (1992:37) and Johnson (1997:110) also argue that Schleiermacher’s christocentrism is 
undermined by his methodological and material commitment to religious awareness as the basis of 
theology.  
2 TeSelle largely glosses over the significant differences between these various theologians in his 
attempt to characterize 20th century christocentric theologians as offshoots of 19th century German idealism 
(1975). Sykes argues that although there is a formal similarity between the christocentric approaches of 
Harnack and Barth, they are distinguished by substantial material differences (1979a:28-29); for a similar 
point with respect to Herrmann see Mangina 2004:8-9. Thus, while there is a formal parallel between 
Barth’s christocentrism and that of 18th and 19th century German theologians, their influence on his 
christological concentration should not be overemphasized. Hunsinger convincingly argues that a more 
fruitful background for understanding Barth’s theology and his christocentrism in particular can be found 
in the theology of Luther (see 2000d).  
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scope of Barth’s christocentrism has repeatedly led to charges that Barth’s theology is 
christomonistic—i.e., a theological system that reduces everything to Christology.3 
Barth, according to this interpretation, focuses so completely on the ontological and 
epistemological centrality of Jesus Christ for the entire cosmos that the particularity, 
significance, and, ultimately, even the reality of humans and other creaturely beings are 
lost as everything is subsumed under the “totalism” of Barth’s Christology (Balthasar 
1992:242; cf. also Deegan 1961; Come 1963:152-157; Willis 1971:236ff.; McGrath 
1986:105-106; Biggar  1993:5; Muers 1999:268-269). Similarly, Barth is critiqued for 
developing an isolationist approach to theology (D. Williams 1947:253; Ebneter 
1952:36; Crawford 1972:327; Dorrien 1997:338-343; Milbank 1999:2; Webb 1991:504; 
Roberts 1991:59-79). From this perspective, Barth’s christological concentration 
involves a methodological christomonism that precludes any significant engagement 
with non-theological disciplines (e.g., Cobb 1969).4 According to Bruce Marshall, then, 
                                                 
3 Such criticisms have not dissipated (e.g., Rosato 1981:145; Thiemann 1981:120; Richmond 
1986:404; Roberts 1991; Milbank 1999; and Frei 2005) and remain particularly common among American 
evangelicals (e.g., Packer 1975; Muller 1991:130ff.; and G. Lewis 2003). 
4 Riches notes that the term christocentric itself has come to be associated with an anti-intellectual 
rejection of natural theology and human reason (1972:223-224). Sykes suggests that Barth is at least 
“partly responsible” for such interpretations (1989:7). In a number of places Barth makes comments that 
might indicate a real reticence to engage in any such dialogue. As early as I/1, Barth cautions that theology 
should restrict itself to “its own relevant concerns” (I/1, xvi) and refuse to learn anything methodologically 
from other disciplines (I/1, 8), as it must retain its “autonomy” and protect itself from “corruption” (I/1, 
285). Particularly well known along these lines are Barth’s famous statements regarding the practical non-
existence of a philosophia christiana (I/1, 6), the dispensability of the natural sciences for developing a 
theological account of creation (III/1, ix), and the incompatibility of theology with any world-view (cf. 
III/1, 340-344; III/2, 4-11; and IV/3.1, 255-256).  
Unfortunately, such comments are often abstracted from the rest of Barth’s theology and, indeed, 
from the context in which they were written. Thus, Barth’s comments in I/1 are interpreted in isolation 
from his extensive discussions regarding the close relationship that exists between theology and the non-
theological disciplines (I/1, 5-6, 84, 284), the possibility of revelation coming through any medium (I/1, 
55), his rejection of anti-intellectualism (I/1, 200-201), and his assertion of the “dignity” of other 
disciplines as they seek to carry out their own task (I/1, 256). Barth’s statements must also be understood 
in light of his qualified affirmation of the possibility of a philosophia christiana (I/1, 5377-378; cf. Barth 
1981:33-38; 1986:27, 32), the validity of future theologians interacting more extensively with the natural 
sciences in a theology of creation (III/1, x; cf. Webster 2000a:111), and the impossibility of doing theology 
independently of some particular world-view (I/2, 728-729; III/2, 6-8). While this is certainly not sufficient 
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the most common complaint against Barth’s theology is its apparent isolationism—i.e., 
its “putative refusal to engage the achievements, needs, and problems of modern or 
contemporary culture” (1993:445).5  Thus, Barth’s theology is routinely interpreted as 
involving a “christological constriction” (Crawford 1972:327) that remains in “splendid 
isolation from all efforts at human understanding” (D. Williams 1947:253) as it seeks “to 
derive all the presuppositions, grounds, and possibilities of divine and human existence 
from the materials of christological history” (Crawford 1972:327; cf. Come 1963:140).6
                                                                                                                                                
to establish that Barth was in fact open to interdisciplinary dialogue, it at least suggests that his interpreters 
should be careful in appealing to his writings selectively to establish their point. 
5 Several scholars indicate that this criticism has been particularly common among Protestant 
scholars in the English speaking world (cf. Riches 1972:223-224; Sykes 1989:7, 1979b:12-13; Mangina 
2003:437, 2004:ix).  
6 Two areas in which this criticism has been particularly prevalent are the use of the natural 
sciences and empirical data in theology, theological anthropology in particular, and the relationship 
between theology and philosophy. So, Barth is regarded as having little or no interest in the natural 
sciences and what they have to say about humanity (Pannenberg 1985:16; McGrath 2001:176; Krötke 
2000:159). (McGrath does argue, however, that T. F. Torrance’s systematic retrieval of Barth’s theology 
with respect to the natural sciences demonstrates that while Barth’s theology was limited in this regard, 
“the Barthian heritage has considerable potential as a dialogue partner between Christian theology and the 
natural sciences” [2001:177]). This seems to raise the possibility of a purely abstract theological 
anthropology disengaged from the hard realities of human existence and unable to speak meaningfully to 
the significant needs of contemporary society at a time when questions about the human person are 
becoming particularly prominent (Krötke 2000:159; Ng’weshemi 2002:147). Comparable criticisms have 
been raised with respect to Barth’s understanding of philosophy. Kincade thus accuses him of having a 
“recalcitrant attitude to philosophy” that is characterized by “ambivalence” and “distrust” toward all 
philosophical contributions (1960:161-169) and that refuses to allow any “substantive role to philosophy 
within dogmatics” (Willis 1971:103-109), resulting in a naive denial of the necessary relationship between 
the two. Indeed, Barth’s understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy played a 
prominent role in the divisions that arose between him and the other dialectical theologians (McCormack 
1997:400-410; Ford 1979a:59). His theology is thus derided for its subjectivity (cf. esp. Pannenberg 1991), 
its positivistic approach to revelation (see Fisher 1988), and its pervasive irrationalism (e.g., Blanshard 
1964; Trigg 1998). Lying at the root of many of these criticisms is Barth’s well known rejection of natural 
theology (see Barth and Brunner 1946; T. Torrance 1947, 1970; R. Brown 1980; O’Donovan 1986; Barr 
1994; Thiselton 1994; Dorrien 2000; J. Hart 2001; Hauerwas 2001; Holder 2001; McDowell 2002) and his 
corresponding refusal to engage in an apologetic defense of theology (McGrath 2001:177; Kincade 
1960:162; Crawford 1972:321; for more on Barth’s rejection of apologetics see Pinnock 1977; Hunsinger 
1991; Clausen 1999; Ward 2004). 
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More recently an alternative reading of Barth’s christocentrism has arisen as 
scholars have attempted to understand the relationship between Barth’s theology and 
postmodernism (e.g., Freyer 1991; Andrews 1996; Ward 1993a, 1993b, 1995; W. Lowe 
1988, 1993; Smith 1983; W. Johnson 1997; G. Thompson 2001). Rather than 
understanding the center of Barth’s theology as a determinative center that encompasses 
all creaturely reality within its totalizing framework, this approach prefers to understand 
the center of Barth’s theology indeterministically. These theologians tend to emphasize 
Barth’s awareness of the necessary finiteness of humanity and human language, and thus 
the generally indeterminate nature of theological discourse. According to William Stacy 
Johnson, then, there is a strongly “theocentric” strand to Barth’s theology that focuses on 
“the hiddenness and mystery of God” (1997:1). Consequently, Barth’s theology is 
understood to be largely “nonfoundational” and “de-centered” in the sense that the center 
of Bath’s theology is like the “opening at the center of a wheel” (ibid., 3-5; cf. I/2, 867).7
While there may be a measure of truth in each of these different interpretations of 
Barth’s theology, the sheer distance between these proposals suggests that greater clarity 
is needed. Thus, McCormack correctly notes, “All of this is to say that the customary 
description of Barth’s theology as ‘christocentric’ has very little explanatory value unless 
one goes on to define concretely what ‘christocentrism’ meant in his case” (1997:454). 
Well aware of some of these problems, Barth himself rarely used the term (Riches 
1972:223), even warning against a theology that is too christocentric (Barth 1991:91). It 
would seem, then, that further clarification is necessary before the term christocentric 
can be used in a meaningful way to characterize Barth’s theology.8   
 
2.2. Determining Karl Barth’s Brand of Christocentrism 
This leads us to the question with which this section is primarily concerned: What 
exactly do Barth’s interpreters mean when they describe him as a christocentric 
theologian? To answer this question it will prove helpful to expand on a definition of 
                                                 
7 While this section will make some evaluative comments with respect to such postmodern 
readings of Barth’s christocentrism, it will not attempt a broader evaluation with respect to its adequacy as 
a way of understanding Barth’s theology. For some studies on this topic see Ward 1993a; Thompson and 
Mostert 2001. 
8 For a broader study of christocentric theologies see Vander Goot 1981. 
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christocentrism offered by Bruce McCormack. According to McCormack, Barth’s 
particular form of christocentrism can be defined as  
 
the attempt…to understand every doctrine from a centre in God’s 
Self-revelation in Jesus Christ; i.e. from a centre in God’s act of veiling 
and unveiling in Christ…. ‘Christocentrism’, for him, was a 
methodological rule…in accordance with which one presupposes a 
particular understanding of God’s Self-revelation in reflecting upon each 
and every other doctrinal topic, and seeks to interpret those topics in the 
light of what is already known of Jesus Christ. (1997:454)9
 
Three things about this definition stand out as being particularly important for 
understanding the unique form of Barth’s christocentrism: a veiling and unveiling in 
Christ, a methodological orientation, and a particular understanding of God’s self-
revelation. In addition, we will need to consider the implications for Barth’s 
christocentrism of his Trinitarian orientation and his emphasis on incorporating both 
divine and human realities into any properly Christian theology. These five qualifications 
will help us understand more clearly what it means to attribute ‘christocentric’ to Barth’s 
theology. 
 
2.2.1. (Un)veiling Christocentrism: No Simple Given 
First, McCormack notes that Barth’s christocentrism is one that involves both 
“veiling and unveiling in Christ.” As Barth repeatedly argues, God’s Word is never 
merely given, as though it were the possession of human beings and under their control, 
but is an event whereby God manifests or unveils himself to human beings while 
remaining veiled in the sovereignty and mystery of his being (I/1, 169, 174, 315-325; 
II/2, 54-57, 179-203). Though Barth firmly asserts that the incarnate Christ is the 
revelation of God in a human being and thus the unveiling of God, he nevertheless denies 
that this humanity is intrinsically revelatory, but is so by the gracious act of God (I/1, 
173, 323-324; Barth 1991:1, 157). Thus, the incarnation is the supreme manifestation of 
                                                 
9 TeSelle points out that christocentrism can be applied to epistemological, anthropological, or 
ontological concerns (1975:1). Barth’s theology can properly be considered christocentric on all three 
points. 
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the deus revelatus who at the same time remains the deus absconditus (I/1, 320ff.). As a 
result, Barth’s christocentrism rejects (1) an entirely apophatic approach to theology that 
voids it of any meaningful content (thus denying the “unveiling” of God’s self-
revelation) and (2) an illegitimate systematization of theology based on some theological 
concept from which the rest of the system can be logically deduced (thus denying the 
“veiling;” I/2, 868ff). 
Webster argues that it is at this point that “[m]uch of the material which seeks to 
relate Barth to postmodernism has often lost its way” in that it overemphasizes the 
negative aspects of this presentation to the detriment of his “churchly positivity” 
(2001a:15). His concern, then, seems to be that many postmodern readings of Barth 
focus on the hiddenness of God emphasized by his language of veiling, but are not 
adequately balanced by an equal treatment of the givenness and objectivity of “God's 
freely taking form in the incarnation of the Son,” which “bestows upon Christian 
dogmatics a specific kind of positivity” (ibid., 18).10 Webster’s criticisms thus point out 
the potential for mistake that arises whenever either pole of Barth’s christocentric 
theology, the revelatory veiling or unveiling, are emphasized to the neglect of the other. 
 
2.2.2. Methodological Christocentrism: Moving from Christ to Theology 
Secondly, McCormack’s definition presents Barth’s christocentrism as “a 
methodological rule.” This, of course, is not to argue that it is merely a methodological 
rule, since, as we have seen, Barth is well aware that this rule is itself based on the 
ontological reality of the incarnation and the constitutive nature of Jesus’ eternal 
election. Rather, here we simply acknowledge the significance of the methodological 
role that Barth’s christocentrism plays.  
                                                 
10 Webster thus argues that “It is given” sums up “virtually the whole of what I want to say about Barth's 
relation to postmodernism” (2001a:19). Although he is even somewhat critical of Johnson’s study, suggesting 
that he presents “a rather strained reading” which tends to overemphasize the “mystery” motif in Barth’s 
theology (ibid., 16), Johnson at least recognizes the importance of affirming its positive dimensions in 
addition to its “countermelody,” i.e., mystery (cf. W. Johnson 1997:1). Any tendency to overemphasize the 
latter is probably the result of Johnson’s attempt to counter the significantly more common overemphasis 
on the all-consuming determinateness of Barth’s christological concentration. One can rightly question, 
however, whether Johnson’s use of the terms theocentric and christocentric as the most appropriate for 
identifying the hiddennes and givenness of Barth’s theology. 
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Two important aspects of Barth’s christocentric methodology require our 
attention. First, he argues that the directionality of all theological thinking must move 
from Christ to any given theological formulation. Barth recognized that the directionality 
of theological thinking has important consequences for the content of our theologies, and 
consistently maintained that theological thought must always begin with Christology (cf. 
Tanner 2000:11). Secondly, this methodological principle not only affirms the 
directionality but the universality of christological thinking. As indicated above, Barth 
maintained that properly theological thinking, whether addressing doctrine or some other 
mode of discourse, must begin with Christology.  
This methodological christocentrism, however, cannot be interpreted as 
necessitating the theological isolationism with which Barth is often associated. If one 
wants to focus exclusively on the proper point of departure for theology, then it must be 
conceded that Barth is christomonistic, but only in this narrow sense. This does not 
mean, however, that his theology is methodologically isolated from other disciplines. A 
number of useful studies have argued that Barth’s theology is quite open to interacting 
with and learning from a broad spectrum of non-theological disciplines (e.g., Stock 1980; 
T. Torrance 1990; Price 2002; McDowell 2003b; Mangina 2003, 2004; Migliore 2004).11 
Indeed, Barth’s emphasis on the relativity of theology,12 the importance of fellowship 
and solidarity with all people (III/2, 250-274; cf. Biggar 1993:148), the need for 
addressing the contemporary situation of the theologian (IV/3.2, 735; Barth 1979:161; 
1982b:54),13 his willingness to consider all people as potential members of the church 
(III/4, 484-485; IV/3, 117, 494-496), and his openness to extra-ecclesial revelation (I/1, 
54-55; IV/3.2, 38-164)14 all provide significant resources for supporting interdisciplinary 
                                                 
11 Webster makes a similar argument with respect to Barth’s openness to historical dialogue 
(2004b). Although several have argued that this openness was more of a theoretical than an actual reality 
(e.g., Johnson 1997:8-9 Ford 1979b:196), we will see in the next section that his actual practice was more 
open than is often acknowledged. 
12 According to Barth, all theology is necessarily relativized by its character as a human response 
to the sovereign revelation of God (I/1, 11-24) and its temporally limited nature (cf. Frei 1988:84).   
13 Barth’s famous criticism of German theology in the 19th early-20th century theology as 
capitulating to contemporary culture should not be read as indicating that Barth did not recognize 
engagement with culture as one of the tasks of theology, but as resisting any move to ground or validate 
theology in the ideas, needs, and/or questions of a particular culture (cf. 1982a:17-19). For other studies of 
Barth’s understanding of human culture see Palma 1983; Gorringe 2004; Metzger 2003.  
14 Cf. Dorman 1997; J. Thompson 1978:114-115; Sonderegger 1992:82-83; Gill 1986.  
 54
dialogue.15 Rather than irrationally isolated from other forms of discourse, his theology 
is thus understood as critically open to engaging the ideas and insights of these other 
approaches—but always in such a way that the interaction is determined by the 
christological perspective (cf. Hartwell 1964:53-58; Freyer 1991; Balthasar 1992:218-
219, 240; McDowell 2003b:45; I. Boyd 2004:26.).16
Indeed, John McDowell argues that Barth’s clear affirmation of his 
presuppositions and commitments enables a more effective and meaningful engagement 
(2003b). After criticizing theologians who view theological conversation either as pre-
determined and closed to insights from other perspectives or as completely open and thus 
constituted by the conversation itself, McDowell offers an understanding of conversation 
grounded in the particularity of the conversation partners. In such a conversation, the 
participants are neither fully constituted by the conversation itself, having identities that 
are already established by their historical particularities, but neither are they completely 
determined and closed to new insights, as they are willing to entertain the genuinely new 
insights and ideas of the other.17 Conversation, rightly understood, thus “involves 
difference, and the awareness of difference” (ibid., 491).18 In other words, for a 
conversation to be valuable, the participants must understand their own presuppositions 
and approach the conversation with something different to contribute: “We do not 
converse because we share a common foundation, and can trade variations upon that 
agreed theme, but because we are different” (ibid.)19  
                                                 
15 As Mangina points out, however, we should be careful about stressing the role of dialogue in 
Barth’s theology to the extent that we neglect his emphasis on the primacy of Scripture and theology’s task 
as witness (2004:176). We must also heed Barth’s warnings against theologians “yearning for the fleshpots 
of Egypt” and losing sight of theology’s true concern in their aversion to theological solitude and the need 
to  “swim against the stream of fellow theologians and nontheological opinions and methods” (1979:118).  
16 For studies countering the charges of irrationality, subjectivism, and fideism in Barth’s 
theology see Urban 1964:218-222; Molnar 1995:315-339; Smith 1983, 1984; Dalferth 1989; Mangina 
2003, 2004:48-53.  
17 In a similar manner, J. Taylor defines ‘dialogue’ as “a sustained conversation between parties 
who are not saying the same thing and who recognize and respect the differences, the contradictions and 
the mutual exclusions, between their various ways of thinking” (1981:212). 
18 McDowell thus follows Kenneth Surin’s criticism of pluralism as a merely “cosmetic” 
commitment to difference which ultimately subsumes all differences in its pursuit of “universal 
uniformity” (see Surin 1990). 
19 See also Webster 2001a:24-26.  
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An important part of legitimate conversation, then, is the willingness to argue. 
Rather than viewing argument and disagreement as “a sign of failure” it should instead 
be viewed as an indicator of commitment to a conversational process that values the 
difference between one’s own particular location and that of the other (ibid.).  
Based on this understanding of conversation, McDowell argues that, rather than 
viewing Barth’s strong commitment to his christological presuppositions as resulting in 
his virtual isolation from other perspectives, it is precisely this awareness of his own 
particular identity that enables Barth to engage in meaningful conversation with other 
people (ibid.).20 “Denying the factors that shape his commitments would be to renounce 
who he is” and thus that which “can make conversation possible” (ibid.). As indicators of 
this conversational openness McDowell points to Barth’s willingness to interact with 
“specifically ‘extra-ecclesial’ elements” like philosophy and culture (ibid., 494-497). 
   
2.2.3. Particular Christocentrism: No Mere Conceptual Construct 
Finally, McCormack’s definition stipulates that Barth’s christocentrism operates 
on the basis of “a particular understanding of God’s Self-revelation.”  Barth’s rejection 
of any attempt to ground theology on a particular principle or idea is well known. He 
asserted that truth is not  
 
an idea, principle, or system…. Nor is it a structure of correct 
insights, nor a doctrine, even though this be a correct doctrine of the 
being of God, that of man, their normal relationship to one another 
and the establishment, restoration and ordering of this relationship. 
(IV/3.1, 375)21  
                                                 
20 From a similar perspective, Grenz calls for a renewed commitment to “generous orthodoxy” 
that seeks to recognize the crucial and legitimate differences and contributions made by alternate 
perspectives while at the same time remaining committed to certain theological presuppositions (2000:325-
326). 
21 Similarly in III/2, he states, “In Jesus God is not just a word or a systematic principle, but the 
reality and prima veritas which of itself sets itself at the head of all other thoughts and gives them a 
specific direction and content” (p. 552). This was the basis of his disagreement with Berkouwer’s 
evaluation of his theology in The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth (1956). Barth objected 
to Berkouwer’s title and subsequent exposition on the basis that he was “not concerned here with the 
precedence, victory or triumph of a principle, even though this principle be that of grace. We are concerned 
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 Barth’s christological concentration centers theology not on “a principle from 
which a system can be deduced,” according to Eberhard Jüngel, but on “the concrete 
existence of Jesus Christ” (1986:128). So Barth understood his christocentrism to center 
on “an actual encounter with the reality to which theological presentation can only point” 
(p. 553); which, for Barth meant primarily “the divine act of the atonement” (ibid.).22  
As with the discussion of veiling and unveiling above, then, the postmodern 
interpretation of Barth can, at times, fall short on this point. Although Barth does 
describe his theology using his famous metaphor of “the opening in the centre of a 
wheel” (I/2, 867), he does not mean to suggest that this center is indeterminate or without 
particular content. Rather he affirms that knowledge of the center can only be provided 
through the revelatory event and cannot be possessed by conceptual knowledge (cf. W. 
Johnson 1997:11-66).23 Barth’s christocentrism thus involves “a particular understanding 
of God’s self-revelation” that reveals the center of theology to be the relationship 
between God and man revealed in Jesus Christ through his concrete existence.  
Stephen Sykes, however, finds Barth’s argument inconsistent on this point. 
According to him, Barth denies that any “central doctrine, concept, or idea” lies at the 
center of theology; an approach he associates with Barth’s rejection of neo-Protestant 
attempts to define the “essentials” of Christianity (1979a:25; cf. also Sykes 1988). Thus, 
Barth’s focus is not on “the centrality of a doctrine of the Atonement, but the centrality 
                                                                                                                                                
with the living person of Jesus Christ” (IV/3.1, 173).  “[C]hristological thinking,” for Barth, “in this sense 
is a very different process from deduction from a given principle” and he thus contends that theology does 
not develop from “a Christ-principle,” but from “Jesus Christ Himself as attested by Holy Scripture” (p. 
175). Therefore, Barth rejected Berkouwer’s characterization of his theology on the basis that any principle 
used systematically to determine God’s revelation is an illegitimate imposition on the divine freedom. 
Cushman describes it as an imposition of “man-made constructs on that which transcends man” (1981:11).  
22 As Barth describes it, the “heart of the Church’s dogmatics…has a circumference, the doctrine 
of creation and the doctrine of the last things, the redemption and consummation. But the covenant 
fulfilled in the atonement is its centre” (IV/3.1, 3). This actualistic centering of theology on the atonement 
has particular significance for this project as it indicates that theology cannot remain “only a doctrine of 
God” but must involve the relationship between God and man (II/2, 5; cf. Webster 1998:79-80 and 
Johnson 1997:13). On this theme Barth is thus very much in line with and perhaps influenced by Eastern 
Orthodox anthropologies (cf. Nellas 1987:120).  
23 Barth thus contends that the conceptuality of doctrine can “participate in” the truth of the Word 
but that the Word “cannot be enclosed or confined in any doctrine…not even the most correct 
Christology,” since He is the Lord as well as “the measure and criterion” of all doctrine (IV/3.1, 376). 
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of the act of the Atonement in which God is God” (ibid., 40). But Sykes thinks Barth is 
unaware that this actualistic center “demands a special Christology, which, although it is 
comparatively unspecific compared with the degree to which two-nature Christology was 
eventually developed in the post-patristic era, is nonetheless identifiably non-Docetic, 
non-Ebionistic, and non-Arian” (ibid., 41; cf. McGrath 1986:107). Therefore, he argues 
that the center of Barth’s theology is a particular christological doctrine and not merely 
the divine act itself. Barth’s assertions to the contrary are “unconvincing rhetoric” that 
disguise the reality of this conceptual core (ibid., 51). Sykes, by contrast, agrees with 
Barth’s actualism but contends that theologians should explicitly utilize some concept or 
idea “corresponding to, but in no way replacing the actuality of God’s revelation, which 
seeks to render conceptually what is there enacted really” at the center of theology (ibid., 
50). 
Sykes’ criticisms, however, should be responded to on three points. First, even 
though he acknowledges that Barth’s concern is primarily with “unauthorized 
systematization” (ibid., 46-48), he unaccountably fails to consider the significance of 
Barth’s understanding of an authorized systematization (cf. I/2, 868ff.). Theology, for 
Barth, can be systematic so long as it is an expression of the ratio of its object, i.e., God 
revealed through Christ.24 While Barth rejects any attempt to place a principle or idea at 
the center of Christian theology, he fully affirms that the story of God’s encounter with 
humanity in the incarnation can and must play this role (cf. Ford 1979a:74). As John 
Webster argues, Barth’s theology “is, then, striking above all for its narrative density, its 
ceaseless vigilance against conceptual takeover, its refusal to go beyond the simple ‘It 
came to pass...’.” (1995:83-84; see also Webster 2001b:41-43). Because of “the absolute 
and self-positing character” of this divine-human event “Barth locates the bridge 
between Jesus’ history and our own not in some cognitive or interpretative or 
experiential processes, but in the self-manifestation of the risen Jesus in the power of the 
Spirit, as a reality which we can only acknowledge” (ibid., 87-88). Thus, Barth is fully 
aware that the actualistic center of his theology has its own ratio from which a system 
can be developed. Secondly, Sykes fails to bring into the discussion Barth’s awareness of 
                                                 
24 On the development of Barth’s use of the ratio concept through his interaction with Anselm see 
T. Torrance 1962:182-193. 
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the inseparability of form and content in any discussion of methodology.25 This 
inseparable relationship makes it questionable at best to charge Barth with being 
unaware that the formal center of his theology could not be divorced from its material 
content.  Finally, although Sykes is well aware of Barth’s concern that any move toward 
conceptualizing the center of theology will result in the theologians attempting to control 
the object of theology—he even notes that the history of theology bears out these 
concerns—but he casually dismisses Barth’s actualistic methodology without providing 
in his alternative approach any substantive response to this concern (1979a:50-51). 
It may be that at times Barth does not differentiate clearly enough between the 
illegitimate systematization that seeks to develop an entire theological system on the 
basis of an idea or principle with the pragmatic adoption of some given conceptual 
perspective that is necessary for any given theological formulation. But Barth clearly 
recognizes the legitimacy of this latter move stating that  
 
truth certainly can and should be reflected in such a doctrine, and 
secondarily attested in this form. It demands to be taught as such, i.e., 
to be grasped, considered and understood with the greatest possible 
consistency, and to be expressed in tolerably correct, clear and 
logical thoughts, words and sentences. (IV/3.1, 375-376)  
 
But we must recognize the limitations of these conceptualizations in that “even in 
the doctrine which is most correct, and most conscientiously attained and fashioned, we 
are already or still in the sphere of man and not yet or no longer in that of the truth of 
God which encounters him” (ibid.; cf. I/2, 731). 
Contrary to both Sykes and some postmodern readings of Barth, then, Barth is 
fully committed to both the actualistic center of theology and its material particularity. 
The two can be differentiated for heuristic reasons but should never be separated as 
though they can be independently critiqued. 
 
                                                 
25 As McLean observed, for Barth “form and content are bound up together and should be 
separated only for the purpose of speech. Even then, speech itself must constantly attempt to reveal that 
they are together” (1981:12); see also Balthasar 1992:47-55 and McCormack 1999:476-477.  
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2.2.4. Theocentric Christocentrism: A Trinitarian Orientation 
Besides the three principles brought out by McCormack’s definition of Barth’s 
christocentrism, two other factors must be recognized. First, it seems that the most likely 
reason Barth thought the concept of christocentrism should be used carefully in theology 
is because Barth’s christocentrism was always intended, as Geoffrey Bromiley observes, 
“to point to (and not away from) the centrality of the triune God” (1979:xi; see Barth 
1991:91). Similarly, Johnson says,  
 
It is commonplace to interpret Barth as a ‘christocentric’ theologian. 
Yet this simple designation does not end the matter. One cannot 
focus on Jesus Christ in himself, according to Barth, without 
understanding his life as caught up in a more dynamic Trinitarian 
movement of God’s Word and Spirit. (1997:13)26  
 
Indeed, the significance of the Trinity is reflected in the entire structure of the 
Church Dogmatics and its individual expositions.27 Unlike some contemporary 
theologians who seek to place christocentric and theocentric in opposition to one another 
(e.g., Knitter 1983), Barth would regard any such move as singularly inappropriate. 
Rather, Barth always intended the christocentric orientation of his theology to lead to and 
                                                 
26 Hartwell likewise states: “In view of Barth’s teaching on the Triune God, creation and the Holy 
Spirit it may even be doubted whether his theology can be classified as wholly christocentric, seeing that to 
both the Father and the Holy Spirit a prominent place is assigned in it” (1964:16).  
27 At this point one must acknowledge the extensive discussions that have taken place regarding 
the adequacy of Barth’s pneumatology and its implications for understanding his christocentrism. John 
Thompson argues that despite the apparent paucity of pneumatological material, the very structure of the 
Dogmatics suggests an inherently Trinitarian and, thus, strongly pneumatological orientation (1991:42; cf. 
also Hunsinger 2000c:127-142). T. Torrance even goes so far as to say that no one has given the Trinity a 
greater role in theology than Barth (1962:176). Others have been more critical citing Barth’s weaknesses in 
Barth’s theology as underlying apparent weaknesses in his understanding of gender (Rogers 1998:43-82; 
2004), human freedom and history (Rosato 1981; Willis 1971; Gunton 1989), and the relationship between 
Christ’s humanity and ours (I. Davidson, 2001) among others. But it should be noted that most of these 
arguments have more to do with the manner in which Barth presented his pneumatology and do not in any 
way weaken Thompson’s point that the structure and intention of Barth’s theology reflects an inherently 
pneumatological interest. In addition, the proposed fifth volume on redemption, which was to have focused 
on pneumatological issues, may well have ameliorated some, though not all, of these concerns.  
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support his primarily trinitarian concerns. As John Thompson noted, for Barth, 
“Christology and Trinity are distinguishable but inseparable” (1986a:13). A 
christocentric theology that was in tension with, let alone in opposition to, its trinitarian 
orientation would ultimately fail to be Christian theology. 
 
2.2.5. (The)anthropological Christocentrism: The Divine-Human Relation 
Finally, as Barth’s christocentrism does not reflect a denigration of the Trinity, 
neither does it indicate a promotion of christological concerns at the expense of 
creaturely realities. Barth was very clear that theology cannot be about God alone but 
must include humanity as well:  
 
A very precise definition of the Christian endeavour in this respect 
would really require the more complex term ‘the-anthropology’. For an 
abstract doctrine of God has no place in the Christian realm, only a 
‘doctrine of God and of man’, a doctrine of the commerce and 
communion between God and man. (1982a:11) 
 
The significant attention that Barth devoted to human concerns (e.g., ethics, 
culture, agency, etc.) demonstrates the keen interest in creaturely realities Barth exhibited 
through his christocentric theology (cf. Mangina 2001). Some have argued that this 
openness to creaturely reality is a fairly late development, not surfacing until volumes III 
and IV of the Dogmatics. According to Webster, however, it is more appropriate to speak 
of a richer expression in these later writings of a concern that has its roots in the earliest 
phases of Barth’s theological development (1998:37-38).  
As we have seen, however, many interpreters contend that this aspect of Barth’s 
theology actually involves some form of ontological or epistemological christomonism 
that denigrates and subsumes creaturely realities. This despite the fact that Barth’s 
rejection of christomonism could not have been clearer. In the posthumously published 
fragment IV/4 he asserted that “a true Christocentricity will strictly forbid us” from 
pursuing christomonistic lines of thought (IV/4, 19). Even more clearly, he argued in 
another late article that “[t]he Gospel defies all isms” which fail to unite God and man 
and that “sound theology” eschews Christomonism as a failure to appreciate the 
affirmation and union of both God and humanity (1962). These concerns have also been 
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effectively responded to by a number of recent studies which demonstrate rather 
convincingly that such criticisms revolve primarily around a failure to appreciate the 
dialectic involved in Barth’s redefinition of human reality, particularly human freedom, 
as a determinate correspondence to God (cf., McLean 1981:60-62; Webster 1995, 1998; 
McCormack 2000:106). 
Additionally, several scholars have argued that the christomonist objection fails 
to appreciate Barth’s understanding of the ‘enhypostatic’ nature of humanity’s 
relationship to Jesus (e.g., Dalferth 1989; Webster 1998; I. Davidson 2001; Tanner 
2001). Thus, as Jesus’ human nature exists enhypostatically in union with the Word, so 
all human nature exists enhypostatically in union with Jesus. Barth’s christocentricity, 
then, is more properly understood as the proper ground, rather than the subsumption, of 
creaturely reality.  
 
2.3. A Properly Delimited Christocentrism 
Given these caveats, one might begin to wonder whether it is still appropriate to 
speak of Barth as a christocentric theologian. Since it is necessary to qualify the term so 
carefully, maybe we would be better served by finding some other descriptor that is less 
susceptible to such confusion. While it is true that the breadth and depth of Barth’s 
theology make it amenable to a variety of descriptions, there remains, nonetheless, a 
particular aptness to this label. As indicated at the beginning of this essay, Barth clearly 
emphasized that Christian theology must be determined at every stage by the incarnation. 
He thus argued that  
 
within theological thinking generally unconditional priority must 
be given to thinking which is attentive to the existence of the living 
person of Jesus Christ…, so that per definitionem Christological thinking 
forms the unconditional basis [begründende] for all other theological 
thinking…It is thus quite out of the question to start with certain prior 
decisions (e.g., concerning God, man, sin, grace etc) and then to support 
these christologically….The only decisions which can have any place are 
those which follow after [Nachentscheidungen], which are consistent with 
thinking which follows Him [folgsamen Denkens], which arise in the 
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course of Christological thinking and the related investigations, 
definitions and conclusions. (IV/3.1, 175) 
 
The consistency with which Barth carried out the christological determination of 
theology suggests that, despite the potential for confusion and mischaracterization, the 
christocentric label may still be justly, though carefully, applied. Indeed, one might well 
respond to Barth’s critics by asking, along with Barth, if the incarnation is a reality, if the 
sovereign God of the universe has in fact become incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ, 
can theology be anything but christocentric?28
From this discussion we can see that christocentric is not a generic label that can 
be usefully applied irrespective of the unique particularities of individual theologians. 
Any attempt to understand Barth as a christocentric theologian must therefore bear in 
mind that his unique brand of christocentrism always involved (1) both a veiling and 
unveiling of knowledge in Christ, (2) a methodological orientation, (3) a particular 
Christology, (4) a Trinitarian focus, and (5) an affirmation of creaturely reality. We may 
continue to describe Barth’s theology as a christocentric theology so long as we bear 
these caveats in mind.  
 
3. Seeing the Human, In Part: The Phenomena of the Human 
Having clarified the nature of Barth’s christocentrism and its implications for 
understanding its character as both determinate and open, we are now in position to 
ascertain the precise manner in which Barth actually participates in such dialogue. To do 
this, we will first consider Barth’s understanding of the “phenomena of the human 
[Phänomene des Menschlichen]” in III/2 and how such phenomena relate to the various 
                                                 
28 This would seem to be an apt response to those who are concerned about the “well-nigh 
incredible consistency” of Barth’s Christology (Frei 1993:175); a concern that apparently led to Colin 
Brown’s criticism that Barth developed a speculative theology that is “more christocentric than the Bible” 
(1978:108). Contrary to Brown, as we have seen, the consistency of Barth’s christocentrism is not based on 
systematic speculations but on a commitment to the reality-defining significance of the incarnation. 
Brown’s comment also betrays a lack of sensitivity to Barth’s christological hermeneutic; which would 
raise serious questions about what it means to be more christocentric than the Bible (for good comments on 
this aspect of Barth’s hermeneutic see Baxter 1986 and Higton 2004).  
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anthropological disciplines.29 After developing this concept, we will take a brief look at 
three crucial dialogues in which Barth engages other disciplines on their interpretation of 
these phenomena.  
 
3.1. Science and Speculation: A Phenomenological View of Humanity 
In §43.2 Barth considers two distinct approaches to understand the human person, 
each of which begin with that which can be ascertained about human nature from 
observing humanity as it currently appears. That is, they begin by observing the 
phenomena of human life.  
Despite this common starting point, however, Barth makes a sharp distinction 
between speculative and scientific approaches to anthropology. A speculative approach 
involves the development of “axiomatic principles” from which a theological 
anthropology may be developed (p. 22).30 The second type, “the exact science of man,” 
differs in that it develops hypotheses from its research but, “[t]o the extent that science is 
exact, it will refrain from consolidating its formulae and hypotheses as axioms” (p. 23). 
Hence, the primary difference between the two is that the scientific approach understands 
                                                 
29 At first glance Barth’s discussions in §44.2 seems oddly placed given the overall structure of 
III/2. The subject matter of this section follows very naturally on the heels of the discussion in §43.2, with 
its critique of non-christological approaches to anthropology. And it also fits rather awkwardly in its own 
context separating as it does §44.1, with its discussion of Jesus as the revelation of the basic form of 
humanity, from §44.3, where that basic form is used to develop an understanding of true humanity as the 
divine counterpart. Closer examination, though, indicates that Barth intentionally postponed his more 
extended critique of non-christological anthropologies until after he had developed his christologically-
derived principles of true humanity in §44.1. §44 can thus be understood as (1) the christological 
development of the basic form of humanity; (2) the basic form of humanity critically applied to evaluate 
non-christological starting points; and (3) the basic form of humanity constructively applied to develop an 
understanding of humanity. So, sections §43.2 and §44.2 share the same basic concerns, but the more 
complete discussions of the latter section had to wait for the christological arguments of §44.1. 
30 According to Hunsinger, “Speculation designates, in the Barthian lexicon, just that procedure 
which seeks to move from the general to the particular, from an a priori understanding of what sorts of 
things are generally possible and actual (as established by reason apart from faith) to an understanding of 
what sorts of things are possible and actual in theology….More broadly, speculation is a term used to 
designate the deriving of doctrine from anything other than the biblical witness to Jesus Christ as the center 
and norm of God’s self-revelation” (1991:51).  
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the tentative nature of its hypothetical investigations while the speculative approach 
attempts to develop an axiomatic foundation upon which to build a theory of humanity.  
Consistent with the christocentric orientation of his theology, Barth’s comments 
about the speculative approach are unsurprisingly critical. He accuses this approach of 
being mythical, unbiblical, and arrogant (p. 22). His primary concern is with the 
“unlimited self-confidence” (p. 23) of this view whereby it attempts “to see the essence 
and nature of man apart form the Word of God,” and instead seeks to develop an 
autonomous perspective from which to develop its anthropology (p. 22). Whether this 
approach includes an “idea of God” or not is irrelevant in Barth’s analysis since either 
way the foundation of the anthropology is not the Word of God, but is instead the 
autonomous attempt by the human person to “know and analyse himself” (p. 23). 
Against this perspective, Barth can only maintain that “we are not able to see the essence 
and nature of man apart from the Word of God” (ibid.).  
The scientific approach, however, receives a much more positive evaluation from 
Barth insofar as it remains true to its scientific orientation. As such it will recognize that 
its purpose is to investigate the phenomena of humanity and not try to develop 
comprehensive theories regarding the essential nature of humanity (p. 24).  
Scientific anthropologies so understood can actually be quite helpful as they 
provide “precise information and relevant data which can be of service in the wider 
investigation of the nature of man, and can help to build up a technique for dealing with 
these questions” (ibid.).  
Despite this positive evaluation, Barth’s discussion precludes any possibility that 
knowledge of true humanity could be derived in this way. Though the exact science of 
man may be adept at analyzing the phenomena of humanity, it is completely unable to 
deal with “the relation of this creature to God, and therefore with his inner reality and 
wholeness” (p. 25).31 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Barth argues, “Even the fact that man 
                                                 
31 Similarly, P. Jewett observes, “Knowledge of the outer world of the universe where we live and 
the inner world of the mind by which we perceive where we live - knowledge of the ‘phenomena of 
humanity’, as Barth calls it - gives us genuine knowledge about ourselves. Such knowledge, however, will 
never disclose the ultimate mystery of our humanity; it will never tell us what it means to say 'I'” (1996:16-
17). Barth’s approach is thus markedly different from the more common method espoused by Zizioulas 
where even a humanistic approach to anthropology recognizes that “the actual man of our experience” 
transcends empirical investigation, but that such endeavors, nevertheless, provide “‘the raw material’ for 
the conception or creation of the real man” (1975: 401, 402; cf. also Macquarrie 1982:3-4). While Barth 
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is the creation of God…is a fact that is not accessible to human thought and perception 
otherwise than through the Word of God” (ibid.).32 Even scientists who are “obedient 
hearers of the Word of God” cannot use the scientific approach to ascertain true 
humanity in its relationship with God. This is because such a move would necessitate 
that they “look beyond the phenomenal man who is the object of exact science to the real 
man perceptible in the light of God’s Word” (ibid.). There is no reason why a person 
should not do this but, in so doing, they should recognize that they are no longer 
developing a scientific but rather a theological anthropology (pp. 25-26). The scientific 
approach thus remains “a good work” only insofar as it recognizes its limits and avoids 
becoming “axiomatic, dogmatic and speculative” (p. 25).  
 For Barth, then, both the speculative and scientific approaches are 
inherently flawed when viewed as starting points for achieving an understanding of true 
humanity. The speculative approach fails, in Barth’s estimation, to provide real 
knowledge of any kind with its hyper-inflated sense of its absolute vantage point; while 
the scientific approach, though valuable in its own right, is incapable of seeing beyond 
the phenomena of humanity to the nature of true humanity.  
 
3.2. The Phenomena of the Human vs. the Symptoms of Real Humanity 
Barth’s understanding of the “phenomena of the human,” however, is somewhat 
more complicated than it first appears.33 In his opening discussion of the phenomena 
(§43.2), Barth seems to equate the phenomena of the human with whatever is accessible 
to “exact science” (p. 23)—e.g., “physiology, psychology, and sociology” (p. 24). Thus, 
the phenomena of humanity are understood to be the “outward features” of humanity 
accessible to the exact sciences (p. 20). Any anthropological approach that fails to limit 
its investigation to these empirical phenomena and seeks instead to develop a system for 
understanding true humanity becomes a speculative “exponent of a philosophy and 
world-view” (p. 24). Thus, it would appear that this first discussion limits the phenomena 
                                                                                                                                                
would affirm the usefulness of such “raw material,” he would not allow that they are necessary for an 
understanding of true humanity. 
32 For Barth, the determinative significance of humanity’s relationship to God precludes even “a 
theoretical, practical or methodological atheism in his self-knowledge” (p. 345). 
33 Thus Stock complains about the “bewildering way [verwirrender Weise]” in which Barth 
presents this distinction (1980:528). 
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of humanity to the “exact” sciences and specifically excludes any speculative or 
philosophical consideration of human being.  
This apparently scientific account of the phenomena, however, is clearly 
expanded in §44.2. His explicit engagement with both scientific and philosophical 
perspectives on the human person in this paragraph require a much broader 
understanding of the phenomena which he defines here as “certain human 
characteristics” (p. 76) that are a part of humanity’s creaturely nature and consequently 
place human beings in basic continuity with all other animals (pp. 76-79). Later in the 
work, Barth explicitly defines these human characteristics that are ostensibly open to 
phenomenological analysis as including biological, relational, intellectual, volitional, 
emotional, political, cultural, and even religious dimensions of human existence.34 For 
Barth, then, the “phenomena of humanity” can be defined as any aspect of human 
existence that can be observed and analyzed from some limited human perspective (e.g., 
philosophy, biology, sociology, history, etc.) independent of an awareness of the true 
humanity revealed in Jesus Christ. 
At this point, Barth draws a helpful distinction between the “phenomena of the 
human” and the “symptoms of real man [Symptome des wirklich Menschlichen]” (p. 
75).35 In contrast to the phenomena, which can be studied independently of a 
christological perspective and can only result in a “phantom man [Schattenmenschen],” 
the “symptoms of real man” are indicators of true humanity and, as such, can only be 
discerned when the phenomena are viewed from the vantage point provided by the true 
humanity of Jesus (ibid). To understand the relationship between these two views of 
humanity, we will have to consider the limitations of the phenomenological method.   
 
                                                 
34 The inclusion of religion in Barth’s understanding of the phenomena is reinforced in his 
subsequent discussion of the theology of Emil Brunner under the same category (pp. 128-132). For Barth, 
even religion and theology remain merely phenomena of humanity when they fail to regard humanity in 
light of its historical relationship with God grounded in its ontological determination in Christ. Elsewhere, 
Barth explicitly affirms that the phenomena include those things not “perceptible to our senses” and thus 
not amenable to empirical study (p. 91).  
35 Frey critiques Barth at this point for failing to provide a “methodologically precise account 
[methodisch präzise Rechenschaft]” of this distinction (1978:217). Freyer, though, points out that Barth’s 
distinction is more precise than often recognized (1991:195).  
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3.3. Partial Perspectives: The Limitations of a Phenomenological Viewpoint 
These phenomena, though useful, are inherently limited from a number of 
directions. First, as we discussed above, no purely phenomenological analysis of creation 
in general or humanity in particular can ever lead to knowledge of humanity’s essential 
relationship to God. Since this relationship is basic to any proper knowledge of 
humanity, the phenomena are necessarily precluded from resulting in knowledge of true 
humanity (pp. 20-21). 
A second limitation, however, stems from humanity’s sinful condition. 
Theologians have consistently noted the problem of sin not only as it impacts human 
existence and experience but also as it affects our ability to understand humanity itself 
and therefore the proper methodology for approaching that study. As John Zizioulas 
points out, sin constitutes “a fundamental methodological problem” for any theological 
anthropology (1975:401). Theologians either affirm, on the one hand, that true humanity 
can be discerned through actual humanity’s sinful state, thus implying that sin and 
redemption do not “essentially alter our view of man” or, on the other hand, that true 
humanity cannot be discerned in this way, thus problematizing any approach to 
anthropology (pp. 20-21). Hence, the methodological implications of the sin problematic 
are such that any theological anthropology must address them. 
Barth is keenly aware of these methodological issues. According to Barth, the 
Word reveals humanity as “a betrayer of himself and a sinner against his creaturely 
existence” (p. 26). Humanity stands “in contradiction to God his Creator” and to “the end 
for which he was created” (ibid.). Though the “real creaturely nature of man” (p. 38) 
persists through the gracious love of God and the faithfulness of Jesus, humanity’s sin 
means that “man has no power of vision to see through the perversion of his nature to his 
true nature” (ibid.). So Barth asks,  
 
In these circumstances how can we possibly reach a doctrine of 
man in the sense of a doctrine of his creaturely essence, of his human 
nature as such? For what we recognize to be human nature is nothing 
other than the disgrace which covers his nature….But if we know man 
only in the corruption and distortion of his being, how can we even begin 
to answer the question about his creaturely nature. (p. 27) 
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We ourselves are blinded by sin and can only wonder if our understanding of 
humanity is mere delusion, but in Christ we see the reality (p. 43).36 Barth thus rejects 
the traditional approach to theological anthropology “which was to try first to establish 
generally what human nature is, and on this basis to interpret the human nature of Jesus 
Christ in particular. Our whole approach to the relation between human sin and human 
nature has led us irresistibly in the opposite direction” (p. 44).  
Interestingly, though, Barth brings sin into the discussion after he rejects the 
possibility of speculative and scientific starting points for theological anthropology. As 
the previous discussion shows, this is not because Barth does not appreciate the 
significance of the sin problematic. The order of his argument shows that his primary 
concern is to demonstrate that any proper theological anthropology must begin with the 
relationship between humanity and God. Any anthropology that begins in some other 
place is necessarily flawed regardless of the questions posed by sin.37
As a third limitation, Barth contends that the phenomena are inherently “neutral, 
relative and ambiguous” (p. 76). While these phenomena are certainly capable being 
symptoms of real humanity, one wonders about the criteria by which it is possible to 
determine which phenomena indicate true symptoms and which only apparently do so. 
Thus, they are unable on their own to establish a picture of true humanity (ibid.). What is 
needed is some criterion outside the sphere of the phenomena themselves by which the 
phenomena can be evaluated and understood in their proper order. And, of course, the 
only possible criterion for such a task according to Barth is the true humanity of Jesus 
Christ.38
                                                 
36 In his analysis of the second edition of Barth’s Romans commentary, McCormack, following 
Michael Beintker, identifies a similar distinction between reality theologically perceived and reality as “it 
appears to men and women living in history,” which he classifies as the “ontic” and the 
“phenomenological” levels of reality (1997b: 266).   
37 Additionally, Barth critiques non-christological approaches for their inherently circular and 
self-referential nature: “For the point at issue is who is the man who wants to know himself and thinks he 
can? How does he reach the platform from which he thinks he can see himself” (pp. 75, 178)? Moltmann 
raises a similar concern with his observation about the necessary circularity involved in any attempt by a 
human person to understand his own subjectivity (1974:2).  
38 Thus, in Barth’s discussion of Polanus, he concludes that the idea of the human person as a 
rational animal is a phenomenon of humanity that can be rightly viewed as a symptom of true humanity, 
but only if it is seen in light of humanity’s “definite history grounded in God’s attitude to him” (p. 77). If 
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The final limitation of any phenomenological approach to humanity is that such 
accounts are necessarily constrained by the current state of human knowledge. Scientific 
and philosophical studies of humanity offer “only a modest degree of certainty” because 
their certainty can only be that of “the competent observer” who is necessarily limited by 
the knowledge available in her field (p. 88). The insights of these disciplines, while 
valuable, can only provide “modest, i.e., limited, conditioned and relative certainty, and 
definitely not the certainty which life demands of man” (ibid.). A properly theological 
account of the true human, by contrast, seeks to ground knowledge of humanity in its 
eternal relationship with God and thus a knowledge that is not affected by the ephemeral 
nature of human knowledge.  
 We can see, then, that despite Barth’s affirmation of the validity of 
phenomenological investigations of human existence and their ability to produce true 
insight into human phenomena, he thinks that this endeavor is inherently limited by its 
christological inadequacy, the sinfulness of humanity, the ambiguous nature of its 
results, and the finite limitations of phenomenological knowledge. 
 
4. Joining the Dialogue: Karl Barth at the Anthropological Roundtable 
Having considered the nature of these phenomenological investigations and their 
corresponding limitations, we are finally in place to determine the precise nature of 
Barth’s approach to interdisciplinary dialogue. Consistent with Barth’s aversion for 
general principles, however, we find that he does not give any specific guidelines for 
such dialogical interaction. Rather than provide us with an abstract account of how to 
deal with the phenomena, he presents several concrete examples.39 The bulk of §44.2, 
then, is devoted to Barth’s engagement with these various ways of understanding the 
human person and his repeated contention that each provides insight into the phenomena 
of the human, but not true humanity itself. In this section, then, we will (1) consider the 
nature of the three dialogue partners Barth engages, (2) determine the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                                
not, it can only be “an indifferent phenomenon, which can be established and observed as such, but which 
does not shed even the smallest ray of light on the true nature of man” (ibid.).  
39 Barth actually deals with four different anthropologies in this paragraph. Since our concern is 
primarily with the manner in which Barth interacts with non-theological anthropologies, however, we will 
not address his treatment of Brunner’s anthropology in the fourth dialogue.  
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Barth can affirmatively engage these alternate perspective, and (3) analyze the process 
by which he critically interacts with each.  
 
4.1. Biology, Moral Agency, and Existential Subjectivity: The Conversation Partners 
The Biological Dialogue: The first of the discussions, concerning a biological 
account of humanity (pp. 79-90), actually involves two separate perspectives: one 
theological and one more properly scientific. In the first, Barth summarizes the historical 
development of apologetic efforts by modern theologians to defend the uniqueness of 
humanity from naturalistic attempts to view it as no different from other creatures.40 He 
discusses how this apologetic endeavor moved from arguments asserting a high level of 
discontinuity between humans and other creatures to a greater appreciation for the 
similarities between them and a greater use of, indeed dependence on, evolutionary 
accounts of human development. In each case, the theologians in question sought to 
establish true humanity on the basis of some distinction particular to human beings (p. 
85). In the second account, Barth addresses Adolf Portmann’s attempt to determine “the 
singularity of man in his non-human environment” (p. 87). Writing with more properly 
scientific, rather than theological, concerns, Portmann did not seek to establish 
humanity’s absolute uniqueness but rather its relative singularity—i.e., the extent to 
which humanity is both similar to and different from other creatures (ibid.). His work is 
thus distinct from the previously mentioned theologians primarily in the scope of his 
intent; methodologically the procedures are identical.  
The Ethical Dialogue: Barth’s second dialogue moves beyond the realm of what 
is apprehensible by the senses to the person as the subject of particular volitions and 
actions (pp. 91-92). Thus, anthropology moves beyond the merely biological and into the 
realm of ethical behavior.41 Here Barth engages this ethical/idealist viewpoint in the 
philosophy of Johan Gottlieb Fichte (pp. 96-109).  
                                                 
40 Barth affirms the intentions of these theologians even while denying that their apologetic 
endeavors were well grounded. He thus argues that they were right to resist the “levelling down” of a 
naturalistic world-view that was prone to a “forgetfulness and denial of the specifically human” (p. 84). 
Nonetheless, Barth believed that these theologians were constrained to confront this problem on grounds 
established by their opponents because of their failure to see the christological basis of humanity as the 
only secure starting point (pp. 79-80).  
41 This move from a merely biological account to an ethical account is required, according to 
Barth, because ethical action “can of course be explained and described in connexion with the other 
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Barth summarizes Fichte’s presentation as moving through three phases.42 In the 
first, Fichte stipulates that the scientific view of humanity plunges the human person into 
doubt. While it seems to the person that she is free, she comes to realize from the results 
of the exact sciences that her life is fully determined in every respect. She is thus cast 
into doubt about the reality of her existence and the conflict between two basic ways of 
understanding herself (i.e., intuitively known freedom and empirically established 
determinism). The second portion of the work resolves the dilemma through an idealistic 
presentation of human knowledge. Everything “external” to the human person is viewed 
as an idealistic projection of that person’s knowledge. The subject and the objects of 
which the person is aware are actually one and the apparent division between them 
created by the conflict addressed in the first section is dissolved. A problem remains, 
however, in the possibility that the subject, the ego, is itself merely the product of 
thought. While transcendental idealism can solve the dilemma posed by scientific 
materialism, it is inadequate for grounding the real presence of the individual subject. So, 
Fichte moves into the third section: faith. Here Fichte maintains that we are directly 
aware of ourselves as individuals who have an impulse to act. This knowledge is not 
derived in the sense posited by the previous section (i.e., knowledge of objects) but it is 
established as knowledge, nonetheless, as I “voluntarily decide to acquiesce in the view 
which naturally forces itself upon men in my impulse to affirm myself in action” (p. 99). 
The reality of the ego is thus grounded in “practical reason”—i.e., knowledge of the self 
as it freely wills itself in its own action (pp. 99-100). The human person is both a 
spiritual being who can posit himself by an expression of “a pure will” and a sensual 
being who can act through particular deeds (p. 100). In these three moves (doubt, 
knowledge, and faith), then, Fichte seeks to establish human existence on the basis of 
humanity’s freedom and moral agency.  
The Existential Dialogue: In the third section, Barth moves from those 
anthropological approaches that perceive humanity as “a self-contained reality 
                                                                                                                                                
processes of the cosmos but can never be derived from the latter” (ibid.). Barth thus rejects any possibility 
that the moral freedom of human agents can be explained on the basis of any biologically reductive 
account of human persons.  
42 We will not be concerned in this section, or in any of the subsequent discussions, with the 
question as to whether Barth summarizes and interprets his various conversation partners adequately. We 
will simply deal with the ideas and works as he has presented them in an effort to determine the manner in 
which he handles their ideas.  
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[geschlossene Wirklichkeit]” (p. 109) to one which addresses more clearly the problem of 
the human person’s subjective existence in relation to something other than himself. 
Rather than approaching the human person as an object of scientific enquiry or moral 
action, this third approach begins from the human person’s existence as a personal 
subject. Barth thus engages existential philosophy, primarily as espoused by Karl 
Jaspers, as an example of this type of approach. 
According to Barth, this existential approach comprises for key moves (pp. 111-
112). (1) Existentialism recognizes that a complete anthropology must transcend mere 
objectivity and address the ground of human subjectivity itself. (2) The human person 
thus lives in a tension between his objective reality and his subjective quest for himself 
as that which lies beyond that objectivity. Lest this collapse into vicious circularity, the 
existentialist posits an external ground for human subjectivity in the subject’s relation to 
something that is ‘other’ than herself. (3) The fundamental ground of human subjectivity, 
however, cannot itself be objectifiable (i.e., not simply another human person), but “will 
undoubtedly elude all objectification, materialisation, or even spiritualisation; indeed 
every kind of definition” (p. 112). (4) This transcendent other, though necessarily 
mysterious and remote, comes to us in “those paradoxical situations of suffering and 
death, conflict and guilt” in which “existence is transformed from a mere possibility into 
a reality…in the moments when in these unavoidable and inexplicable situations we have 
to wrestle with them, or rather with the transcendent which encounters us in them” 
(ibid.). The real subjectivity of the human person is thus constituted as she meets the 
transcendent ‘other’ in the most difficult circumstances of life. 
 
4.2. Seeing the Phenomena: The Affirming Conversation 
Barth is very clear on his appreciation for all three of these approaches to the 
phenomena of the human. He affirms that those thinkers who have addressed the 
biological phenomena have “applied themselves seriously and fundamentally to the 
question of human phenomena” and have seen much that was “both incontestable and 
important” (p. 85), pointing specifically to their recognition that humanity is at least 
relatively distinct from other creatures (pp. 86-88). He expresses particular appreciation 
for Portmann’s work as indicating that humanity’s “biological singularity consists in the 
indissoluble connexion (peculiar to each individual) between his inherited tendencies and 
development on the one hand and his experience of history on the other” (p. 87). Such 
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insights are important and “[i]t would be obstinate to disregard and ungrateful to ignore 
them” (p. 88). 
Barth expresses a similar appreciation for the insights generated by the ethical 
approach, considering it a necessary improvement on the merely biological. Indeed, the 
ethical view’s emphasis on humanity’s freedom and agential activity indicates something 
that “may well be supremely symptomatic” and “may well be significant for the whole 
further development of our theological anthropology” (p. 94). 
The existential approach is likewise treated favorably for its recognition of a 
phenomenon that is not only “decisively important” but may even be “the most genuine 
symptom [echtestes Symptom] of the human” (p. 113). Although he rejects the 
suggestion that the existentialist approach is essentially Christian (ibid.), it still surpasses 
the previous accounts in its ability to “show the being of man dynamically and in its 
basic openness as his act in relation to another than himself and in encounter with this 
other rather than self-grounded, self-resting and self-moving” (p. 114). Transcending the 
self-contained objectivity of naturalism and idealism, this account highlights what is for 
Barth one of the essential elements of true humanity, its necessary relationality and 
extrinsic determination. 
In all three accounts, then, Barth fully affirms that legitimate human phenomena 
are recognized and analyzed from these non-theological perspectives in such a way as to 
contribute valuable insights. These insights must, therefore, be “taken into account” in 
our attempts to understand human nature (p. 88).  
 
4.3. Veiling the Phenomena: The Critical Conversation 
4.3.1. The Christological Critique: Anthropological Myopia and Failing to see 
the True Human 
Barth, however, also presents a critical evaluation of the actual accomplishments 
of these various approaches. First, in each dialogue, he contends that each fails to 
consider the human person from a christologically determined vantage point. Barth’s six 
criteria for true humanity explicitly indicate the determinative significance of humanity’s 
relationship to God in Jesus Christ. The nature of these three non-christological 
approaches, however, fails to take into account the attitude of God to man and man’s 
relationship to God and are, therefore, definitively precluded from achieving any account 
of true humanity. Thus, although the biological account sees “something of his aptitudes, 
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capacities, and possibilities,” it does not see true man (p. 89). The ethical account is 
superior in that it advances beyond “the narrowness of naturalism,” but we cannot think 
that have thus “attained to real man, to his uniqueness in creation. All our six criteria for 
the discovery of real man forbid this” (p. 94).43  
It is important to realize at this point that Barth’s christological criteria are not 
merely formal principles depicting the bare shape of human existence, which can then be 
filled with whatever data might be provided by some other discipline.44 Instead, they 
designate both the form and (at least some of) the content of true humanity.45 He is thus 
particularly critical of the ethical view’s understanding of moral freedom. Humanity, in 
this approach, is not only viewed as theistically independent but also morally neutral. 
The human being of the ethical account is free to will both for and against God. It thus 
presents a picture of humanity that includes the human person standing in sinful 
contradiction to his existence in Christ as though it could be included in a depiction of 
true humanity (ibid.). For Barth, this simply cannot stand as a valid anthropology, 
contradicting as it does the christologically determined picture of humanity as existing 
for the glory of God (criteria #3), under his lordship (criteria #4), with the freedom to 
will for God (criteria #5) in his service (criteria #6). 
Although Barth expresses the greatest appreciation for the existential approach, 
he maintains that it too fails as an account of true humanity (p. 113). Thus, it rightly 
points out that the subjectivity of human life is grounded in a historical encounter with an 
‘other’. Nonetheless, such an approach falls necessarily short of true humanity by 
abstracting humanity’s existentiality from its determinative relation in Jesus Christ. Barth 
thus concludes that this approach fails to show us “a genuine symptom of real humanity” 
because it does not know “what true humanity is” (p. 121).  
                                                 
43 Barth does not reiterate this specifically christological objection with respect to the existential 
account, but it certainly undergirds the entire discussion.  
44 Thus, Barth would not appreciate the suggestion that theological anthropology provides only 
the “general categories [die Grundkategorien]” (Stock 1980:537) for anthropology and, consequently is 
“blind” without the insights of scientific anthropology (Price 2002:50029.  
45 That Barth does not derive all the material elements of his theological anthropology directly 
from his christological premises will become clear in the course of this discussion.  
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For Barth, then, each of the perspectives is fundamentally limited in its ability to 
understand the phenomena of the human by its non-christological starting point.46  
 
4.3.2. Beyond the Christological Critique: Determining the Coherence of an 
Anthropology 
In addition to these explicitly christological concerns, Barth also demonstrates 
his willingness to engage the coherence and consistency of these other approaches. Thus, 
he argues that the biological approach has sometimes been used to interpret the 
biological phenomena as indicating the unique identity and value of the human person 
(pp. 85-87). But, as Barth points out, the phenomena of the human demonstrate 
humanity to be only relatively distinguishable from, and in no way demonstrably 
superior to, other animals. Indeed, a comparison of human capabilities to those of the 
other creatures reveals that all animals have their distinctive attributes and that those of 
some of the animals far surpass those of human beings (p. 89).47 Consequently, any 
attempt to interpret these phenomena as indicators of humanity’s truly unique identity in 
relation to the rest of creation actually transcends the limits of the biological 
methodology. Value judgments that seek to establish humanity’s identity on this basis 
are themselves not phenomenologically ascertainable and, consequently, lie beyond the 
proper scope of this approach (ibid). Transcending the limitations of their perspective, 
these thinkers have misinterpreted the phenomena that were rightly theirs to consider (p. 
89).   
                                                 
46 It is worth noting at this point that throughout these discussions Barth avoids using the 
individual criteria in particular criticisms, rather, he wields them en toto to challenge the basic 
christological adequacy of some other perspective. Since he does not discuss his methodology with respect 
to using the criteria, it is difficult to establish whether he does this for pragmatic reasons (e.g., space and 
time) or more theoretical reasons (e.g., a concern about abstracting one criterion from the others). There 
does not, however, appear to be any particular theoretical reason to prohibit using the criteria individually 
for a more nuanced interaction with some particular perspective so long as their essential 
interconnectedness of all the criteria remains in view.  
47 As Barth says, “If it is clear that human possibilities as compared with those of the animals 
closest to man are far wider, yet it must also be remembered that not only these higher animals but that 
others also, which according to the usual scale of values are perhaps much lower in the ladder of creation, 
have possibilities which put those of man in the shade. And for all we know there may be animal 
possibilities which do not make us think merely because we do not perceive them.” 
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Similarly, Barth presents an extended critique of the coherence of Fichte’s moral 
philosophy (pp. 103-109). First, Barth contends that Fichte attempted to develop an 
indeterministic view of human freedom and that such an approach is fundamentally 
flawed in its inability to provide the human person with the boundaries within which true 
freedom must operate. Second, he thinks that Fichte’s idealistic grounding of human 
knowledge leaves the human person without any real knowledge of himself; he is thus 
not even free to know that he exists as more than a mere concept.48 Third, The idealistic 
conception of human knowledge means that the human person is ultimately no different 
than the rest of creation and thus robs humanity of the differentiation so important, for 
Barth, to any valid understanding of humanity. Fourth, Fichte’s attempt to ground the 
self in freely willed action is undermined and ultimately invalidated by the premises 
contained in the first two stages of his own argument. If the move to faith and 
understanding the person as act in the third stage of the argument is valid, Barth 
contends that it necessarily impacts the argument at a much earlier stage and calls into 
question the validity of the doubt and idealistic knowledge of the earlier discussions.49 
And finally, Barth thinks that Fichte’s conclusion, humanity as the triumphant 
determiner of her own reality, means that his argument ultimately leaves the human 
person in the same condition as in deterministic naturalism—i.e., no different than her 
environment.50 While we cannot take the time to unpack each of these criticisms, it 
                                                 
48 So Barth contends, “Man as Fichte understands him has no other source of knowledge. There 
can be no knowledge from without because there is no ‘without’ anyway. This type of thinking is ended 
before it has even begun. Hence we can only note that he appears to speak of a supposedly free man about 
whom he is nevertheless obliged to report that he knows nothing of himself and can know nothing” (p. 
106). 
49 Barth thus asks, “Are the doubter and the knower so presented by Fichte that he can now 
legitimately introduce the same person as a believer in a mode of self-contemplation in which what was 
formerly invisible is now visible and what formerly seemed unreal suddenly becomes real, and therefore 
the former mode of self-knowledge is completely shattered and transcended? How can Fichtean man make 
this leap when there is nothing outside himself, so that he cannot be induced by any outward cause to make 
any such radical transformation in his mode of self-contemplation?” (p. 106). Even if such a move were 
possible, Barth argues that it should inform the argument from the beginning: “How could the doubter and 
the knower speak as Fichte makes them speak if his believer must speak in this way? If what is here said 
about man is fundamentally and intrinsically valid, how can it fail to have been stated earlier?” (p. 107). 
50 Again Barth critiques Fichte with a question, “Does not this really bring us back to the point 
from which the whole essay started, to the vision, as it appears to uncritical knowledge. Of the one in the 
all, of the all in the one, of the great life stream in which man is only a tiny drop?” (p. 107). Although 
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seems clear that Barth is willing to critique Fichte on logical as well as christological 
grounds.  
This same approach can be seen in Barth’s criticism of Jaspers’ existentialism. 
First, Barth thinks that Jaspers has provided an insufficient account as to what makes 
particular situations meaningful as a “frontier [Grenze]” situation (p. 114). Although 
man is “everywhere involved in suffering and death, conflict and guilt,” why should 
these negative situations be viewed as more existentially decisive than any other (ibid.)? 
The existentialist merely asserts their distinctive quality without providing any real 
assurances on the matter (ibid.). Likewise, this approach provides no account of the 
character of the other itself: “could it not equally well be a demon which fools us at that 
frontier as the ostensible and illusory goal of our search” (p. 116)? Although the 
existentialist provides us with “solemn assurances” that this is not so, the nature of the 
other is so key to the system that the question is not so easily avoided (ibid.). Third, 
Jaspers’ account presumes that the human person will respond to the other in the frontier 
situation “with unconditional surrender and trust” (ibid.). At the most, the existentialist 
allows for the opposite response, rejection of the other. But what if the human person 
responds with complete indifference (pp. 116-117)? Jaspers’ system, according to Barth, 
does not seem to allow for this since the encounter with the other in the frontier situation 
is too dynamic to ignore in this fashion. But this neglects the harsh realities of human 
life, which is more often characterized by apathy and lethargy (p. 117). Finally, and most 
decisively, Barth argues that Jaspers’ account does not really transcend the human 
individual at all (pp. 118-119). This system requires that the human person be capable of 
placing unconditional trust in the other. But this means that “the unconditional trust and 
therefore the transcendence which we supposed him to lack…is already within him” (p. 
118). Since he already has the capacity for a trust that transcends himself, he possesses a 
transcendent dimension within himself. “Thus man does not really need to ask 
concerning transcendence. Indeed, in the strict sense he cannot. What he can and must 
do is simply to understand that he himself is the answer to his question” (p. 119). 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Fichte attempts to reverse this by focusing on the human person rather than external realities, “In the last 
resort does it not amount to the same thing whether we see the one which is the all, the all which is the one, 
from the standpoint of its universal structure or any other part, or from that of man himself?” (ibid.). 
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5. Dialogue vs. Monologue: We Are Talking but Is Anyone Listening? 
Having developed a better appreciation for Barth’s christological criteria, it 
remains to determine the extent to which these interactions can be considered a dialogue 
in which Barth is actually willing to learn and be challenged rather than a mere 
monologue that has been pre-determined by Barth’s christological presuppositions. 
Through each of the three discussions, we have seen that Barth remains firmly 
committed to his christological criteria and that he uses them with relentless consistency 
to establish the inadequacy of these alternate anthropologies for depicting true humanity. 
Viewed from one angle, this could easily be understood as an indication that these are 
not true dialogues and that the outcome has been determined from the beginning. 
However, as we saw with McDowell’s discussion of theological conversation earlier, a 
commitment to one’s own particularity, including one’s particular presuppositions, is 
necessary to engaging in meaningful conversation. Consequently, refusal to identify and 
embrace one’s presuppositions is actually a refusal to participate in conversation. Thus, 
simply noting that Barth is committed to his christological presuppositions is insufficient 
for determining that these interactions do not qualify as legitimate conversations. 
Additionally, although Barth would not entertain the possibility that the christological 
center of his theology could be overturned through any dialogical encounter, his 
commitment to the relativity of all theological formulations leaves him at least 
theoretically open to the transformation of his understanding and articulation of 
theological realities through such conversational events.51 Thus, although the center of 
                                                 
51 Price thinks that Barth’s refusal to allow for the possibility that science could “invalidate the 
findings of theology” ultimately severs any real contact between them (2002:10-11). Similarly, Webster 
suggests that Barth’s theology is characterized by “a perverse kind of idealism, an isolation of theological 
language about human nature and history from the ‘phenomena of the human’ to which he grants no real 
definitive role in discovering what he calls ‘real man’” (1995:68). His concern seems to be, then, that 
Barth’s refusal to allow the phenomena to inform his understanding of true humanity necessitates some 
level of isolation between the different modes of discourse. Although it seems that the way Barth actually 
formulated his theology can be criticized along these lines, there are resources in his distinction between 
revelation and theology for handling this objection (cf. I/1, 47-87). While Barth would never allow the 
possibility that God’s sovereign revelation could be subjected to a scientific critique, there seems to be no 
reason why his theology could not be open to a scientific or philosophical critique of some particular 
theological formulation given its necessarily human limitations (cf. Johnson 1997:281-282). 
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his presuppositional structure is not open to critique, Barth’s particular formulation of it 
may be. Even at this level of encounter, then, Barth is not necessarily an isolationist.52
Barth’s openness to significant conversation becomes even more apparent when 
we move to the level of particular phenomena. At the end of §44.3 (“Real Man”), which 
Barth devotes to a development of true humanity as it stands “in the divinely initiated 
history of his self-responsibility before God the Creator” (p. 199), he returns to a 
consideration of the phenomena. He argues that now, with a well-established 
understanding of true humanity, he is in a position “where a radical reconsideration of 
these aspects is possible” (p. 198).53 Although a knowledge of true humanity is a 
necessary presupposition for this phenomenological analysis to have genuine 
significance for theological anthropology, that does not change the fact that this is still a 
genuine extra-ecclesial source of information that can lead to “a non-theological but 
genuine knowledge of the phenomena of the human” (p. 199).54  
Thus, all three accounts provide insights into human phenomena that Barth finds 
enlightening about the nature of real humanity: the biological account of humanity in its 
“interconnexion with other cosmic phenomena” (p. 200), the ethical depiction of the 
human person “in his freedom to rise above the organic chemico-biological process into 
the free field of a history initiated and experienced by himself” (p. 201), and the 
existential description of “man in his openness towards a without…of true transcendence 
which proclaims itself only in the fact of the limitation of human existence” (ibid.).55 
                                                 
52 This is true at least in theory although one could certainly challenge whether Barth consistently 
demonstrates such theoretical openness in practice. 
53 Johnson argues that it is only at this point that Barth is able to address the phenomena positively 
(1997:79). As we have seen, though, the positive aspects of Barth’s evaluation have been clear throughout 
his discussion. What this later section allows him to do is to indicate some of the ways in which these 
insights can be appropriated when they are viewed retrospectively from the perspective of true humanity. 
His earlier positive evaluations are thus strengthened and clarified by showing how these insights can be 
incorporated into his christological anthropology in the concluding section.  
54 Price seems to think that this implies a shift from I/1 where Barth proposed “that theology can 
learn little from other sciences with regard to its own method” (2002:108; cf. I/1, 8-10). He does not make 
it clear, though, how this critical and ad hoc use of non-theological insights constitutes a weakening of his 
prohibition against methodological dependence.  
55 An important question that is often raised at this point is whether this is an indication that 
Barth’s later theology exhibits a change in his position on natural theology (cf. Brunner 1951:123-135; 
Crawford 1972:320-321; R. Anderson 1986). There can be no question, though, of a weakening on natural 
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Thus, it is clear that, as Marshall argues, Barth does not think that theology needs to 
derive all of its anthropological insights from that which is “‘immediately derivable’ 
from scripture’s talk of God in Christ” since this forms theology’s “primary orientation, 
not its exhaustive source” (1983:457).56
For Barth, then, there can be no final separation between theological and non-
theological modes of discourse.57 Although there are significant differences between the 
various disciplines that must be recognized and respected, they should not be understood 
as occupying distinct and unrelated spheres (I/1, 1-11; Barth 1979:113-114; cf. Price 
2002:105-107.).58 By contrast, Barth understands all truth to be God’s truth and thus to 
lie within the purview of theology (Cf. Hartwell 1964:43; McLelland 1974; Schwöbel 
2000). Theological anthropology, therefore, cannot be separated from other 
anthropological approaches, but, as the “exhaustive and superior” presupposition, it 
actually has the task of understanding and critically appropriating, whenever useful, all 
other presuppositions.59 Marshall thus argues that Barth’s theology is properly 
                                                                                                                                                
theology here. Throughout III/2 Barth has retained his negative evaluation of natural theology (pp. 29-41, 
79, 321, 520). Although he is open to the theological use of insights from other disciplines, this can only 
take place when these insights are understood in light of a prior knowledge of humanity’s relationship to 
God through Jesus that can only be known through revelation (cf. T. Torrance 1962:22-23 and Pannenberg 
1991:102-103).  
56 In his review essay of III/2, Brunner questions whether this does not amount to the same as his 
espousal of “eristics” (1951:130-131). Barth’s interdisciplinary dialogue, however, never seeks to be an 
apologetic engagement for the purpose of preparing, positively or negatively, a point of contact amenable 
to revelation.  
57 T. Torrance thus argues that, for Barth, theology and science are closely related spheres of 
inquiry in that they share “important problems and questions” but that they never surrender their distinct 
characteristics (1990:51, 60).  
58 Marshall thus argues that Barth “seems concerned to deny rather than assert that there are 
‘spheres'’ of discourse ‘external’ to theology (as the first two theses of the Barmen Declaration perhaps 
most succinctly insist). Since theological discourse has no abiding ‘outside’, distinctions between 
discourse ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to theology, while in some respects perhaps provisionally useful, can in 
principle never be binding” (1983:456). Price affirms the same idea although he expresses some frustration 
that Barth failed to indicate the relationship between these various modes of discourse more clearly 
(2002:109-115).  
59 Hunsinger describes this process using the distinction between “analytic” truths derived “by 
way of inference from beliefs…established as doctrinally warranted” and  “synthetic” truths derived “by 
way of critically rethinking or reconstructing concepts first devised elsewhere in order to make them 
compatible with Christian theology” (1991:61). Thus, when Barth adopts the existential concept of a 
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understood as “totalistic” in that it includes everything within the scope of its inquiry 
“and so necessarily engages in critical dialogue with, rather than staying at ‘one remove 
from’, the spirit (or spirits) of its time” (Marshall 1983:456-457).60
Before concluding this section, one final question needs to be addressed. Barth 
has routinely been criticized for neglecting empirical realities in his theological 
anthropology.61 If his theology is open to interdisciplinary dialogue as argued in this 
chapter, one might wonder why his theology is not characterized by greater practical 
engagement with their empirical insights. First, we must recognize that Barth’s theology 
was limited by the scope of his primary interests and concerns. Barth repeatedly 
indicated that the primary concern of his theological anthropology was to develop an 
account of true humanity as it is (and can only be) revealed through the person of Jesus 
Christ. Although he was “open” to the possibility of other sources of anthropological 
knowledge, he fully admits that it was not his purpose “to give even an indicatory or 
encyclopaedic exposition of this knowledge” (p. 199; cf. III/1, xi).62 Criticizing his 
‘neglect’ of empirical phenomena, therefore, may well be an example of faulting him for 
failing at something he never intended to accomplish. Second, Barth’s account of 
humanity in III/2 must not be divorced from the ethics of creation in III/4; as integral 
parts of Barth’s doctrine of creation, the two volumes must be read together.63 Barth’s 
                                                                                                                                                
determination of the person through encounter with an ‘other’, he notes that he does so only as a concept 
that has now been filled with a specifically christological content (p. 134). There can, therefore, be no 
question of “an exact correspondence and coincidence between the Christian statements and these others 
which rest on very different foundations,” but we should not be surprised of or unwilling to make use of 
the “approximations and similarities” that inevitably arise (p. 277).  
60According to Hunsinger then, we can make a useful distinction between conceptual frameworks 
and their material contents (2000d:293). The former necessarily conflicts with Christianity in that two 
“comprehensive organizing frameworks” are by definition incompatible. With respect to the latter, 
however, much of the material content of these systems is “not only compatible with the gospel, but useful, 
in certain circumstances even necessary, for the Christian community to adopt” (ibid.).   
61 Biggar provides a useful summary of several such critiques (1993:156-161).  
62 Thus Eberhard Busch states that his theology “does not try to avoid problems but has, at the 
same time, the courage to leave otherwise much discussed ‘issues’ aside because it believes that it has to 
deal with more urgent and important things” (2004:xii). Similarly, Johnson notes that despite Barth’s 
reticence to indicate and explore specific examples of such secular sources of truth, there are a wide variety 
of ways in which such sources could be theologically useful (1997:41). 
63 This is in accord with Barth’s general commitment to maintaining the essential relationship 
between ethics and dogmatics (cf. I/1, xvi). Webster argues that neglecting the integral importance of 
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extensive engagement with the hard realities of human life in the latter part-volume (e.g., 
family life, abortion, war, etc.) must be seen, therefore, as the practical outworking of his 
more theoretical treatment in III/2.64
 
6. Conclusion: Open and Closed—A Properly Delimited Conversation 
Properly understood, Barth’s christocentric approach to theology involves neither 
an unnecessary constriction of theology resulting in its isolation from all other forms of 
discourse nor an indeterministic openness that undermines the positive and objective 
nature of the divine self-revelation. Instead, Barth’s insistence that Christian theology 
can only be grounded in the person and work of Jesus Christ constitutes a determinate 
starting point that grounds the possibility of any meaningful interdisciplinary dialogue. 
In this way, Barth’s theology can be viewed as enabling a christologically determined 
engagement with non-theological disciplines.  
In the three dialogues that we considered in the second half of this chapter, Barth 
exhibits the shape that he thinks such a dialogue should take, one that involves both a 
positive and a negative moment. Negatively, Barth presents a dialogue in which the 
theologian must remain firmly committed to the exclusiveness of the christological 
vantage point as the only perspective from which to view true humanity. On this basis, 
the theologian enters into a critical engagement with the inherently limited starting points 
adopted by other anthropological disciplines and the various ways in which their material 
development fails to cohere adequately with the christologically determined view of 
humanity. Additionally, the theologian must analyze the extent to which these other 
anthropological approaches present a coherent account of humanity. Barth thus devotes a 
fair portion of each section to pointing out various methodological and logical 
inconsistencies in these proposals.65 The negative moment of Barth’s interdisciplinary 
                                                                                                                                                
Barth’s ethical discussions “attracts all manner of misinterpretations which can be corrected only be 
attending to what Barth has to say in its completeness” (2004b:14). For a brief discussion of some thematic 
and structural connections between III/2 and III/4 see Preece 2001:147-170. 
64 McLean (1981:40) and Preece (2001:163-164) likewise argue for the theoretical strengths that 
Barth’s theology has for engaging empirical realities despite his occasionally minimalist treatment of such 
issues. 
65 It is thus clear that Barth’s christological criteria are necessary but not sufficient for 
establishing the validity of any account of human phenomena. Elsewhere in III/2 Barth also uses a 
pragmatic criterion for evaluating non-theological disciplines (e.g., pp. 382-390). 
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dialogue, then, can be summarized as: (1) a christological critique of its formal 
presuppositions; (2) a christological critique of its material interpretations; and (3) a 
rational critique of its methodological consistency and logical coherency.  
This negative moment, however, should not be allowed to obscure the essential 
positive moment. Thus, we have seen that Barth fully appreciates the valuable 
contributions of these non-christological perspectives. While we cannot encounter real 
man through these limited vantage points, they can nonetheless provide insightful 
glimpses into the nature of human phenomena within their own frames of reference. As 
Johnson affirms, “Even though secular knowledge provides no firm basis for a so-called 
natural theology of God, there is still something worth discovering and knowing in all 
these various ways of being human” (1997:80). 
Consequently, having discussed and evaluated three different, non-theological 
approaches to anthropology, each of which has sought to understand the human person 
“in his own strength and by his own resources,” Barth concludes, that “we have not 
encountered real man in this way” (p. 121). He acknowledges that this is because he set 
out from the very beginning determined to refuse any conception of true humanity 
“which is neutral, indefinite or obscure in respect of God’s attitude towards it and its 
own attitude towards God” (ibid.). Therefore, on the basis of the christological criteria, 
these anthropological discussions were “necessarily critical” and ultimately 
unsatisfactory (ibid.). But, as we have seen, rather than rejecting these alternative 
approaches, he appreciates them as presenting “a progressively more penetrating analysis 
of the picture in which man can see and understand himself” (pp. 121-122). Once again, 
then, Barth’s “No” is subsumed within a larger “Yes” (see Hunsinger 2000d:280). 
Though unable to reveal true humanity, he can nonetheless appreciate their 
accomplishments in their own frames of reference.  
As we move into the next chapter and then into our own engagement with 
interdisciplinary dialogue in the second part of this study, we must, therefore, keep in 
mind (1) the foundational importance of Barth’s christological criteria for ascertaining 
the true form and basic content of any properly theological anthropology; (2) the vital 
importance of alternate perspectives for developing a well-rounded understanding of the 
human person; (3) the close relationship between theology and these non-theological 
perspectives; and (4) the process by which Barth’s christological anthropology analyzes, 
criticizes, and, when necessary, critically appropriates these insights. Holding together 
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these four points, we will be able both to appreciate and more properly evaluate what 
Barth is doing as he addresses the question of human ontology.   
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Chapter 4 
Christ, Spirit, and Covenant 
A Model for Human Ontology 
 
1. Wholeness, Duality, and Order: The Terms of Barth’s Concrete Ontology 
Having now established the method and form of Barth’s christocentric 
anthropology as well as its openness to dialogue with non-theological perspectives, we 
are finally in a position to engage Barth’s understanding of the body/soul relationship 
itself. As one of the three main foci in the constructive development of Barth’s 
theological anthropology (relationality, ontology, and temporality), he clearly believes 
that ontology has decisive importance for understanding the human person.1 He therefore 
treats this issue at great length in §46 as he presents an account of human ontology that is 
grounded in Christology, pneumatology, and the covenantal relationship between God 
and human persons.2
                                                 
1 It is true that Barth delays his treatment of human ontology until halfway through III/2. But he 
develops his account at this point not because it is only a secondary concern, but because he believes that it 
is only after having laid a properly christological foundation for theological anthropology that the question 
of human ontology can be adequately addressed. By proceeding in this way, Barth thinks that he gains an 
“advantage over the older dogmatics” that failed to ground their discussions christologically (p. 325). This, 
he argues, will help him “avoid a certain one-sidedness, exaggeration and vulnerability” (ibid.). Far from 
being of minimal importance, then, Barth identifies ontology as one of fundamental importance for 
theological anthropology and an issue he engages extensively (contra Price 2002:247).  
2 Basing his ontology on these theological convictions, Barth thus differs from those 
contemporary theologians who have moved away from substance dualism as a response either to modern 
scientific developments, the perception that Greek philosophy has unduly influenced theology at this point, 
or the conceptual problems associated with substance dualism (Grenz 1994:158-160). As we saw in the 
last chapter, Barth’s theology is open to correspondences with scientific disciplines (cf. Price 2002 and 
McLean 1986:138), but Barth certainly would not have responded favorably to Price’s suggestion that 
theology should alter its language about human ontology simply because of modern scientific 
developments (2002:251-252). Likewise, Barth was well aware of Greek philosophical influences on 
theological anthropology at this point (pp. 380-382), but rejected such philosophical influences as grounds 
for dismissing any particular theological formulations, since all theology is influenced by some philosophy 
(I/2, 728-729). Finally, we will see that Barth was familiar with the conceptual problems associated with 
substance dualism but they comprise neither the foundation of his argument nor even his most substantial 
objection.  
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As always, Barth is committed in this section to grounding his theological 
formulations in Scripture.3 Indeed, Barth thinks the only way to reach “a Christian 
understanding” of humanity that remains unencumbered by alien perspectives is through 
“an adequately biblical and exegetical ground” (ibid.). He is well aware, though, that the 
biblical accounts do not specifically and unambiguously address many of the issues that 
arise in the course of such a discussion (pp. 325-326; cf. also Berkouwer 1962:31; 
Kümmel 1963:38, 93-94; R. Jewett 1972:1-4; J. Green 2004a:194.).4 Thus, although 
Barth strives to ground his ontological argument in the biblical text, he recognizes from 
the beginning that the material is rather limited and, consequently, his arguments are 
often driven more by theological commitments than exegetical arguments.5
But exactly what kind of ontology does Barth offer? According to Barth, the 
ontological constitution of human persons is best understood as a properly ordered and 
unified duality of body and soul that is created, preserved, and regenerated by the Holy 
Spirit and so constituted as God’s covenantal partner. Thus, as body and soul, the human 
person is “wholly and simultaneously both, in ineffaceable difference, inseparable unity, 
and indestructible order” (p. 325). Barth thus builds his understanding of human 
ontology on two sets of terms: body, soul, spirit and wholeness, duality, order.  
                                                 
3 Barth’s commitment to Scripture as the exegetical basis of theology can be traced to the earliest 
stages of his theological development (Watson 2000:57-58). Indeed, Barth argues that commitment to 
Scripture is what distinguishes a properly Christian theology (I/1, 48). Though his exegesis has, at times, 
been subjected to pointed critique (e.g., Crawford 1972; Frey 1978:209; Barr 1994), several recent studies 
have affirmed his attentiveness to the biblical text and his careful and imaginative interpretations (e.g., 
Hunsinger 2000a:210-225; T. Torrance 1990:76-77; Watson 2000:57-71; Ford 1979a:55-87; and 
Cunningham 1995).  
4 There is even significant disagreement about the proper background against which to understand 
the biblical texts. Joel Green, for example, has forcefully argued in a series of recent papers that the 
biblical milieu was not exclusively dualistic and, therefore, that we cannot simply assume a dualistic 
background for the anthropological language of the Bible (2004). N. T. Wright, on the other hand, 
contends that the proper background for understanding the biblical texts is the anthropological dualism of 
large strands of second temple Judaism (2003).  
5 This is certainly not to negate the significance of Barth’s commitment to exegesis or his 
extensive use of exegetical argumentation throughout this paragraph. As Watson correctly warns, 
interpreters who minimize the significance of exegesis in the Dogmatics “will radically misinterpret that 
project” (2000:57). Rather than minimizing Barth’s exegesis, then, this simply acknowledges, as Barth did, 
that the biblical texts do not answer many of the questions that must be raised in a discussion of human 
ontology and, therefore, the argument must move in a different direction.  
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The very nature of this language, though, immediately raises “a whole complex 
of problems” (p. 326) which renders its use problematic. The fact that Barth openly 
associates body/soul language with wide ranging word pairs like spirit/substantial 
organism, rational/sensuous, inner/outer, invisible/visible, 
inapprehensible/apprehensible, intelligible/empirical, and heavenly/earthly indicates the 
broad associations this language has and the complex issues surrounding its application 
(p. 326).6 Fully aware, then, of the problems associated with body/soul language, Barth 
chooses this manner of speaking, not because of its terminological clarity, but because it 
serves to raise the primary problems that an account of human being must address and 
because it has the advantage of retaining the predominant biblical terms for human 
nature (ibid.).   
So, then, how should we understand Barth’s ontology? From one perspective, 
Barth’s ontology is clearly monistic. As we will see, he rejects any notion that the human 
person comprises two distinct substances, but affirms instead the holistic union of body 
and soul in one person. Barth’s view, then, can be properly described as “concrete 
monism” (p. 393). On the very next page, however, he asserts that his view could also be 
understood as “the concrete and Christian dualism of soul and body” (p. 394). What kind 
of ontology does Barth think he is offering that can be adequately described, in some 
way, as both dualist and monist?  
Barth’s interpreters seem to be divided over this very issue.7 Many interpreters 
affirm Barth’s accent on the wholeness of the human person as it stands in contrast to the 
substance dualism of much traditional Christian theology (e.g., R. Anderson 1982:210-
211; Hoekema 1986:216-217; Berkouwer 1962:93-94; Price 2002:20-21, 248; and 
McLean 1981:46). But these interpreters fail to acknowledge, or possibly fail to realize, 
that holistic language of this nature does not resolve the body/soul question. They appear 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting at this point that the various word-pairs Barth identifies as being legitimate 
ways of characterizing human ontology strongly suggests that he would have been open to mind/body or 
even mind/brain as serving this same purpose, though admittedly with slightly different emphases. Indeed, 
as Frede points out, historically speaking “to talk about the soul is to talk about the mind conceived in a 
certain way” (1992:93).  
7 Spezio rightly comments that the differences among Barth’s interpreters can be attributed both 
to misinterpretations and to Barth’s own lack of clarity (2004:587). Barth’s occasional lack of clarity, 
however, is often due to his commitment to follow the object of his investigation wherever it might lead 
rather than bind himself to some arbitrarily determined idea of conceptual coherence (p. 583)—a concept 
that Spezio himself notes earlier in his article but fails to connect to Barth’s methodology.  
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to think that identifying Barth as a “holist” is sufficient to distinguish him from other 
ontological approaches (e.g., reductive monism or substance dualism).8 But, holistic 
language merely provides a different, though possibly superior, language for discussing 
the body/soul question rather than an actual answer to the problem of their particular 
relation.9 Other interpreters, however, take a different approach. Noting Barth’s use of 
the traditional body/soul language and his equally strong emphasis on the duality 
inherent in human nature, they conclude that his ontology at least implicitly affirms some 
form of dualism.10  
As we take a closer look at Barth’s ontology, we will see that the reason this 
question can be so difficult is because it is the wrong question. Or, rather, the question 
approaches the issue from the wrong direction. Focusing on the “problem” of human 
nature, Barth’s interpreters expect to see a “solution” that can provide an adequate theory 
of the body/soul relation. Barth’s focus, however, as we saw in chapter two, is on 
                                                 
8  The limitations of such holistic language for discriminating among approaches can be seen in 
the fact that it is used by both dualists (e.g., Cooper 2000 and Moreland 1995:102) and physicalists (e.g., J. 
Green, 2002b:3-22 and Gregersen 2000:153-188).  
9 Hirst ([1959] 2004:105) and Kim (1998a: 8-10) both correctly argue that their emphasis on 
“unity” and “supervenience” respectively may provide superior languages for articulating the problem but 
do not actually provide solutions. Macquarrie similarly argues that “personal” language does not resolve 
the body/soul problem but that it is less obviously biased toward idealism, materialism, or reductionism 
and, therefore, is a superior language for speaking of human persons (1982:50). Noting, as Price does, that 
Barth views the body/soul relation in dynamic rather than substantialist terms may be another example of a 
different “language” that, while somewhat useful, still does not address the more theoretical issues 
involved (Price 2002:248). 
10 P. Newman thus argues that in spite of Barth’s statements and qualifications to the contrary, 
“the oblique insinuation of dualism” persists because of his emphasis on the necessity of soul language 
(1981:423). Similarly, Willis argues, “it appears virtually impossible to employ this terminology without 
importing a note of dualism (classical, Cartesian, or other) into the discussion, however severely one warns 
against this possibility” (1971:236). Taking issue with Barth’s emphasis on the primacy of the soul in the 
human person, Moltmann asserts that Barth “only slightly modifies the answers given by Plato and 
Descartes” (1985:252). Even interpreters who do not posit an implicit dualism seem to think that there are 
dualistic impulses in Barth’s anthropology. Price, who is fully aware of Barth’s emphasis on unity and his 
rejection of dualistic approaches to humanity, argues that there are strong similarities between Barth and 
the interactionist dualist Sir John Eccles (2002:254-255). Similarly, immediately after noting Barth’s 
rejection of substance dualism, Berkouwer states that Barth “rejects just as strongly any monistic 
anthropology (1962:94, emphasis added). Such a statement would seem to imply some level of openness to 
a non-monistic anthropology of some kind.  
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understanding the implications that (1) the person and work of Jesus Christ as the true 
human and (2) the covenantal relationship in which all humans have been summoned to 
participate have for understanding human nature. In other words, given the reality of the 
incarnation, the atonement, and the covenantal relationship between God and all human 
persons, what must we believe about the ontology of the human person? In the course of 
our study, we will see that this methodology leads Barth to develop a particular picture 
of human nature—a pneumatologically grounded unity, duality, and order—that has 
implications for developing a theoretical account of the body/soul relationship but does 
not itself constitute such a theory.   
Understanding the precise nature of this pre-theoretical presentation and the 
theological commitments upon which it is established will require two things. First, we 
will need to understand how Barth answers three questions:  (1) What are the basic 
aspects or components of the human person’s ontological constitution? (2) How is this 
ontological constitution maintained? And (3) why is the human person constituted in this 
way? As we have seen, though, Barth’s theological presuppositions and methodological 
commitments require that these three questions in turn be subordinated to an even more 
fundamental question—who is the true human and thus the one who manifests true 
human ontology? Having answered these questions, we will also need to understand the 
theoretical implications of his ontology. We will see that Barth’s anthropological 
ontology can be understood as a model of human nature generated by his christological 
paradigm, which has implications for generating more precise theories of the body/soul 
relationship.11
 
2. The What, How, and Why of Barth’s Concrete Ontology 
2.1. The Significance of the “Who?” Question for Human Ontology 
Although we have seen that Barth is sensitive to the phenomena of human 
existence, he denies that any “purely” phenomenological depiction of humanity is 
adequate for establishing a firm foundation upon which to develop an understanding of 
                                                 
11 That Barth does not develop a theoretical account does not mean that he would have been 
opposed to such a project. Elsewhere, Barth demonstrates his openness to philosophical constructions so 
long as they do not serve as a substitute for faith (e.g., III/3, 23).  
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human ontology (pp. 419-422.).12 In keeping with his well-known dislike of abstractions 
in theology (see Hunsinger 1991:51-52), then, Barth maintains that theological 
anthropology must focus on the “concrete reality” of Jesus Christ (p. 393).13 Thus, 
although §46 is focused on addressing important questions about what human beings are, 
how they come to be what they are, and why God has created them in this way, he asserts 
that these questions simply cannot be answered in abstraction from the “who” upon 
whom their answers are firmly established (p. 421). Acknowledging the primacy of the 
who question, according to Barth, is particularly important at this point. Barth is well 
aware that the realm of human ontology has been explored by many non-theological 
disciplines and, without a firm christological foundation, “one can very easily go astray” 
(p. 325) among these other approaches.14
 
Here too….[w]e find our bearings and our instruction as we look 
to the constitution of the humanity of Jesus. With the clarity and certainty 
that we gain here, we can then set out the propositions in which the 
Christian understanding of the constitution of all men generally may be 
expressed and comprehended. (p. 327) 
 
Failing to proceed christologically at this point “would be intolerable, would have 
the most fatal consequences, and would give free entrance to the most varied ambiguities 
and errors” (p. 326). The precise nature of these intolerable consequences, ambiguities, 
and errors will become clear through the course of this chapter as nearly all of Barth’s 
criticisms of alternate ontological perspectives stem from their inability or unwillingness 
to view man from this christologically determined vantage point.  
                                                 
12 This is in contrast, then, with some contemporary theologians who explicitly adopt a more 
phenomenological approach (e.g., Macquarrie 1982 and Pannenberg 1985). 
13 Barth’s insistence on understanding human ontology from a broad, christological perspective is 
thus antithetical to modern reductionistic approaches and consistent with Barth’s overall emphasis on 
understanding parts only in terms of their comprehensive wholes (see MacLean 1981:13).    
14 This comment raises the question of Barth’s relationship to these earlier approaches. While 
questions regarding the philosophical and theological background of Barth’s ontology are interesting and 
worth exploring (though see McCormack’s criticism of such studies for positing merely parallel 
relationships without establishing any solid connections [2002:236-239]), they are ultimately of limited 
value in determining the validity and adequacy of his ideas. This study will, therefore, address such issues 
only in a very limited fashion. 
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 2.2. What Are We? Wholeness, Duality, and Order in Human Nature 
Beginning from the secure vantage point provided by the who of Jesus Christ, 
then, Barth argues that we must view the human person as having a nature that is whole, 
dual, and ordered. Using these three perspectives, Barth seeks to depict the relationship 
of body, soul, and spirit in the human person in a manner that is faithful to the person 
and work of Jesus Christ and the covenantal relationship to which all human persons 
have been summoned in him.   
 
2.2.1. ‘One Whole Man’: The Holistic Starting Point   
The narratival presentation of Jesus Christ in the Bible, according to Barth, 
reveals that any suggestion of a discontinuous duality implied in his adoption of 
body/soul language is simply inadequate when applied to the person and work of Jesus 
(p. 327).15 Instead, the Bible describes him from every direction as a whole person: 
 
Far from existing as the union of two parts or two ‘substances’, He 
is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body: the one in the other 
and never merely beside it; the one never without the other but only with 
it, and in it present, active and significant; the one with all its attributes 
always to be taken as seriously as the other. (ibid.)  
 
For Barth, the biblical emphasis on this holistic depiction of Jesus is so clear and 
strong that there can be no other starting point for developing an anthropological 
ontology (p. 371; cf. Moltmann 1985:244).  
                                                 
15 Throughout this section, Barth’s argument focuses primarily on the total impression generated 
by the biblical narratives rather than exegetical examinations of particular texts. Barth’s argument, then, 
does not revolve around identifying particular (proof) texts that might support his point; instead it builds 
on the way the Bible portrays Jesus as a person through its various narratives. Several people have noted 
Barth’s narratival emphasis on “the overall shape and pattern of the text” (Mangina 2004:43) and its 
similarity to contemporary narrative theology (e.g., Kelsey 1975:44, 48). This can be a useful comparison 
if we recognize, as Bloesch rightly argues, Barth’s “firm insistence on the historical basis of the Christian 
faith” in distinction from any form of narrative theology that divorces the world of the text from its 
historical location (1992:30; cf. also Mangina 2004:43; Broz 1988, esp. 23-24).  
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Looking first at Jesus’ life in general, Barth sees a person in whom there is no 
conflict or tension between the inner and outer dimensions of his existence (p. 338).16 
Although the Bible makes clear that Jesus’ life was characterized by vital interior and 
exterior dimensions, he argues that the Bible always has the whole person of Christ in 
view and that passages focusing on one dimension or the other are quite rare (pp. 328-
330). The Bible thus leads the reader to view Jesus as “the unity of two realms or 
aspects” and, therefore, as “a real man” (p. 328). Both are essential, but their unity is the 
focus of the biblical portrayal (p. 330). 
Barth finds a similar emphasis in the biblical account of Jesus’ work, particularly 
his atoning work.17 Looking at the many biblical passages that talk about Jesus offering 
himself (e`auto,j; e.g., Gal. 1:4; 2:20; Eph. 5:2, 25), his soul (yuch,; e.g., Mt. 10:28; Jn. 
10:11, 15; 15:13), or his body (sw/ma; eg. Lk. 22:19; Heb. 10:10; Rom. 7:4), Barth 
concludes that the atonement was the unified action of a whole person (pp. 328-340; cf. 
IV/1, 225).  Indeed, all of Jesus’ deeds demonstrate “the unity of his work” (p. 331) and, 
thus, the unity of his person. For Barth, then, only a holistic presentation of human 
ontology presents an adequate understanding of Jesus’ work.  
Finally, Barth finds this holistic emphasis even in the death and resurrection 
narratives: “As this one whole man, and therefore as true man, the Jesus of the New 
Testament is born and lives and suffers and dies and is raised again” (p. 327). Although 
there is “a transformation” that takes place between Jesus’ death and resurrection there is 
no change in his body/soul relation such that there is “division” or “subtraction” (ibid.). 
Rather, “As the same whole man, soul and body, He rises as He died, and sits at the right 
hand of God, and will come again” (ibid.). Thus, against all docetic interpretations of the 
resurrection the Bible portrays the resurrected Christ as a whole body/soul entity (ibid.; 
                                                 
16 Such a description of Jesus’ life unfortunately neglects the real tensions that are occasionally 
seen in Jesus’ life—e.g., Gethsemane (Mt. 26:37ff.). With respect to this scene Barth only comments that it 
demonstrates the reality of Jesus’ inner life without noting its implications for depicting his body/soul 
relation exclusively in peaceful terms (ibid., 328). Barth may have been better served by using his 
emphasis on Jesus’ solidarity with human persons in taking up human “flesh” with its contradictions and 
tensions (pp. 335-340; cf. IV/1, 171-175, 216) to argue that inner tension and conflict is a real aspect of our 
present earthly state even though the biblical emphasis on the unity of the whole person points in the 
direction of a redeemed life where harmony between these two aspects of the person is the goal (cf. 
Moltmann 1985:352-353; Sherlock 1996:219-220).  
17 This is thus consistent with Barth’s overall emphasis on the inseparable unity of Christ’s person 
and work (IV/1, 122-128).  
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cf. pp. 441-454) who exists in continuous identity with the pre-resurrection Jesus (p. 
214). 
In every aspect of Jesus’ life, ministry, and death, then, Barth finds the Bible 
describing him as a holistic union of body and soul; a holism that permeates everything 
that he says, does, and is.  
 
And He is one whole man in His relation to others, in what He 
does for them, what He gives them, what He asks of them, what He is for 
them and for the whole cosmos. He does not fulfil His office and His 
work from His miraculous annunciation to His fulfilment in such a way 
that we can separate His outer form from His inner or His inner form from 
His outer. Everything is the revelation of an inner, invisible, spiritual 
plane of life. But it is almost more striking and characteristic that 
everything has an outer, visible, bodily form. (p. 327) 
 
An anthropological ontology that begins from the perspective of this concrete 
reality must, therefore, take the whole person as its point of departure. 
 
2.2.2. Two Distinct Moments: The Duality of the Human Person 
This does not mean, however, that such a holistic perspective exhausts the reality 
of human nature. According to Barth, the christological picture presents the wholeness of 
the human person so clearly that one might easily miss the important distinctions that 
must be drawn (p. 340). Despite his holistic emphasis, Barth consistently maintains a 
duality within the human person.18 Body and soul, though integrally united and 
interdependent, are neither identical nor reducible to one another (p. 367). They are the 
“two moments” of the one human person and are always distinguishable aspects of 
human nature (p. 399).19 Consequently, we can only keep ourselves from “prejudice, 
                                                 
18 Drawing on Trinitarian language, Moltmann offers a similar perspective by affirming “that 
body and soul interact ‘perichoretically’ and that the relationship is thus “marked by differentiation and 
unity” (1985:258-262).  
19 Willis misses Barth on this point when he argues with respect to Barth’s portrayal of the 
body/soul relationship in Jesus that this distinction ultimately has no “binding, absolute meaning” 
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abstraction and one-sidedness” (p. 372) by realizing that, although Jesus presents the 
human person as “wholly and simultaneously” both soul and body, there is still an “inner 
differentiation” (ibid.).20 For Barth, then, body and soul are distinguishable 
determinations of human persons that are neither identical nor reducible (p. 367). There 
can be no effective accounting of the human person without an equal emphasis on both 
soul and body in their “interconnexion” and their “particularity” (ibid.). As soon as any 
attempt is made to address the nature of the human person, “we are confronted by the 
remarkable fact that…we have to do with a whole, but with a whole in which there is 
antithesis, and therefore with a duality” (ibid.).    
It will help at this point to define more clearly how Barth uses the terms body and 
soul. First, he understands a person’s body to be her “material body” (p. 350), which as 
such is “visible, outward, earthly” (p. 367). The body, therefore, is “sensuous,” 
“empirical,” and available to study in ways that the soul is not (p. 326).21 For Barth, 
then, the body represents the objective aspect of human nature and can be defined as: 
 
a spatio-material system of relations….It is spatial, i.e., it is 
essential to it to be at its own specific point in space. It is material, i.e., it 
is essential to it to be distinct from other bodies in virtue of its own 
specific material mode or compositions. It is a system of relations, i.e., it 
is free in its inner relation, but forming a specific composition. (p. 377)  
 
Barth further associates body with the being of a creature as that which 
determines the “manner” and “nature” of its existence (p. 367). Although all earthly 
entities are material bodies of this sort, they are not all merely material bodies. Some 
material bodies can become “besouled” and thus transcend their mere materiality as 
                                                                                                                                                
(1971:209). It would be more accurate to say that, for Barth, the tension between them has no absolute 
meaning but the distinction is integral to understanding human nature.  
20 Price rightly points out that Barth’s anthropology is thus quite consistent with the early Church 
councils, which maintained that both a human body and a human soul were necessary for true human 
existence (2002:248).  
21 Barth’s view of body and soul as being dissimilarly available to empirical analysis is also a 
prominent aspect of contemporary philosophy of mind where the empirical status of a person’s conscious 
state often demarcates a border between various views of the mind/body relation (e.g., van Gulick 2004). 
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“organic bodies’—material entities that have soul and are therefore alive (p. 377).22 An 
organic body is, therefore, understood as “an object in relation to a subject,” i.e., the soul 
(ibid.).23
Soul, on the other hand, is understood primarily as the subjective life of a 
material organism:  
 
Soul is life, self-contained life, the independent life of a corporeal 
being. Life in general means capacity for action, self-movement, self-
activity, self-determination. Independent life is present where this self-
movement, self-activity, and self-determination are not only the 
continuation and partial appearance of a general life-process, but where 
there is a specific living subject. (p. 374)24
 
Soul is that which allows a material body to become a living body and to 
actualize the existence that is proper to it (p. 350). It is the self-directed and self-
determined activity of an independent living being,25 i.e., the subject of a particular life 
                                                 
22 Some might be inclined to dismiss Barth’s ontology at this point as a form of vitalism—i.e., 
positing some “unknowable factor” to explain the emergence of organic life (Bechtel and Robertson 1998). 
McGinn thus eschews any theistic account of the mind/body relation by associating it with vitalism and 
even alchemy (1991:7, 17). Though widely discredited, some contemporary thinkers have pointed out that 
the term actually covers a very broad range of positions and that its more sophisticated versions are not so 
easily dismissed (e.g., Polkinghorne 1993 and Moreland 1995). Regardless, that theistic views cannot be 
dismissed as a naïve appeal to vitalism should become clear in the latter half of this study.  
23 Although Barth does use subject/object language in describing the body, his understanding is 
markedly different from the modern notion of the “disengaged” subject acting instrumentally through its 
objectified body (R. Taylor 1989:185-188). Given the inseparability of the two, Barth’s rhetoric is intended 
to emphasize the leadership of the person’s inner life in opposition to any form of biological determinism.  
24 By associating the soul with the principle of movement and independent life, Barth is, 
therefore, unwilling to attribute souls to plants (p. 374). Thus, although he does discuss the three ‘levels’ of 
living beings (plants, animals, and humans) in a very Aristotelian manner (ibid.; cf. De Anima 413ff.), he 
differs in not affirming the souls of plants and in refusing the speculate on the nature of the animal soul 
(ibid., 374-377).  
25 In a similar manner, Pannenberg argues that the soul is “that which makes us human in our 
bodily reality” while the body is “the concrete form in which our humanity, the soul, finds appropriate 
expression” (1991:2.184).  
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(p. 364).26 Soul is therefore associated with a variety of terms that all denote a human 
person’s interiority—e.g., “inner,” “rational,” “invisible,” intelligible,” inapprehensible,” 
and “heavenly” (p. 326). The independent life of a material organism, the soul is “the 
subject and form of specific apprehensions, thoughts, sensations, feelings, purposes and 
endeavours” (p. 353).  
For Barth, then, the human person is characterized by a distinct duality: the 
objective and subjective moments of human existence. The first moment, the soul, 
involves the human’s being’s subjective and conscious life. The body, the second 
moment, denotes that which executes the decisions of the soul, displays the attitudes 
developed by the soul, and represents outwardly the interiority of the subjective self (p. 
398). The soul, then, is the independent life whereas the body is that which “lives the 
independent life” (ibid.).  
Having established body and soul as indicating the duality of human existence, 
we must reaffirm the wholeness and unity that was so important to Barth. From the 
above definitions we can see that body and soul seem truly inseparable in Barth’s 
anthropology. The very notions of soul and (organic) body are, for Barth, incoherent 
independent of one another (pp. 331, 376). You can no more have life apart from that 
which is made alive than you can have an organic body without its subjective life. 
Understood in terms of such distinctions as inner/outer, movement/space, and 
action/means, body and soul can be distinguished but not divided without destroying the 
                                                 
26 This manner of speaking about the body/soul relation is somewhat similar to Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism – i.e., the soul as the form of the body (cf. Nussbaum and Rorty 1992 and Shields 2005). 
Indeed, Barth’s description of the person as “form and life of a substantial organism” (p. 325) is an explicit 
adoption of Aristotelian language (Moltmann 1985:252).  Other similarities include accepting the idea of 
animal souls (p. 377; cf. De Anima 413ff.), using “logos” with respect to the ordering of human nature 
(III/2, 335-336; cf. De Anima 403a), and associating soul with life (De Anima 434a) and movement (De 
Anima 415b). Indeed, both ontologies can be described as an attempt to mediate certain forms of 
materialism and dualism (Price 1992:161, Burnyeat 1992:15). Despite these similarities, Moltmann is 
incorrect in viewing Barth’s ontology simply as a form of Aristotelianism (1985:254). Indeed, Barth 
explicitly rejects Aristotle’s ontology as theologically inadequate (p. 380). Barth’s intense interest in the 
distinction between body and soul and the difficulty of maintaining their unity in the human person 
constitutes a substantial difference from Aristotle’s hylomorphism in which their unity could almost be 
taken for granted (see De Anima 412b). Even the apparent verbal similarities are not as clear as they first 
appear given that Barth’s christological use of “logos” certainly differs from Aristotle’s. While it may be 
useful, then, to note some parallels in their anthropological ontologies, we should be very careful about 
insisting on a closer relationship without recognizing the very real differences.   
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entity in question (p. 373).27 In addition to this conceptual argument, Barth contends that 
every human action and experience also demonstrates this unity. The human person 
never experiences her self “as a dual but only as a single subject, as soul identical with 
his body and as body identical with his soul” (p. 426). Every action of the human subject, 
even the apparently simple act of knowing (pp. 374-376),28 is impossible apart from the 
inseparable operation of both body and soul (p. 378).29
For Barth, then, the human person is an inseparable union of body and soul.30 
This union, though, cannot be understood in terms of “identity,” “interchangeability,” or 
“the union of two parts” (p. 372).  
 
Soul and body are not two factors which merely co-exist, 
accompany, supplement, sympathise and co-operate with one another, but 
whose intentions, achievements and sufferings have different origins, 
ends and meanings. The one man is the soul of his body and therefore 
both soul and body. (p. 426) 
 
Rather than such language with its implicit substance dualism, Barth affirms the 
two moments of the human person in inseparable unity and irreducible differentiation: 
“Soul would not be soul, if it were not bodily; and body would not be body, if it were not 
besouled. We are not free to make abstractions here, either on one side or the other” (p. 
                                                 
27 Paul Jewett argues that this approach reduces the soul to a mere “concept of thought” and 
counters that it should be viewed instead as having “objective reality, though not the reality of a material 
object” (1996:41-42). Similarly, Mangina refers to the body/soul difference as one among many necessary 
“conceptual distinctions” (2004:199). For Barth, however, the soul is not a merely conceptual reality. 
Although it cannot be considered independently of the body, it is, as we have seen, neither identical with 
nor reducible to the body and therefore has its own objective reality though never in isolation from the 
body. 
28 Thus, although Barth associates personal identity primarily with the soul, he recognizes that the 
body, as a “participant…in my subjectivity” (p. 378), is integrally involved (for a similar perspective see 
Macquarrie 1982:48). In this sense, Barth can associate the “I” of the person with the body as well as the 
soul (pp. 374, 377, 426).  
29 Barth thus views the soul as completely incapable of performing any action apart from a 
material body. Rather than viewing the soul as in bondage to the body, Barth contends that the soul would 
actually be in bondage (i.e., unable to act) apart from its embodiment (pp. 351-352).  
30 Whether there is any sense in which the body and soul could be viewed as separable in any 
sense in Barth’s anthropological ontology is a question that we will take up later in the chapter.  
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350).  Barth thus contends that a human being is a duality of body and soul existing in 
differentiated unity.  
 
2.2.3. One Proper Order: The ‘Rationality’ of Body and Soul 
According to Barth, though, noting the unity and duality of the human person is 
inadequate; we must also consider the “indestructible order” that obtains in the body/soul 
relation. Again, looking first to the person of Jesus Christ, Barth argues that “the oneness 
and wholeness of this human life is fashioned, structured and determined from within” 
(p. 332). From such examples as Jesus fasting in the desert (Mt. 4:1-2), his agony in 
Gethsemane (Matt. 26:39), and Jesus’ affirmation of Mary’s contemplation over 
Martha’s bodily activity (Lk. 10:38-42), Barth argues that the biblical narratives 
demonstrate the priority of the soul as the director of personal life over the body as that 
which is directed (p. 339). Rather than a “chaos” in which there is no order to the 
body/soul relationship, Jesus’ nature is a “cosmos”—a “formed and ordered totality” in 
which there is “a higher and a lower, a first and a second, a dominating and a dominated” 
(ibid.). The order among the two moments, then, is that the soul leads, commands, and 
controls while the body follows, obeys, and is controlled (p. 424).31 Barth insists that the 
biblical narratives clearly portray Jesus as one who performed all of his deeds, 
particularly the atonement, knowingly, freely, and actively.32 Affirming the priority of 
Jesus’ subjective life over any biological determinants is, therefore, of “decisive 
importance…in the anthropology of Jesus” (p. 418). Any view of the human person, on 
Barth’s account, that gave primacy to the body in the activity of the person, would, 
therefore, undermine the biblical account of Jesus’ person and work.  
Four things must be kept in mind, however, with respect to this anthropological 
cosmology in Jesus. First, the unity of the two moments is not dissolved by the 
hierarchy. Despite the essential ordering of the body/soul relationship, there can be no 
thought of a division or separation between the two moments of Jesus’ human existence. 
                                                 
31 The idea that there is a ‘leading’ element in the human was expressed by ancient Stoic and 
Epicurean philosophers by the term hegemonikon (Sedley 2005), which subsequently found its way into 
Christian theology (Lampe 1961:599-601; cf. also Calvin, Institutes, 1.15.8; Verghese (1972:121), 
Macquarrie 1982:14, and Pannenberg 1991:201). Though Barth, does not seem to have used the term, the 
concepts are basically parallel.  
32 See esp. Barth’s summary of the doctrine of reconciliation (IV/1, 79-156).  
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There is no “original separation” or “hidden conflict” in the order of the two moments, 
but simply the proper functioning of a single human person (p. 338). Second, there can 
be no valuing of the soul at the expense of the body—both alike are vital aspects of a 
human life (ibid.).33 The dignity of these two moments is not precluded by the hierarchy, 
                                                 
33 As Pannenberg notes, it is entirely possible for this hierarchical order to become a tyranny of 
the soul over the body (1991:1.201). Moltmann thinks that Barth’s ontology commits precisely this error 
and criticizes it on several points. First, he thinks that Barth’s position involves a “domination” of the soul 
over the body (1985:253). He argues that this corresponds to a pattern of domination in Barth’s doctrine of 
creation that follows a similar pattern in his doctrine of God (ibid., 253-254). In a related criticism, he also 
contends, “Barth never mentions a right to resistance on the part of the misused body, nor does he concede 
to the feelings any right to a say in the decisions of the reasonable soul” (ibid., 254). His concern here 
seems to be that Barth has missed the integral relationship between the two whereby “it is impossible to 
assign any fundamental primacies” (ibid., 260). He contends that we should speak instead of flexible 
“centricities” (ibid., 261) that change over time rather than hierarchical orders. Finally, he criticizes Barth 
for so emphasizing order and hierarchy that he fails to “even suggest that a harmony between the body and 
its dominating soul is something to be desired” (ibid., 254).  
Some of Moltmann’s comments point in very helpful directions. He rightly notes that Barth’s 
adoption of hierarchical language may have unintentionally undermined the very unity he was striving to 
maintain. It may be worth asking whether one needs to speak of the body as a “lower” reality (p. 332) to 
maintain Barth’s emphases on freedom, subjectivity, agency, and other vital aspects of human personhood. 
A greater emphasis on language affirming “community, partnership, and mutual influence” may be worth 
pursuing (cf. Moltmann 1985:257).   
On other points, though, Moltmann’s criticisms are less helpful. First, despite Barth’s hierarchical 
language, his understanding of the body/soul relationship simply should not be characterized in terms of 
“domination,” despite the fact that he occasionally used such language himself (e.g., p. 339). The very 
concept implies a sharp distinction between the two moments that simply does not exist in Barth’s 
ontology. We should also recognize with Pannenberg that the possibility of abuse does not necessarily 
preclude the validity of viewing the relationship in terms of leading and following (1991:1.201). Even 
more strongly, we should note McLean’s argument that Barth’s actual intention, despite all of this 
“somewhat conventional and seemingly linear” hierarchical language, is to radically redefine it in terms of 
the model of Jesus as Lord and Servant: “For Barth servanthood and lordship are functions of one another” 
(1986:112-113).  
Second, Moltmann’s arguments seem driven primarily by a pre-determined rejection of any form 
of sovereignty (see his remarks on the Father/Son and God/creation relationships; 1985:254-255). 
McFague (1987; 1993) and Kaufmann (1993) have similarly argued for a connection between domineering 
portraits of God and hierarchical views of human ontology.  But, again Pannenberg rightly notes that 
sovereignty cannot be dismissed so easily without minimizing important biblical texts (1991:1.201).   
Finally, many of Moltmann’s comments manifest a misunderstanding regarding the very nature of 
Barth’s project. He repeatedly associates Barth’s ontology with Platonic and Cartesian ideas while 
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but is actually established by that order as each is provided its unique status and dignity 
through its relation to the other (p. 339). Additionally, this hierarchical unity is not 
maintained in Jesus by any external principle. Jesus not only has life but actually is life 
in himself (cf. John 6:35-51; 11:25; 14:6).  Consequently, he is his own “principle,” 
“ground,” and “intention” (p. 332). Finally, Jesus’ existence in the differentiated unity of 
body and soul is not an accidental existence: “Structured and determined from within,” 
the unity, duality, and order of the body/soul relation in Christ is “necessary and of 
lasting significance” (ibid.).   
This hierarchical relation is likewise manifest in human nature generally. Barth 
thus defines the human person as “a rational being” (p. 419). Barth is not here referring 
to humanity’s intellectual capacities but rather to the “meaningful order” of human 
nature such that “it is proper to his nature to be in rational order of the two moments of 
soul and body” (p. 419). Thus, in such key human activities, as perceiving, thinking, 
willing, desiring, and acting (pp. 399-416), we are faced with an ordered unity that 
transcends the notions of “simple distribution…or…cooperation” (p. 400), but always 
involves “the primacy of the soul” (p. 418).34 Unlike Jesus, however, this rational 
ordering of the two moments in human persons generally is not obvious, but is, instead, 
hidden in the tensions and contradictions of human life (pp. 331-332).  
 
                                                                                                                                                
minimizing the various ways in which Barth distances himself from and even attacks those very 
conceptions (1985:252-253). It may well be that Moltmann is led astray here by Barth’s adoption of rather 
traditional language and concepts and has, as a result, missed the primary thrust of Barth’s argument 
(similarly P. Newman 1981:423).  
34 Frey thus describes this ordered duality as “hierarchical interactionism [hierarchischen 
Interaktionismus]” (1978:208). Though this label is useful in demonstrating the ordered interdependence of 
Barth’s ontology, the use of the term interactionism is weakened by its association with certain forms of 
dualism. 
 101
2.2.4. One Undivided Existence?: On the Separability of Body and Soul35 
One last question that remains to be answered regarding Barth’s depiction of this 
psychophysical relation is whether the body and soul could have any form of 
independent existence after the death of the person.36 From one perspective, it seems 
clear that Barth would reject any such intermediate existence. Indeed, Barth consistently 
affirms that physical death entails the end of the human person. Thus, at death the human 
person enters into a state of “non-being” (pp. 595-595). Death is, therefore, “the limit of 
our existence in time” (III/4, 588) and “the end of all human and creaturely life and 
creativity and work” (IV/2, 295). Although this is not “a death without hope” (IV/2, 
476), which would be to fall prey to a fear of the “negation of being” (ibid.), which was 
overcome through the death and resurrection of Jesus (p. 595), it is still “the end of 
man’s existence” (p. 427; cf. IV/3.2, 924-928). Death, therefore, deprives the individual 
of “all prospects for the future” (p. 589; cf. IV/3.1, 310). Indeed, “Whatever existence in 
time may mean, it cannot consist of a continuation of life in time” (p. 589). 
Such statements would seem to suggest that an intermediate state is completely 
inconceivable on Barth’s account. A closer look at some of his other language, however, 
suggests that at least three readings are possible on this point. First, one could view Barth 
as affirming that at death the human person enters into a supra-temporal reality such that 
                                                 
35 We will not attempt in this section even to survey let alone resolve all of the issues involved in 
the debate regarding whether we should believe in an intermediate state. Our task, instead, will be to 
consider whether an intermediate state is compatible with Barth’s christological framework. The debate on 
how to read the biblical data regarding human ontology and the intermediate state continues, with some 
arguing for a more dualistic emphasis (esp. Cooper 1982, 1990; cf. also Osei-Bonsu 1987; Chamblin 1993; 
Moreland and Rae 2000) and others contending for a monistic approach (esp. J. Green 1998, 2002a, 2002b, 
2004b; cf. J. Robinson 1952; Kümmel 1963; Wolff 1974; van Inwagen 1995; Betz 2000; Heckel 2000; 
Stone 2004). Given the sharp discontinuity between these two approaches to the text, Green correctly 
argues, “In short, simple appeal to ‘what the Bible teaches’ will not resolve those anthropological 
questions arising from discussion of body and soul, mind and brain. It is worth asking, though, whether a 
reading of the narrative of Scripture as whole accounts best for a view of the human person characterized 
by dualism or by monism” (J. Green 2005:21). Thus, Hoekema argues that although the Bible teaches that 
there will be an intermediate state, it does not specify exactly how it will take place and that, therefore, it is 
difficult to draw ontological conclusions (1986). 
36 As Bromiley rightly points out, we must be careful against trying to reconstruct Barth’s 
eschatology from his scattered comments, but must limit ourselves to more tentative conclusions 
(1979:245). 
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she immediately experiences her ‘future’ resurrection.37 From this perspective, then, 
Barth argues that when the person dies, she crosses the “frontier” (IV/3.1, 310) of death 
and immediately enters into the eternal life of God “in fellowship with him” (IV/1, 111). 
While this is certainly possible, Barth can also be understood as allowing the 
possibility of a temporal gap between the death and resurrection of the person, but not 
one in which the person continues to exist. Thus, Barth can say that Jesus “ceased to be” 
after his physical death and that his existence was thus “terminated by death like that of 
every other man” (IV/3.1, 312). Since all human persons cease to “be” after physical 
death, it would seem possible to suppose that they could remain in this state for some 
indefinite period of time before they experience any future life, should God graciously 
choose to reconstitute them as the souls of their bodies (pp. 362, 364, 427-428; IV/3.2, 
926-928).  
Some of Barth’s language, however, presses in a third, and entirely different, 
direction. Thus, despite his emphasis on the cessation of the person at death, Barth can 
still speak of a dead human individual as “a bodiless soul and a soulless body” (p. 355). 
In death, “the soul is alienated from the body and the body from the soul” (p. 425). Such 
language indicates that Barth is not completely opposed to speaking of the soul and body 
as separated from one another after death. Since the soul is only active and expressive in 
its union with the body, however, such a disembodied soul would be incapable of 
engaging in the “activity” that is the hallmark of human life (p. 425). Instead, the 
“ostensibly all-powerful soul becomes completely impotent” (p. 370). Being “deprived 
of the freedom for true and meaningful action and movement,” dead human persons 
“exist in a state of utter weakness and helplessness” and are “incapable of enjoying the 
good things of life” (p. 589).  For Barth, then, it would seem that death is a “radically 
sharp and serious limitation of all human being and action” (IV/3.1, 310; emphasis 
added). We must notice, though, that all of this language suggests that Barth is able to 
view the soul as continuing to exist after the death of the body, albeit only as “the spent 
soul of a spent body” (p. 370), which is unable to engage in meaningful activity. It seems 
possible, then, that Barth’s ontology is compatible with the conceivability of the body 
and soul having a limited existence independent of one another, albeit not in such a way 
                                                 
37 For a similar eternalist conception of the resurrection see Gutenson 2004. Oscar Cullman 
contends that Barth consistently affirmed such an immediate resurrection in his earlier theology, a more 
nuanced version of which he maintains in the Church Dogmatics as well (1958). 
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that the person herself can be said to still exist.38 If this third reading of Barth’s theology 
is allowed, then clearly the body/soul relationship can be understood as one of integral 
interdependence while still affirming the possibility that they could exist independently.  
On the other hand, what if this reading of Barth is incorrect? What if we conclude 
that Barth’s strong language regarding the cessation of human existence at death 
disallows any possibility of such independent existence?39 It would seem that if this 
reading is correct, Barth’s ontological conclusions may be overstepping the parameters 
of his own christological methodology.  
Since Barth insists that an adequate anthropological ontology must begin with 
christological reflection, decisions regarding the state of human ontology during any 
intermediate state would have to begin with the biblical portrayal of Christ during his 
entombment. But, there are remarkably few verses in the Bible that could be read as 
making any reference to the nature of Jesus’ existence during this time (e.g., Eph. 4:9; 1 
Pet. 3:19). And, if we follow Barth’s own interpretations, even these verses tell us 
nothing about the three days of his entombment (Lauber 2004). Thus, on Barth’s 
interpretation, the Bible is entirely silent on the nature of Christ’s existence during this 
time. But, if this is the case, then the christological narratives provide no basis upon 
which to make a definitive statement regarding the conceivability of an intermediate 
state.40 While the narratival emphasis on Jesus as a whole person in the Bible affirms 
psychophysical interdependence, it does not actually entail inseparability.41 Rather, the 
christological picture merely affirms that any account of the human person must view 
embodied wholeness as the normal condition of the human person. Whether there is an 
                                                 
38 This truncated existence could be understood to entail some form of soul sleep. If so, the 
viability of this third reading would seem to be substantially weakened by the fact that although this was a 
position with which Barth was quite familiar (Barth 1995), he makes no use of the concept, and he 
explicitly interprets passages that describe death as “sleep” as referring to the process of dying rather than 
the state of death (p. 778-779). 
39 For the purposes of this study, it will not be necessary for us to draw any definitive conclusions 
about which of these three readings is the correct way in which to understand Barth’s ontology. 
40 Of course, if one differs from Barth on this point and understands these texts to affirm that 
Jesus was active during this time, Barth’s christological methodology would require us to affirm some 
form of an intermediate state.  
41 Barth seems to miss this point when he argues that the death and resurrection narratives make 
no suggestion of a separation of body and soul, without similarly acknowledging that neither do they deny 
any such state of affairs (p. 327).  
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abnormal situation in which this wholeness is not a part of the human condition is simply 
not in view.42 To remain consistent with his overall methodology, then, it would seem 
that Barth’s anthropological ontology would need to affirm, as it does, the body/soul 
wholeness of the human person before and after the resurrection while remaining silent, 
and potentially open, on the status of human ontology during any interim period.43  
From this discussion, then, it would seem that two conclusions are available to 
us. On the one hand, we could conclude that Barth’s ontology views the human person as 
a body/soul entity that ceases to exist at death, but that the soul might continue to exist in 
a limited form during any interim period between death and resurrection. On the other 
hand, we could view Barth’s ontology as closed to any such an interim existence for the 
soul. If this is the case, however, we must question whether this aspect of his ontology is 
actually consistent with his christological methodology. Either way, it would seem that 
there is room for developing some concept of an intermediate state within the parameters 
of Barth’s christological anthropology, even if he did not choose to develop this option 
himself.  
 
2.3. The Pneumatological How: The Holy Spirit and Human Ontology 
Our earlier discussion of the tensions and contradictions that arise between body 
and soul raises an important question at this point. If there can be tensions and 
contradictions with respect to the body/soul relation, how is their unity maintained? With 
                                                 
42 Similarly, Barth’s emphasis on the concrete experience of the human person in perception and 
action simply affirms unity as the normative state of human nature. While it may provide a strong bias in 
favor of inseparability, it actually establishes no sure argument for the non-existence of a variant state. 
Unless Barth wishes to affirm the impossibility of spiritual beings possessing the capacity for perception 
and action (something Barth would presumably be averse to affirming with respect to angels, demons, and 
the triune God), it would seem that he should at least be open to the possibility that human persons could 
engage in both perception and action as disembodied beings—albeit in an abnormal and (possibly) 
functionally reduced manner. 
43 This would also suggest that attempts to support a dualist ontology based on Jesus’ death and 
resurrection are similarly flawed. Moreland and Rae argue that the biblical narratives suggest that between 
Jesus’ death and resurrection “he continued to exist as a God-man in the intermediate state independently 
of his earthly body” (2000:35; cf. Taliaferro 1995). Their only support for this conclusion, however, is that 
Jesus remains human through this transition. But, whether substance dualism is the only way to account for 
continued humanity through death and resurrection is itself a highly contentious issue that we will address 
in the next chapter.  
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that question we have arrived at the third, and decisive, term in Barth’s anthropological 
ontology, spirit.  
The importance of the Spirit for understanding human nature is again determined 
christologically.44 Any consideration of Jesus’ life must acknowledge the “unique 
relation” he shared with the Holy Spirit as the Messiah and the Son of God (p. 332). 
Indeed, Jesus owes his very existence to the Holy Spirit (p. 333). As the “new man” who 
reveals the “true nature of man,” Jesus thereby demonstrates the close connection 
between anthropology and pneumatology, especially as regards human ontology (p. 334).  
This connection is played out with respect to humans in general on three different 
levels. First, the Spirit is involved in the creation of the human person. As we have seen, 
Barth contends that humanity must be understood in terms of its absolute dependence on 
God. This is true of humanity’s ontological constitution as well. Since, according to 
Barth, a material being is merely “a spatio-material system of relations,” no merely 
material body inherently possesses independent life (p. 377).45 If, then, a material being 
actually becomes a living being and therefore subject of a personal life it can only be 
because of “an event over whose occurrence he has no control” (p. 353).46 For Barth, this 
is the “event” by which the human person, as a union of body and soul and, thus, as both 
subjective life and objective corporeality, is an expressly pneumatological event. 
Consequently, “Man is as he has spirit” (p. 354).47 The Spirit is “the fundamental 
                                                 
44 Rosato asserts, “Barth's sincere efforts towards a genuine theological anthropology first led him 
to pneumatology” and, in the process, to the conclusion that Jesus “had also to be understood 
pneumatologically” (1981:95-96). This rather speculative attempt to understand the genesis of Barth’s 
ideas unfortunately neglects the extremely important order in which Barth actually presents his ideas and 
thus misunderstands the significance of his christocentrism.   
45 Some may, however, possess the capacity for such life even if they do not possess that life 
inherently (p.  377).  
46 This is, of course, true for all living beings. What distinguishes humans in the sphere of living 
creatures is not their pneumatological constitution but their covenantal relationship with God (p. 359).  
47 Barth’s presentation of the relationship between body, soul, and Spirit thus follows what 
Hunsinger refers to as Barth’s “theological grammar” (2004). Body and soul are understood using the 
pattern of “dialectical inclusion” and “unity-in-distinction” that are characteristic of Barth’s Trinitarian 
grammar. The “incarnational pattern,” clearly evidenced here, involves “two terms and a relationship” 
(ibid., 182). Both forms of grammar seem to be at work in this section, as Barth seeks to explain how the 
unity-in-distinction of body and soul are maintained through the Spirit.  
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determination” (p. 363) of human nature as “the principle which makes man into a 
subject” (p. 364).48  
That Barth views this pneumatological constitution as an “event” leads to the 
second aspect of the Spirit’s work, preservation. For humans in general, the Spirit is a 
“transcendent determination” (p. 348);49 human life as a body/soul union is not a fixed 
possession, but is something that must be continually established by God through the 
agency of the Spirit (ibid.).50 This pneumatological event “must be continually repeated” 
for humans to remain human (p. 359).51 Human nature in general must be distinguished 
from Jesus at this point.52 Unlike other humans, Jesus “does not merely live from the 
Spirit but in the Spirit” (p. 334). Jesus alone has a relation to the Spirit that is intrinsic 
and enduring: “He is the man to whom the creative movement of God has come 
                                                 
48According to Ray Anderson, Barth “stands quite alone here in his radical interpretation of the 
relation of spirit to soul and body” (1982:211). Although Barth’s interpretation could probably  be 
considered a minority interpretation, it is certainly not without precedent among modern theologians (e.g., 
Pannenberg 1985:522-523; P. Newman 1981; Moltmann 1985:263; T. Torrance 1989:113). Interestingly, 
given Barth’s extensive familiarity with Kierkegaard’s writings, he too posits the human person as a 
synthesis of body and soul realized by the spirit (Macquarrie 1982:48).  
49 One of Barth’s concerns at this point seems to be to protect against any idea that humanity has, 
whether inherently or contingently, some part of the “divine essence” as an ongoing possession (p. 363). 
He explicitly excludes this possibility, however, by arguing that Scripture understands the Spirit as an 
“activity” and not a “being” and as something that can not be possessed (ibid.).  
50 Ray Anderson thinks it is rather “doubtful” that anyone would follow Barth on this because 
such an overemphasis on the Spirit would “evacuate the human person of a truly human mortal spirit” 
(1982:212). He thus accuses Barth of espousing a “form of Apollinarianism” and prefers to speak of spirit 
as an “orientation” of the human person (soul) brought about by the Holy Spirit (ibid., 212; cf. Come 
1963:152). Contrary to this interpretation, however, Barth does not understand the work of the Spirit to 
eliminate or even minimize the reality of human subjectivity and spirituality but merely to emphasize its 
radical dependency at all points. MacLean, thus argues, “in preservation (providence) there is a ‘natural 
man’, maintained by God's active and free relationship to this context. This relationship is designated as 
Spirit. Man is not absorbed. God created him, maintains him, and is constantly relating to him, indirectly, 
through the context of his life” (1981:45). 
51 Mangina points out that Barth’s similar event-language with respect to the church (IV/1, 650-
7224) should not be understood to imply that its pneumatological constitution is non-continuous, but rather 
as an attempt to emphasize the divine source and mystery of the church’s being (2004:154). The same 
argument would seem to apply to Barth’s anthropological ontology.  
52 See chapter 2.  
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primarily, originally and therefore definitively….He not only has the Spirit, but primarily 
and basically He is Spirit” (ibid.). 
Finally, we must also recognize the Spirit’s work of regeneration. Though God 
graciously maintains the ontological connection between himself and human persons, the 
intimate relation between God and his covenant-partner has been lost through human 
unfaithfulness (pp. 26-41, 139, 347; cf. IV/1, 139-145). Although the Spirit constitutes 
all human persons as body/soul unities in his work as creator and preserver, this unity is 
not experienced as such by human persons. On the contrary, humans in general live in 
the flesh (sarko,j), which Barth understands as “the condition of man in contradiction, in 
disorder and in consequent sickness” (p. 336).53 In the incarnation, Jesus took up this 
fleshly existence and transformed it into something that is “quickening and living and 
meaningful” (ibid.). This renewed human reality, however, cannot become a reality for 
individuals until they become aware of it and begin to take responsibility for its 
expression in their lives (IV/2, 421-422, 443-444, 454, 477-478). Thus, although Barth 
sees the ontological union of body and soul as universally realized through the creative 
work of the Spirit, he views the experience and expression of this union as an ongoing 
task (Gorringe 2004:47; cf. Macquarrie 1982:55 and Sherlock 1996:219). 
Having identified these three works of the Spirit with respect to human ontology, 
the specific relation between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit remains to be 
considered. Barth argues quite forcefully that “spirit” in the Bible, both Old and New 
Testaments, refers primarily to the spirit of God as “the creative movement” of God 
toward his creation (p. 333),54 and only derivatively of something properly characteristic 
of the human person.55 Barth thus distinguishes sharply between the human soul and the 
divine spirit by which it is made alive.56 There remains, nonetheless, a close relation 
                                                 
53 Barth recognizes that “flesh” can refer generally to human physicality but contends that it is 
most commonly used with reference to the human state in rebellion against God (p. 336). 
54 Although spirit as divine spirit and derivatively as the spirit of humans are Barth’s primary 
categories for understanding spirit in the Bible, he does recognize that it also has application to the 
commission of God (e.g., prophets) and to immaterial beings (pp. 357-358; cf. Sherlock 1996:222). 
Unfortunately he does not clearly address how these alternate uses, particularly the last, should impact his 
emphasis on spirit as primarily referring to the Spirit of God.   
55 For Barth, then, there can be no trichotomous understanding of human persons as body, soul, 
and spirit since he does not regard ‘spirit’ as a component of human ontology (cf. p. 355).  
56 Surveying the biblical terms, he argues that nephesh (vp,n<ï) in the Old Testament and yuch, in the 
New Testament can indicate either life in general, the life of a particular individual, or, by extension, the 
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between them such that “the Bible can speak in general of the spirit…of man,” although 
“[i]n practice, this means nothing else but the soul living through the Spirit” (p. 334).57 
This means, however, that spirit may not be viewed as an aspect of human being. The 
Spirit of God, though integrally and intimately related to human being, must never be 
identified with some portion of it (p. 363.).  
Since the Spirit is what constitutes the human person as soul of his body, the 
removal of the Spirit can only be the death of the person: “As the spirit makes of man an 
embodied soul and a besouled body, so the absence of spirit makes of him a bodiless soul 
and a soulless body” (p. 354-355). Upon this removal, the body/soul union is dissolved 
such that the “ostensibly all-powerful soul becomes completely impotent” and the 
organic body becomes “a mere material body” (p. 370).58 That this withdrawal and 
dissolution will take place is certain (p. 362). Whether there is a future for the human 
person after this death relies completely on whether God graciously chooses to 
reconstitute the body/soul relationship and restore the existence of the person (pp. 362, 
364, 370, 427-428).59  
                                                                                                                                                
individual herself and both are to be distinguished from the divine spirit (x;Wr or pneu/ma) (pp. 378-379). He 
addresses several “problem” passages for this interpretation (e.g., 1 Thess. 5:23; Luke 1:46f.; and Heb. 
4:12) arguing in each case that “spirit” refers primarily to the divine spirit and only by extension to human 
persons (p. 355). Following Genesis 2:7, the human person is understood to be a material being (hm'êd"a]h'ä-!mi 
‘rp'[' ~d"ªa'h'() who is constituted as a “living being” (hY")x; vp,n<ï) by the “breath of life” (~yYI+x; tm;äv.nI), which Barth 
identifies with the Holy Spirit (pp. 333-334, 361, 379, 396). Despite Barth’s strong emphasis on the 
subjective life of the person associated with the soul, he does not want us to miss the fact that Gen. 2:7 
refers to the material body of the person before the pneumatological event as “man” (~d"ªa'h'()  and, therefore, 
the materialist perspective is a valid, though limited, approach to the human person (p. 374). 
57 This interchangeability is possible because “the constitution of man as soul and body cannot be 
fully and exactly described without thinking first and foremost of the spirit as its proper basis” (p. 355). 
The reverse, however, does not hold and Barth argues that it is “never true that the soul is spoken of where 
the Spirit is unambiguously meant….There is in fact no case where the LXX translates nephesh by pneu/ma 
“ (p. 373). Although Job 7:15 would seem to provide a possible exception to this rule, his basic point 
seems to hold.  
58 As Price rightly notes, “in Barth's anthropology, a body without a soul is not a ‘dead person’, it 
is simply a body” (2002:252).  
59 Although Barth thus views having a body as a necessary part of the future resurrection of the 
person, he does not address the question of material continuity that plays such a prominent role in 
physicalist accounts of the resurrection (e.g., L. Baker 1995; Corcoran 2001b; Merricks 2001b; and Peters 
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 2.4. Covenantally Constituted: The Why of Human Ontology 
Barth offers the pneumatological constitution of the human person, however, not 
just as an explanation of the creation, preservation, and regeneration of the body/soul 
relation, but also as an explanation of why such an ontological constitution is so 
important. Humans must be understood as a pneumatologically grounded and rationally 
ordered relation of body and soul because, for Barth, the pneumatological event is 
primarily a covenantal event:  
 
Spirit in His fundamental significance is the element in virtue of 
which man is actively and passively introduced as a partner in the 
covenant of grace, in which he is installed in his position as God’s 
partner in the particular stages and decisions of the history of this 
covenant and in which he is equipped for his function as such. (p. 
347) 
 
The pneumatological event, by which human persons are constituted as body/soul 
entities, is, therefore, the event in which human capacity for covenantal relationship is 
grounded: 
 
Man has Spirit, and through the Spirit is the soul of his body. This 
means at least that, by reason of his creaturely being, he is capable of 
meeting God, of being a person for and in relation to Him, and of being 
one as God is one. He is capable of being aware of himself as different 
both from God and from the rest of the created world, yet also bound up 
with God and with the rest of the created world. He is capable of 
recognising himself and of being responsible for himself. He exists in the 
execution of this self-recognition and self-responsibility before his 
Creator. (p. 395) 
  
                                                                                                                                                
2002). For Barth this is simply consistent with his method of affirming that something is a theological 
truth and being less concerned to establish precisely how it can be realized.  
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For Barth, then, human persons would have no capacity for being God’s 
covenantal co-partners apart from their pneumatologically grounded dual constitution.60 
Barth contends that a purely material or spiritual account of the human person is 
inadequate for dealing with this reality-defining relationship. A purely material being, in 
Barth’s view, simply does not have the capacity for covenantal relationship (p. 353). 
Apart from the subjective life enabled in the pneumatological event, the human being 
would be indistinguishable from other merely material realities and unable to express 
and experience the covenantal partnership. Likewise, if human persons were purely 
spiritual, they would not have the capacity for outward expression and action necessary 
for any real relationship. Humans are, therefore, constituted as body-soul entities 
specifically because they have been created for covenantal relationship.61
Barth develops this argument further by looking at two specific sets of capacities 
that humanity must have in order to function as “a subject to whom God can entrust and 
from whom He can expect this partnership in intercourse with him” (p. 396; cf., Prenter 
1950:215). That God meets with and reveals himself to humanity implies first, that 
human beings are capable of perceiving God, distinguishing themselves from God, and 
knowing him as God (p. 399).62 Barth understands this percipient capacity quite simply 
as the awareness and thought necessary for an individual “to receive another as such into 
one’s self-consciousness” (p. 399). Consequently, in all God’s dealing with humanity, he 
“appeals to this ability” as he expects that humans have the percipient capacity for self-
conscious receptivity of another in relation to himself (ibid.). Barth’s discussion of the 
human capacity for perception is too long to analyze adequately at this point.63 It is 
important to realize, however, that the activities of perception, awareness and thought, 
                                                 
60 As we discussed in chapter two, the covenantal basis of humanity is clouded but not lost as a 
result of human sin because it is firmly grounded in the election of Jesus.  
61 Thus, as Prenter states, the human person is “gifted with his body/soul nature [mit dieser 
seelisch-leiblichen ‘Natur’ begabt]” specifically so that he might be granted the necessary “functions 
[diese Funktione]” (1950:215).  
62 Barth argues that even humanity’s ordinary perceptual experiences are derivative of his 
encounter with God. Thus, humanity’s general capacity for perception is grounded in its particular capacity 
to know and love God (pp. 402-403). 
63 Although Barth devotes a rather lengthy discussion to human perception, he is not interested in 
a theoretical analysis of human perceptivity, but on the capacities of a person in covenantal relationship (p. 
402). 
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for Barth signify the two moments of body and soul (p. 400).64 Although there can be no 
“simple distributions of the two functions in the act of perception to soul and body” (p. 
400), he associates the act of awareness primarily with the body and that of thinking with 
the soul (p. 402). In each, though, the primacy of the soul obtains. Without this 
percipient capacity God’s summons to and encounter with humans “would obviously be 
impossible” (p. 399). And apart from the pneumatological event and the dual constitution 
of human persons, this percipient capacity would be absent. 
The second conclusion Barth draws from this divine-human relation is that God 
summons humanity to decision and action (p. 406). Humanity’s covenantal co-
partnership with God is never a mere “fellowship of knowledge,” but always also a 
“fellowship of action” whereby human persons are summoned into a relationship of 
obedience and service” (p. 406). As with perception, Barth maintains that God’s 
summons to action presupposes the created capacity for action: “Man in his relation to 
God is claimed as one capable of such activity” (p. 407). Activity, for Barth, entails a 
person’s capacity “to set oneself freely in motion in relation to another” (p. 406). This 
implies not only that the human person is free to initiate such action in response to the 
divine summons but also to desire and will such action (pp. 407-408). Once again, Barth 
argues that “a special relation” obtains between soul/willing and body/desiring even 
though there can be no “partition” between these aspects of human existence (p. 408). 
With both of these arguments, Barth thus contends that insofar as the human person is 
the covenantal co-partner of God and, therefore, insofar as the human person must have 
the capacities necessary for perceiving and acting, he must have this dual constitution as 
body and soul so that he might be “qualified, prepared and equipped” for carrying out 
these functions (p. 396). 
With both of these arguments, Barth concludes that the unity, duality, and 
rationality of human nature is established simply and firmly in the fact that the human 
person has been addressed by God and “it is thus presupposed that he was created as 
such by God” (p. 422). So, Barth argues that God’s address to humanity “treats him as a 
being who can rule himself and serve himself” and thus presupposes that God has 
                                                 
64 Moltmann thinks that Barth’s emphasis on perception indicates “a reduction of the ‘human act 
of living’ to thinking and willing” (1985:254). This, however, completely misses Barth’s heavy emphasis 
on activity and agency as primary categories of true humanity (pp. 175-198, 406-416). Barth’s approach is 
quite consistent with that of John Macmurray who thinks that we should speak of human persons more in 
terms of the “I do” than the “I think” (1957:84; cf. Macquarrie 1982:39-40).  
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already created him as “a rational being” who has the capacities of perception and action 
necessary for responding to that address (p. 424). That God has created a being with such 
capacities and therefore a being that can serve as his covenantal co-partner is, of course, 
an act of divine grace (p. 352). So, humanity “is determined by the one grace, that of his 
creation, for the other grace, that of the covenant” (p. 349). In this event of grace, as a 
body/soul being, “it becomes possible for him to meet the divine person and person, to 
be a covenant-partner” (p. 353). In this way, Barth has developed what may rightly be 
called a covenantal ontology.65  
 
3. Christology and Ontology: A Christological Framework for a Theoretical Ontology 
We have now developed a much clearer understanding of what Barth understands 
human ontology to be (a rationally ordered unity of body and soul), how that ontological 
constitution is maintained (the creating, preserving, and regenerating work of the Spirit), 
and why this particular ontology is necessary (the divine-human covenantal 
relationship).66 As mentioned earlier, though, the manner in which Barth answers these 
questions, emphasizing both unity and duality, has generated some disagreement among 
his interpreters as to whether he is better characterized in monistic or dualistic terms. We 
                                                 
65 Noting the importance of covenant in Barth’s ontology, John Webster rightly asserts: “Without 
that substantial anthropology and its corresponding emphasis on the realisation of selfhood through action, 
Barth's understanding of covenant, and his consistent stress on the moral character of human response to 
God, would be simply unthinkable” (2001c:56). 
66 Failure to emphasize all three of these theological loci have led to some rather imbalanced 
pictures of Barth’s ontological framework. Neglecting the christological basis of Barth’s anthropological 
ontology, Berkouwer thinks that Barth operates almost exclusively on a covenantal/creation framework 
and then criticizes him for being inconsistent with his christological methodology (1962:94). Rosato makes 
the opposite mistake and argues that Barth’s theology is “rooted in man's recreation, that is, in soteriology 
and eschatology” in contrast with theological anthropologies in general, which tend to focus on humanity’s 
creation (1981:95). Though soteriology and eschatology have a profound impact on Barth’s anthropology, 
Rosato unnecessarily downplays the key role of creation, providence, and covenant in Barth’s 
anthropology (though these can not, of course, be separated from soteriology and eschatology). Similarly, 
Gorringe argues that “failure to take Spirit into account is what leads us into either a monistic monism or a 
monistic spiritualism,” without acknowledging the christological and covenantal aspects of Barth’s 
framework as well (1999:202). A full appreciation of Barth’s anthropological ontology, therefore, requires 
a recognition of the vital roles that Christology, pneumatology, and covenant/creation play in its 
development.  
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can now see, however, how Barth’s approach to the issue of human ontology is markedly 
different. Although he is well aware of the difficulties associated with human ontology, 
he does not begin with an ostensible problem but with a person. Beginning with Jesus, he 
argues for a particular way of viewing the human person with which any theoretical 
depiction must cohere.67 Price, thus, correctly argues that Barth does not “attempt a 
theoretical rejoinder to the mind-body problem” (Price 2002:257). Despite making this 
observation, however, Price goes on to argue that Barth avoids the mind-body problem 
and merely shrouds the answer in the mystery of God’s being (ibid., 257). But that too 
misconstrues the nature of Barth’s task. He is not attempting to avoid the mind-body 
problem or locate its insolubility in the divine being; rather, he is trying to locate the 
discussion within a theological framework that provides a firm foundation for human 
nature. Thus, he does not avoid the problem but actually attempts to clear the way for a 
valid, theological consideration of the issues.68 To understand how Barth’s 
anthropological ontology applies to the mind/body discussion, we will, therefore, have to 
lay out more clearly its specific implications.  
 
3.1. The Ontological Criteria of Barth’s Christological Ontology. 
While Barth’s anthropology may have other implications for understanding the 
mind/body relation, it seems clear that the following are the most significant: 
 (1) Selfhood. Any attempt to understand the ontological implications of Barth’s 
christological anthropology must begin with the fact that it clearly requires a “rather 
robust sense of human selfhood” (Webster 2001c:56). Barth’s particular view of what it 
means to be a human self, though, differs markedly from many contemporary portraits.  
According to E. J. Lowe, self can be defined broadly as  
 
a subject of consciousness, a being capable of thought and 
experience and able to engage in deliberative action. More crucially, a self 
                                                 
67 In his study of biblical anthropology, Kümmel similarly argues that Jesus “developed no one 
theory of man, but that a very definite picture of man stood behind His gospel preaching” (1963:36).  
68 Such theological considerations are often dismissed as a God-of-the-gaps solution to the 
mind/brain relationship (e.g., Flanagan 1984:64; Polkinghorne 1994:19). Barth does not posit the 
theological grounding of human ontology as an answer to an otherwise insoluble problem but rather as the 
presupposition to a proper understanding of human reality.  
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must have a capacity for self-consciousness….a self is a being that is able 
to entertain first-person thoughts. (1995:817) 
 
This definition usefully captures the importance of the self as subject that plays 
such an important role for Barth (p. 371). Though Barth never clearly defines the term 
subject, it involves, at least, acknowledging the human person as an independent 
individual who can be identified with certain actions and experiences (esp. pp. 335, 352, 
371, 374). 
The usefulness of Lowe’s definition for describing Barth’s anthropology, 
however, is limited for at least three reasons. First, Barth is not interested in 
understanding selfhood primarily in terms of capacities. Though we have seen that Barth 
is perfectly willing to argue from relationship to capacity (e.g., from the reality of the 
covenantal relationship to the capacity for perception and action), he resists the reverse 
approach (e.g., from the capacity for thought to selfhood). He thus refuses to speculate 
on the possibility that other creatures, with notably differing sets of capacities, might also 
experience inner lives as the souls of their bodies (pp. 374-35). Second, although Lowe 
mentions “deliberative action” at the end of his definition, the overt emphasis falls on the 
interiority of the human person.69 While Barth’s theology of the self certainly affirms the 
importance of such interiority, it calls for a much broader perspective.70 Finally, Lowe’s 
definition places too much emphasis on the individual. Barth’s approach, on the other 
                                                 
69 Such a focus on interiority has long been a prominent aspect of modern views of the self (cf. C. 
Taylor 1989:111 and Grenz 2001:59). Lowe’s definition, however, does make a useful distinction between 
the self and the conscious experiences of which it is the subject (1995:817). Failing to make such a 
distinction results in the “punctual” self of which Charles Taylor has been so critical—the transient self 
constituted only by its ephemeral self-awareness (C. Taylor 1989:49-50; this view is often associated with 
Hume’s criticisms of selfhood [1911:1.238-239]). 
70Barth’s understanding of human selfhood manifests an awareness of its external as well as its 
internal dimensions and, therefore, presents a sharp criticism of the autonomous, rational, self-constituting 
self of post-Enlightenment modernism (Fisher 1998:192, Mangina 2001:14, and Kerr 2002:27). This 
resistance to any modernistic overemphasis on interiority, despite his occasionally strong language 
regarding the priority of the soul, means that Barth resists psychologism in his anthropological ontology as 
much as in his soteriology (cf. C. Anderson 2002). Additionally, though Barth’s approach bears some 
resemblance to postmodern de-centered views of the self (cf. Schrag 1997 and Woolhead 1999), Webster 
rightly argues that his theological matrix is “antipathetic to allowing reflexive subjectivity to function as a 
basic anthropological datum” (Webster 2001c:56).  
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hand, prioritizes the relational constitution of humanity.71 Although most of §46 focuses 
on the ontological constitution of the human individual, it is clearly grounded in her 
determinative relation with God.72 We must also not lose sight of the important 
discussions in the previous paragraphs on the constitutive nature of intra-human 
relationships. For Barth, then, a properly formulated concept of selfhood must address 
the human person as a subject constituted by particular relationships.73 As the remaining 
elements of Barth’s ontology are unfolded it will become apparent that these two facets 
are not the sum of his notion of selfhood, but they do comprise its primary aspects.  
 (2)  Consciousness. Though closely related to selfhood,74 we can also affirm that 
Barth’s anthropological ontology requires a real and vital subjective consciousness.75 
Consciousness can be used in a number of different ways,76 but is used most often with 
respect to the “phenomenal awareness” (i.e., experiences or subjective feels) of a given 
                                                 
71 In addition to the God-human relationship so clearly evidenced throughout this discussion, 
Barth also places a priority on human relationships for maintaining a healthy body/soul balance (IV/2, 443-
444).  
72 As Freyer points out the kind of subjectivity that Barth has in mind is not the “subjectivity 
[Subjektivität] of the human person understood in abstraction from God, but the human person who is a 
subject specifically because he has been drawn into covenantal relation through call of God (1991:195). 
Since Barth views this determinative relationship as a historical reality (see chapter 2), Barth’s view of 
selfhood may well share some similarities with those who view selfhood as grounded in particular 
narratives (e.g., Ricoeur 1992; Dennett 1992; and Hutto 1997).  
73 A more complete discussion of human selfhood as it applies to Barth’s theological 
anthropology lies well beyond the scope of this chapter. Adopting an admittedly broad view of the self that 
focuses on the relational constitution of the human subject, therefore, should not be interpreted as denying 
the many other useful ways of understanding selfhood (some general studies of selfhood include C. Taylor 
1989; Carrithers et al. 1985; Marsella et al. 1985; and Grenz 2001, esp. 58-140). Rather, it simply seeks to 
affirm two important elements of Barth’s theological anthropology while, at the same time, drawing on one 
prominent strand of contemporary theology (cf. Macmurray 1961; McFadyen 1990:100-101; Zizioulas 
1985; Teske 2000; and Grenz 2001).  
74 The other aspects of Barth’s ontological framework laid out below can all be viewed as further 
elaborations of Barth’s broad view of selfhood. 
75 Though Barth’s view of the self cannot be limited to personal consciousness, it nonetheless 
remains an important part of his overall ontology.  
76 Most agree that “consciousness,” as commonly used, is a rather ambiguous term with a variety 
of distinct uses (e.g., Block 1995a; Rosenthal 1986; van Gulick 2004; Lormand 1998). M. Antony, 
however, helpfully points out that these uses can be viewed as different modalities of the more general, 
intuitive notion of phenomenal awareness (2001).  
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subject.77 That conscious experience so understood is a requisite element of Barth’s 
anthropological ontology seems without question.78 Barth clearly affirms that the human 
person must be regarded as a self-conscious entity capable of knowing itself and its 
experiences through an “inner experience” of itself (p. 375). Additionally, these self-
conscious experiences must be understood to have a certain “feel” for the human 
subject—i.e., there must be something that it is like to have undergone that particular 
experience.79 Barth’s depiction of the vital “inner life” of Jesus (p. 329) and of humans 
in general would be incomprehensible without some notion that there is a distinctive 
phenomenal quality to such experiences. The same holds for Barth’s understanding of 
perceptual awareness. Barth argues that the very idea of a covenantal relationship 
requires the capacity for a self-conscious experience whereby the human becomes aware 
of some other being (pp 399-401). Any attempt to construe that awareness in such a 
manner as to eliminate, or even unduly minimize, the qualitative experience of the 
encounter would seem antithetical to Barth’s covenantal ontology (p. 397). Among the 
many issues often associated with human consciousness, then, it would seem that Barth’s 
ontology is, at least, committed to the importance of self-consciousness, first-person 
perspectives, and phenomenal experiences.80 
(3) Continuous Personal Identity. Given Barth’s emphasis on the human person 
as an individual subject, it is unsurprising that his ontology also addresses the question of 
identity in both its synchronic (identity at a given time) and diachronic (identity through 
                                                 
77 From this perspective, consciousness can be understood as the what’s-it-likeness (i.e. qualia) of 
a phenomenal experience made famous by T. Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974; cf. Crane 2000 
and Tye 2003). 
78 Barth specifically affirms that the human person as soul and body is “conscious” (p. 398). 
79 Though some contemporary philosophers would disagree with Barth on this point (Shoemaker 
1975, Garcia-Carpintero 2003, Dennett 1991), many argue strenuously in favor of such qualia (Searle 
1992; Block 1994; Chalmers 1996; and de Leon 2001).   
80 This does not mean that Barth’s ontology that commits him to a “strongly realist” notion of 
consciousness—i.e., that it has an independent existence similar to a magnetic field—but only to the notion 
that human life is characterized by a certain set of properties that we categorize with the concept of 
consciousness (see van Gulick 2004). Whether Barth’s ontology is similarly committed to other issues 
commonly addressed in philosophical studies of consciousness (e.g., the irreducibility of first-person to 
third-person perspectives, the ineffability of qualia, and the “explanatory gap” between neurobiology and 
consciousness), will be considered in the next two chapters (for a good summary of these issues see Lycan 
2005).  
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time) forms.81 Although he associates synchronic identity more closely with a person’s 
conscious life, he maintains that it necessarily involves the body as well; the human 
person is an identifiable subject only as an embodied soul (pp. 353, 375, 378). Barth is 
also fully aware that the human person is a fully temporal reality; indeed, he considers it 
one of the defining aspects of the human person and a constituent element of the soul.82 
Together, though, these issues, identity and temporality, raise the problem of diachronic 
identity.  
For Barth, however, the continuous identity of the human person is quite clear. 
Looking to the person of Christ, he notes that Jesus is the “same whole man, soul and 
body” both before and after his resurrection (p. 327). Continuous identity through death 
and resurrection thus applies also to humans in general as they await their promised 
resurrection (pp. 353, 360-362, 364, 370-371; III/4, 338; IV/1, 111-113).83 Continuous 
identity would also seem to be required by the self-responsibility and accountability 
necessitated by his covenantal framework.84 Indeed, the very nature of a covenant would 
seem to presuppose the relatively stable identities of the individuals involved. Barth’s 
view of the continuity of human identity, then, is more properly grounded on the 
covenantal faithfulness of God than speculative arguments regarding her psychological 
and/or somatic continuity.85
(4) Agency. Agency can be loosely defined as the capacity of some particular 
being for developing “intentions” that are causally related to the production of actions 
                                                 
81 On the synchronic/diachronic distinction see Olson 2003b:353. 
82 Barth includes “movement in time” as part of his definition of soul (p. 373) and devotes §46 to 
temporality as the third key aspect of human persons.  
83 Although Barth’s language at times would seem to suggest that human existence is limited to 
this life alone (e.g., III/4, 588-591), he clearly states that humans enter into the eternal life of God “in 
fellowship with him” (IV/1, 111). Although this is life “in” God, “the creaturliness and identity of man will 
certainly not be destroyed” (IV/1, 113).  
84 Philosophers have long recognized the close relationship between continuous personal identity 
and concern for the future (see Kind 2004).  
85 Thus Barth argues, “even in death God watches over him” and remains faithful to the human 
person (p. 371; for a similar argument see R. Anderson 1998). Similarly, Barth argues in CD IV.2 that the 
continuous personal identity of the human person is maintained only by her covenantal participation in the 
eschatological eternality of Jesus (pp. 315-316).  
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(cf. Searle 1983:83-98; Kapitan 1991; Knobe 2004).86 Understood in this way, Barth’s 
ontology entails human agency. Barth’s presentation of the atonement as the freely 
chosen and intended act of Jesus suggests a necessary and strong view of personal 
agency; so too his emphasis on self-responsibility (pp. 396-397) and the human person as 
a volitional being (pp. 406-409). Indeed, his entire account of human nature as a 
rationally ordered being envisions the soul as the agent that directs the intentional actions 
of the person.87 Thus, for Barth, the very nature of human life involves the agential 
“capacity for action, self-movement, self-activity, self-determination” (p. 374).  
(5) Mental Causation. Closely related to agency, Barth’s ontology seems firmly 
committed to the stance that a person’s mental life has causal powers and can exercise 
causal influence on extra-mental realities. For Barth’s account of the soul’s agency to 
have any real meaning, this inner reality must have causal powers. Indeed, in language 
very similar to that being used in contemporary philosophy, Barth argues for the 
“downward” causal influence of the soul (p. 339) as it controls the body (p. 368). Barth 
thus explicitly rejects any “epiphenomenal” understanding of causation (p. 382).  
(6) Freedom. We have already briefly noted the importance of human freedom in 
Barth’s anthropology in general. He continues to develop this notion in his depiction of 
human ontology. Related to, though distinct from, his account of mental causation, Barth 
continues his emphasis on the divinely constituted freedom of the human person. Barth’s 
view of Jesus as the obedient son and atoning sacrifice in particular mandates a strong 
view of human freedom (IV/1, 157-210). And, again, Barth’s understanding of the 
rational order of human as necessary for maintaining covenantal relationality entails that 
human persons are determined for freedom by the self-determination of God and not 
                                                 
86 Tim Bayne and Neil Levy suggest a more encompassing view of agency that involves mental 
causation, authorship, effort, freedom, and decision-making (2004). While we will see that many of these 
are also important aspects of Barth’s ontology, Philip Clayton rightly warns against the tendency of some 
philosophers to bias the ontological discussion from the beginning by presupposing too robust a notion of 
personal agency (2005). Consequently, our discussion will proceed with the more limited notion of agency 
indicated above.  
87 Such an approach would seem to commit Barth to some form of agent causation, although 
certainly not one that affirmed the completely indeterminate nature of human action (see chapter 2). 
Although agent causation is widely considered to be problematic because of its indeterminacy and 
interruption of the causal chain, some philosophers are reviving the argument by associating causation with 
agential substances (e.g., Harre 2001 and E. Lowe 2003). Others dismiss the objection as stemming from 
an inadequate materialistic framework (see chapter 6).  
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merely by cultural or biological influences.88 Indeed, for Barth, “The soul is itself the 
freedom of man” (p. 418).  
 (7) Embodiment. Barth’s understanding of Christology and the concrete reality 
of human existence as well as the embodied nature of human agency and personal 
identity, all suggest that any adequate anthropology must include an emphasis on 
personal embodiment as part of human existence. Along with Barth’s emphasis on the 
resurrection, these things also suggest that embodiment is an important part of the future 
reality of human beings as well. An adequate anthropology must, therefore, include at 
least the hope of resurrected embodiment as part of its picture.89
(8) Contingent Personhood. As we have seen, Barth’s pneumatological 
framework requires that any adequate anthropology will understand humans to be 
persons only contingently as they are constituted as soul/body entities through the work 
of the Holy Spirit. Barth, therefore, strongly opposes any move to understand some 
portion of the human person to be inherently immortal (e.g., pp. 380, 392-393). Human 
persons exist only and continuously as they are maintained as such by the Spirit for 
God’s glory.90
From this brief survey we can see that the theological framework of Barth’s 
anthropological ontology commits him to viewing the human person in a way that 
requires: (1) a strong concept of selfhood emphasizing humans as subjects constituted by 
particular relationships, (2) an inner life comprising self-consciousness experiences, (3) 
an understanding of continuous personal identity that involves both the body and the soul 
but is ultimately dependent on divine faithfulness, (4) an appreciation of humans as 
capable of initiating intentional actions, (5) some view of mentality that allows a causal 
relationship with extra-mental realities, (6) an awareness of humanity’s determination 
and freedom, (7) a strong appreciation for the role of the body in every facet of human 
experience, and (8) a recognition that all aspects of human life and nature are contingent 
realities. 
It is worth noticing at this point that Barth makes very little reference in this 
paragraph to the christological criteria that he established in §44. This does not mean, 
however, that these criteria are not operative in this discussion. Though he does not 
                                                 
88 See esp. III/4, 565-685; see also Webster 1995 and 1998, Busch 2004:116-121, and Mangina 
2004:99, 151-152. 
89 See chapter 6. 
90 Similarly Pannenberg 1991:2.198. 
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mention them explicitly, it seems clear they continue to play a foundational role in his 
argument. Indeed, Barth’s understanding of subjectivity, selfhood, agency, and freedom 
seem to be inherent aspects of criteria 5 and 6 (participation in redemptive history and 
obedient service). Similarly, his argument for the contingency of human personhood is 
almost a direct continuation of his first three criteria (the primacy of God, the 
christological constitution of human persons, and the fact that human persons exist for 
the glory of God). The only aspect of Barth’s ontological framework that does not seem 
to be clearly grounded in his early christological criteria is his emphasis on the absolute 
inseparability of soul and body and the corresponding rejection of any form of conscious 
existence between death and resurrection. 
 
3.2. The Framing of a Theoretical Ontology 
The question remains, however, whether these ontological positions commit 
Barth to some particular theory of human nature. On the one hand, Barth’s depiction of 
human identity, agency and embodiment would seem to suggest some form of 
physicalism. On the other hand his strong emphasis on selfhood, agency, and mental 
causation are often associated with various forms of dualism. This tension can be seen in 
the fact that Barth rejects certain forms of both physicalism and dualism.  
Thus, he critiques “monistic materialism” (p. 382) for reducing the human person 
to mere corporeality and denying the real existence of the inner life of human persons. 
Anything that is not “corporeal, spatial, physical and material,” on this view, must be 
rejected as illusory and “epiphenomenal” (ibid.). The human person is rendered 
“subjectless” (pp. 382-392).91 Such a reductive account of the human person stands in 
stark contrast to the ontological requirements of Barth’s anthropology. As we will see in 
the next chapter, though, while this may have been an accurate description of 
physicalistic theories in the middle of the twentieth century,92 it accounts for only a 
small portion of such theories today. The term physicalism now encompasses a broad 
range of theories, many of which view the human person as a purely material being (i.e., 
                                                 
91 Similarly, he rejects “monistic spiritualism” (p. 390) for the reverse denial of material reality in 
favor of the soul that thus renders him “objectless” (pp. 390-392). Such idealistic accounts of human 
nature, though, will not be considered in this project.  
92 Whether this is in fact an accurate depiction of the philosophy of mind at that time is lies 
beyond the scope of this project. 
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only one substance) but as one with a real and significant mental life.93  Barth’s explicit 
rejection of “monistic materialism,” therefore, does not necessarily indicate a stance with 
respect to these more recent physicalistic proposals.  
But he also denies the validity of any theory that construes the duality of the 
human person in terms of two substances (pp. 380-382). According to Barth, dualism 
understands the human person as comprising two substances that are “self-contained and 
qualitatively different in relation to the other” (p. 380). These two substances are seen to 
be so different that they are only tentatively united, resulting in an ultimate identification 
of the human person with the soul alone (pp. 380-381).94 Even those theories that seek to 
mediate the relationship between the two substances (e.g., interactionism and 
parallelism), Barth argues, fall far short of the holistic unity of the person required by 
Christology and covenantal relationship (pp. 428-436). Based on this definition, dualism 
is clearly inconsistent with the framework of Barth’s ontology. But again, this is a rather 
limited view of dualism as espoused by theologians and philosophers today. A number of 
proposals are now understood to fall under the broad label dualism, many of which do 
not fit the definition offered by Barth and may escape at least some of his objections 
(e.g., Taliaferro 1994; Hasker 1999; Moreland and Rae 2000; Goetz 2005).95 In fact, one 
of Barth’s key concerns about dualism, that it views the soul as inherently immortal and 
is, therefore, incompatible with the contingency requirement in Barth’s ontology (p. 
380), is not an element of most contemporary forms of dualism.96  
Neither of these two sets of arguments, however, clarifies the precise nature of 
Barth’s own ontology. While Barth uses them to explain more clearly what a properly 
theological view of human ontology is not, they do not establish a precise theory as to 
what it is. It may be more helpful then, to view Barth’s argument in terms of the 
relationship between paradigms, models, and theories in theological formulation. From 
this perspective we can understand paradigm to denote the grid through which we 
perceive some aspect of reality, model as a conceptual construction by which we seek to 
understand and apply the paradigmatic framework to a particular aspect of reality, and 
                                                 
93 For nice overviews see Stoljar 2001b and Melnyk 2003. 
94 Barth thinks that even though substance dualists often affirm the essential unity of the human 
person, their dualistic conception necessarily entails that any ostensible unity be problematic and 
ultimately ephemeral (p. 380-381).  
95.   
96 See chapter 6.   
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theory as an attempt to explicate more precisely the reality depicted by some particular 
model.97 Using this language, the incarnation clearly functions paradigmatically in 
Barth’s theology as he strives to understand all of reality through its influence. In turn, 
Barth posits his unity-duality-order model of the body/soul relation as the most accurate 
depiction of the human person in light of this incarnational perspective. As with most 
models, though, this ontological model does not seek to address all of the pertinent 
theoretical issues so much as to provide a useful way of viewing and speaking about the 
phenomenon in question (see Barbour 1974). From this perspective, Barth’s model of 
human ontology can be understood as a way of conceptualizing the human person that 
seeks to integrate two important perspectives (inner and outer), and a way of speaking 
about human nature with an emphasis on holistic language. Although such an account 
does not provide a specific theory of human nature, it can serve to limit the range of 
legitimate options for such a theory.98 Webster makes a similar argument with respect to 
the relationship between Barth’s theology and cosmological theories: “it may be that 
what Barth provides is the framework—if not the actual execution—of a dogmatic 
cosmology” (2000a:111, italics added). Barth’s approach, then, is best understood as 
providing the paradigmatic framework within which an anthropological ontology must 
function, without providing the actual execution of such an ontology.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Barth thus develops an anthropological ontology that can be properly construed 
as christological, pneumatological and covenantal. As he argues,  
 
                                                 
97 This understanding of paradigms as frameworks through which we view reality is widely 
accepted (see Kuhn 1970, Barbour 1974, and D. Clark 2003). On the relationship between paradigms, 
models, and theories, though not necessarily using this terminology, see Barbour 1974, Dulles 1978, 
Godlove 1984, and D. Clark 2003. For a discussion of how this language can be used to understand the 
function of theological formulations see Cortez 2005. 
98 Barth’s distinction between “doctrine” and “theory” (I/2, 761-762) suggests that he would have 
been open to using this kind of language and would have argued that theological formulations should focus 
on developing biblically valid paradigms and models. This does not mean, however, that he would have 
been opposed to theoretical constructions—indeed he saw such theories as indispensable aspects of any 
world view (see his comments on the legitimacy of developing a theoretical philosophy of history; III/3, 
21-26).  
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We have not deduced this from an abstract consideration and 
assessment of man. We have not given it a basis in scientific or cultural 
studies, but in theology. The starting-point was that man stands before 
God, who is his Creator. We brought out the presuppositions which result 
in respect of his creatureliness. We asked concerning that which is 
thereby credited to man and expected from him. We tried to understand 
man’s special nature in the light of the fact that at all events it had to be so 
constituted as to comprise within itself the ability corresponding to his 
special relationship with God. (pp. 416-417).  
 
On this ground, Barth presents a holistic model of human nature that offers a 
useful way of conceptualizing and speaking about the human person that values both the 
objective and subjective dimensions of human life.  
In the next two chapters, we will also consider whether, in addition to presenting 
a useful language, this ontological model also provides a helpful framework for engaging 
the more precise theories of human nature generated in contemporary philosophy of 
mind. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, this will involve more than simply 
noting whether a particular theory supports the ontological criteria mentioned above. 
Barth’s methodological commitments will require us to consider whether it is both 
consistent with Barth’s incarnational Christology and coherent within its own 
framework. Both of these factors must come into play in determining the usefulness of 
an ontological theory for adequately explaining the nature of the human person.  
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Chapter 5 
Physicalism, But Not Reductionism 
Christological Adequacy and Nonreductive forms of Physicalism 
 
1. The Prospect of a Christologically Adequate Physicalist Ontology  
Now that we have developed a basic understanding of Barth’s christological vision 
of human ontology, we are well positioned to move into a consideration of specific theories 
of the mind/body relationship. Our task in the next two chapters will be to understand the 
implications that Barth’s christocentric orientation of theological anthropology has for 
understanding and evaluating contemporary theories of human ontology. Our goal, then, is 
not to try and resolve the mind/body debate, or even to conduct a thorough analysis of any 
specific proposal, but to view some of the more commonly espoused positions through a 
christological lens.  
With that in mind, we turn our attention in this chapter to a group of theories that 
understands the human person in a decidedly physicalist sense. That is, we will consider 
various theories that understand human persons to be completely physical beings (i.e., 
comprising no additional non-physical or spiritual substance) whose ‘inner’ dimensions 
(e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, etc.) must be understood in terms of their physical 
bases.  
In the course of this chapter, we will see that there are a number of different ways to 
construe a physicalist ontology. At the far end of the physicalist spectrum eliminative 
materialism views human persons as strictly physical beings; language concerning ‘mental’ 
realities1 results from erroneous ways of thinking about the human person (i.e., the so-called 
“folk psychology”) and should simply be eliminated (e.g., Paul Churchland 1981). 
Somewhat less radical, reductive or conservative physicalism argues that mental properties 
are identical with physical properties but that they, and the corresponding “folk 
psychology,” should not simply be eliminated. This position thus espouses the reducibility 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, we will use a variety of terms to refer to mental realities (e.g., entities, events, 
properties, etc.), without making any concerted effort to distinguish sharply between them. When a particular 
discussion requires a more particular use of one of these terms, that will be made clear.  
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of mental properties to physical properties (e.g., Kim 1993c), but in such a way that our 
language and concepts concerning the mental are retained.  
For a variety of reasons that should become clear through the course of the chapter, it 
seems highly unlikely that either eliminative or reductive physicalism could be developed in 
a way that would prove adequate to a christological anthropology.2 Our focus, then, will be 
on a third group of theories that we will refer to broadly as nonreductive physicalism 
(NRP).3 NRP seeks to find a means of articulating a commitment to the physicalist 
paradigm, thus rejecting dualism, while eschewing the eliminative and reductive 
implications of the other physicalist approaches. Having become the most influential 
mind/body theory in the last part of the twentieth century, various forms of NRP continue to 
dominate among philosophers of mind despite a recent rise in more reductive approaches 
(c.f., Kim 1998b).  
This chapter will thus seek to analyze the prospects of developing a nonreductive 
physicalist mind/body theory within the ontological framework established by a 
christological anthropology. To do this, we will first need to define the basic tenets of NRP 
and examine its key philosophical commitments. Having done this, we will see that the 
christological adequacy of NRP can be challenged in three areas: mental causation, 
phenomenal consciousness, and the continuity of personal identity. The second half of the 
chapter, then, will survey each of these areas to determine the nature of the problem and the 
various solutions nonreductive physicalists have proposed. The extent to which NRP is 
successful in meeting these three challenges will largely determine the extent to which it can 
be considered a viable option for a christologically adequate anthropological ontology.  
 
2. What Is Nonreductive Physicalism? 
Depending on how one defines NRP, it can encompass a rather broad range of 
theories and ideas. In this study, we will use the term to denote any mind/body theory that 
affirms: (1) epistemological nonreduction, (2) materialist monism, (3) the causal efficacy of 
                                                 
2 Barth made his own opinion of the christological inadequacy of such theories quite clear (pp. 382-
394).  
3 As will become clear later in the chapter, we will be using “nonreductive physicalism” in a broad 
sense to describe any theory affirming the basic tenets of NRP.  
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mental properties, and (4) the asymmetric dependence of mental properties on physical 
properties.  
Before addressing these in detail, though, it will be important to understand a key 
concept used in most NRP ontologies. According to many philosophers, the various entities 
in the universe and the sciences that study them are best understood hierarchically (c.f., 
Campbell 1974; Wimsatt 1976, 1994). According to Kim,  
 
The Cartesian model of a bifurcated world has been replaced by that 
of a layered world, a hierarchically stratified structure of 'levels' or 'orders' of 
entities and their characteristic properties. It is generally thought that there is 
a bottom level, one consisting of whatever micro-physics is going to tell us 
are the most basic physical particles out of which all matter is composed 
(electrons, neutrons, quarks, or whatever). And these objects, whatever they 
are, are characterized by certain fundamental physical properties and 
relations (mass, spin, charm, or whatever). As we ascend to higher levels, we 
find structures that are made up of entities belonging to the lower levels, and, 
moreover, the entities at any given level are thought to be characterized by a 
set of properties distinctive of that level. (1993b:190)4
 
The picture thus presented is of a “world stratified into levels, from lower to higher, 
from the basic to the constructed and evolved, from the simple to the more complex” (Kim 
1999:19).5
This hierarchy factors into the mind-body discussion precisely at the point where we 
try to determine the relationships that obtain among the various levels. Unlike eliminative 
materialism, which denies the reality of higher-level processes and properties, both reductive 
                                                 
4 Stoeger explains this by reference to “constitutive relationships” (2002). That is, the higher levels 
are constituted by both the lower-level particulars and the relationships that obtain among them.  
5 Despite the widespread use of this hierarchical model, Kim points out a number of important 
questions that do not seem to be adequately addressed by those adopting this approach—e.g., the difficulty of 
individuating the levels, defending the use of one simple hierarchy to encompass all reality, and the 
oversimplification involved in such a linear framework (1990:20; cf. Murphy 1996; Sharpe and Walgate 2003). 
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and nonreductive thinkers affirm their reality, but disagree on the best way to explain them. 
Reductive thinkers view the hierarchy as “the stepwise explanation of the phenomena of the 
one level in terms of those of the next lower level, until finally the bottom rung of the ladder 
is reached, that is, the level of fundamental physics, where only a few basic laws of nature 
are needed” (Schouten 2001:680). According to the reductive approach, then, “A property or 
event is explained when we can show how suitable arrangements or sequences of lower-
level properties or events (which do not themselves involve or presuppose the target 
phenomena) would constitute just such a property or event” (Carruthers 2001a:65). The 
nonreductive approach, on the other hand, insists that even though higher-level properties 
are dependent on lower-level properties, each level complements the others such that none 
can be reductively explained in terms of the others (e.g., Murphy 1996).6 These higher-level 
properties and processes are dependent upon but always distinct in some way from their 
lower-level constituents.7 This disagreement on the relationship of higher- and lower-level 
properties pervades the entire physicalist mind/body discussion.  
 
                                                 
6 The near-simultaneous rejection of several “reductive” theories in the early part of the twentieth 
century (e.g., logical positivism, behaviorism, type-physicalism) led to a growing dissatisfaction with reduction 
in general (Kim 1998a; Budenholzer 2003). 
7 Indeed, much of the discussion surrounding NRP can be construed as an attempt to understand and 
evaluate the coherence of maintaining the distinctiveness of higher-level properties within a properly 
physicalist ontology.  
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2.1. The First Principle of Nonreductive Physicalism: Epistemological Nonreduction 
Although epistemological reduction can be explained in a number of different ways,8 
the underlying premise is that higher-level features can be exhaustively explained using the 
terms and theories proper to lower-level disciplines (c.f., Kim 1993c; 1998b; Melnyk 1995; 
Crick 1994).9 As examples of successful reductions of higher-level phenomena, 
philosophers commonly point to the reduction of chemistry to physics and heat to motion 
(Melnyk 1995; Kim 1998a);10 often holding out the hope of the eventual reduction of 
biological, psychological, and sociological phenomena to the fundamental sciences as well 
(e.g., Paul Churchland 1981).   
It is important to realize two things about this form of epistemological reduction. 
First, even a successful intertheoretic reduction does not entail the elimination of the 
reduced theory (Smart 1959; D. Lewis 1966). It may still prove heuristically and 
conceptually useful to continue using the higher-level theory because of its greater clarity 
                                                 
8 Understanding the nature of reduction and the antireductionist response, however, is complicated by 
the fact that, as Meyering rightly notes, “the notion of reduction itself is hardly a unitary concept any longer” 
(2001:761). The term is thus used with reference to several different kinds of reduction (ontological, 
epistemological, logical, semantic, methodological, causal, etc.; cf. Peacocke 1986; Murphy 1998b; Bielfeldt 
2000) and without any clear agreement about the methodology for performing a proper reduction (cf. Peacocke 
1976; Brooks 1994; Block and Stalnaker 1999; Chalmers and Jackson 2001; Budenholzer 2003; Jones 2003). 
Additionally, we must note the differences between “classical reductionism,” which affirmed the direct 
correlation of higher-level theories and concepts with those of lower levels, and “new wave reductionism,” 
which allows for a much fuzzier correlation while still maintaining their ultimate reducibility (cf. McCauley 
and Bechtel 2001).  
9 The form of epistemological reduction cited most commonly is the model of intertheoretic reduction 
developed by Ernst Nagel (1961; though cf. Kim 1993c; Melnyk 1995). According to this approach, the 
intertheoretic reduction of one theory, T1, to another, T2, is possible just in case all the laws of T1 can be fully 
deduced from the laws of T2. This is accomplished by virtue of biconditional ‘bridge’ laws or principles which 
connect the laws and terms of T1 with the laws and terms of T2. Once this ‘bridge’ has been formed, it should 
be a relatively simple matter to express the truths and laws of T1 in the language of T2 (cf. Heil 2004b; Kim 
1993c). This approach to reduction, however, is commonly criticized for setting impossibly high standards in 
that it “requires that each mental property be provided with a nomologically coextensive physical property, 
across all species and structure types,” thus making it easy prey for the kinds of critical arguments we will be 
surveying in this section (Kim 1998b:26). For a more positive evaluation, see Marras 2002.  
10 Even these textbook examples of reduction are not without their critics (Wacome 2004).  
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and simplicity (Heil 2004b:362). As Kim comments, “impugning the reality of what is being 
reduced would make all of our observable world unreal” (1993c:102). Thus, unlike 
eliminative reductivist views that reject the continued use of such “folk” theories, a 
conservative reductionism maintains their continued validity. Secondly, a reductive 
epistemology only requires an ultimate or in principle reduction.11 As Wacome states,  
 
Reductionism’s promises about the reducibility of one science to another are 
always related to what is possible in principle; no one seriously maintained 
that we might in practice dispense with the concepts, generalizations, and, if 
there are any, laws of the higher-level sciences on the grounds of their 
reducibility to physics. (2004:328) 
 
Consequently, even eliminative materialists tend to argue only for the eventual 
elimination of higher-level concepts when suitable lower-level ones become available. 
Despite these two caveats, NRP firmly rejects epistemological reduction. According 
to Van Gulick, NRP “argues that we must not confuse the plausible claim of ontological 
physicalism with the implausible claim that the physical sciences provide us with conceptual 
and representational resources adequate for describing and explaining everything within the 
physical world” (1992:158; cf. also Kirk 1996, 2000). NRP thus holds that at least some 
higher-level theories and concepts are incommensurable with those of the lower-levels 
(Peacocke 1986; Van Gulick 1992; Murphy 1998b; Meyering 2001; Arbib 2002; Rosenberg 
and Kaplan 2005).12   
According to Meyering (2000, 2002), nonreductivists commonly level five primary 
arguments against epistemological reduction.13 First, nonreductivists maintain that higher-
level explanations are often necessary due to a lack of precise knowledge regarding lower-
                                                 
11 Even if the reduction is only “in the mind of God,” it still qualifies as an ‘in principle’ reduction 
(Bonevac 1995).   
12 Of course, this nonreductive argument does not require the dismissal of all forms of reduction. NRP 
proponents are quick to affirm that reduction is necessary at times and that it has usefully served to eliminate 
unsuccessful philosophical ideas like phlogiston (Sharpe and Walgate 2003). What they deny is that all higher-
level phenomena are so reducible. 
13 Wacome lists a number of less effective but popular antireductionist arguments (2004). 
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level entities.14 Second, as we will see in the next section, nonreductive thinkers argue that 
mental and physical types are not identical to one another and, therefore, there is no way of 
mapping precise nomological relationships between them.15 Third, higher-level theories 
often provide an explanatory account of the causally relevant properties of seemingly 
unrelated physical events that is unavailable on a physical description alone. Fourth, the 
possibility of multiple supervenience—i.e., the fact that particular physical properties can 
realize multiple higher-level properties depending on the circumstances involved—indicates 
that appeal to lower-level explanations alone is inadequate for describing the pertinent 
causal factors.16 Finally, the downward causal influence of higher-level properties, a basic 
commitment of NRP and something we will address in more detail later, entails 
epistemological nonreduction. Although some of these arguments are weaker than others, 
they nonetheless present clearly the NRP case for epistemological nonreduction.  
 
2.2. The Second Principle of Nonreductive Physicalism: Physical Monism 
Philosophers commonly describe NRP as being ontologically monistic or 
reductionistic (Kim 1993b; Murphy 1998a; W. Brown 2004). From one perspective, this is 
certainly true and noncontroversial. A basic tenet of all physicalist ontologies is that 
“everything is physical.” Although this can be understood broadly to preclude the existence 
of any non-physical beings, we will understand it more narrowly to refer to the principle that 
                                                 
14 This argument is, of course, inadequate for establishing a robust epistemological nonreduction since 
it is consistent with complete reductionism, though it concedes that we do not always have such reductive 
theories available to us (Meyering 2000).   
15 As we will see in the next section, arguments of this type are also insufficient to ground a fully 
nonreductive epistemology since they fail to preclude the possibility of an in principle reduction in a theory 
that is able to encompass the entire disjunctive set of physical realizers of a particular mental kind.  
16 As an example, Meyering (2001) argues that a given realizer state (e.g., atomic constituents of an 
aluminum ladder) have various dispositional properties (e.g., thermal conductivity and electrical conductivity) 
that are selectively activated depending on the circumstances (e.g., lightning strike or bright sunny day). A 
higher-level explanation thus plays a distinctive role in explaining the cause of a particular event (e.g., being 
electrocuted or burned) by taking into account the overall context in a way that cannot be done by a mere 
description of the physical realizer.  
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all human are physical beings.17 That is, NRP is monistic in that it rejects any appeal to non-
physical substances as an explanation of human ontology.  
From another perspective, though, that of understanding the precise relationship 
between human persons, their mental features, and their physical features, the ontology of 
NRP becomes slightly more complicated. We will thus see that nonreductive physicalists 
differ with respect to the precise nature of the relationship between physical and mental 
items.   
 
2.2.1. Defining Physicalism without Losing the Physical 
At this point, however, an important question arises. What exactly is physicalism? 
Or, even more basically, what does it mean to be physical? Unfortunately, there does not 
seem to be any widely established definition of “physical” to which we can appeal. As a 
result, the term has tended to be used in a rather imprecise manner, leading to significant 
confusion as to what constitutes a properly physicalist theory of the mind/body relation (E. 
Lowe 1993).18 Indeed, Horgan argues that defining physicalism is itself an inherently 
philosophical question and suggests that theories of the mind-brain relationship can be 
understood as ways of explicating particular notions of what it means to be physical 
(1993a).19
                                                 
17 Vallicella (1998) distinguishes global physicalism, which posits that everything that exists is 
essentially physical (e.g., Crane 1994; Post 1995; Melnyk 1997, 2003; Shagrir 1999; Bennett 2004), and local 
physicalism, a more limited thesis contending that human persons are essentially physical (G. Strawson 1994; 
Murphy 1998b; Van Inwagen 2002; W. Brown 2004). Of course, these two definitions are not exclusive and 
many thinkers use both (e.g., Kim 1993b). But, as the former is clearly incompatible with Christian theism and 
as the latter is more pertinent to the matter at hand, the term physicalism will be used throughout this chapter 
with respect to local physicalism.  
18 Fink (2006) points out that similar problems plague attempts to define natural.  
19 Montero goes so far as to argue that failure to solve “the body problem” (i.e., defining the nature of 
the body and the physical) is a pervasive problem that has inhibited contemporary philosophy’s ability to 
resolve the mind/body debate (1999; cf. Sussman 1981).  
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General definitions of physicalism tend to fall into two different categories.20 From 
one perspective, physical things are identified based on their conformity to certain 
paradigmatic physical characteristics. Usually this comprises an appeal to the spatio-
temporal nature of physical things (Kim 1993b:193; Honderich 2001; cf. also van Inwagen 
1990). Montero points out, however, that such a spatio-temporal approach struggles to 
provide an adequate account of things like neutrinos and photons that most would consider 
to be physical in nature (1999:184). Similarly, McGinn argues that such definitions are 
weakened by our limited understanding of the nature of space and time; a limitation that can 
easily render such definitions vacuous (2003:155).  
Recognizing the difficulties of establishing a satisfying, abstract definition of the 
physical, many philosophers opt for a more pragmatic approach. These thinkers follow the 
common practice of defining physicalism in terms of those things that are studied by the 
physical sciences (cf. Melnyk 1997; Ellis 2000).21 But this approach likewise runs into 
trouble. What do we mean by science? If we mean science as it is currently understood, then 
physicalism is almost certainly false, given the historical track-record of scientific theories 
(Melnyk 2003). But, if we mean some form of ultimate science, a theory that will eventually 
be able to account for everything within some scientific framework (e.g., Kirk 2000), then 
physicalism again flirts with vacuousness since there is no reason to think that even such 
disparate things as minds, atoms, and fairy godmothers could not be accommodated within 
such a grand theory (McGinn 2003).   
Based on these difficulties, McGinn argues that we should stop using a vague term 
like “physicalism” (2003).22 Although there is some validity in such a proposal, it may 
prove more useful to continue using it while recognizing its inherent limitations. In this 
study, then, we will adopt a rather general definition of “physical” as that which refers to 
                                                 
20 Stoljar labels these two approaches the “object-based” and “theory-based” conceptions of the 
physical (2001c).  
21 Thus, Melnyk proffers a definition consisting of the following two assertions: “(1) There is some 
science, S, distinct from the totality of all the sciences, such that every entity (property) is either itself 
mentioned as such in the laws and theories of S or is ultimately constituted (realized) by entities (properties) 
mentioned as such in the laws and theories of S” and “(2) S is current physics” (1997:633).  
22 Radder goes even further, arguing that these difficulties indicate fundamental problems with 
physical monism as a tenable metaphysic (2001).  
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those entities and processes that are studied by the physical sciences, either as those sciences 
are currently understood, or in some future form that will not be radically different from 
their present state. 
Having explored the difficulties of defining physical things, we must consider two 
further issues. First, any definition of physicalism must make room for physical properties 
as well. Thus, Van Inwagen proposes that we define physicalism in terms of “an individual 
thing made entirely of those things whose nature physics investigates” and a physical 
property to be “a property that can be possessed by a physical thing and only by a physical 
thing” (2002:167; cf. Melnyk 2003). Although determining precisely which properties thus 
qualify as physical properties can be as difficult as defining physicalism itself (Burge 1993), 
such a distinction will be necessary for understanding the relevant discussions. Second, 
physicalism must also account for physical processes. Thus, physicalism seems necessarily 
committed to the premise that all causal processes are in some sense fundamentally 
dependent on the causal processes studied by the physical sciences. Indeed, many 
philosophers contend that the causal completeness of the physical universe (i.e., the 
principle that all physical events have sufficient physical causes) is a defining factor of any 
true physicalism (Horgan 1993b; Kim 1993c).23 And indeed, nonreductive physicalists agree 
(e.g., McLaughlin 1989; Bontly 2001; Murphy 2002a; Meyering 2002).  
With these principles in mind, physicalism will be used in this chapter to identify the 
theory that (a) human persons are either themselves physical entities or are exhaustively 
composed of physical entities; (b) that all the properties of human persons are either 
themselves physical properties or are properly related (whatever that proper relation turns 
out to be) to physical properties; and (c) that all causal processes are either physical 
processes or are causally dependent on physical processes (cf. Melnyk 1997).24
                                                 
23 The ‘causal completeness’ principle is sometimes referred to as ‘causal closure,’ though some 
prefer to reserve the latter term for a stronger thesis that combines causal completion with the denial of 
overdetermination (cf. E. Lowe 2000; Robb and Heil 2005).  
24 Thus, although dualists are often criticized for their inability to provide a clear definition of the 
soul, we can see that similar problems arise for the physicalists ability to define the nature of the physical; both 
are inherently difficult tasks that rely heavily on philosophical analysis and we should, therefore, be careful 
about asserting a de facto scientific superiority for physicalistic approaches over dualistic ones (see E. Lowe 
1993). 
 134
 2.2.2. What Does It Mean to Say that the Mental is Physical? 
Although all physicalist theories are thus committed to the general form of 
physicalism outlined above, they differ substantially when it comes to understanding the 
relationship between physical properties and processes and other things like mental 
properties and human persons. Given the commitment to physical monism, we might expect 
that physicalists would simply identify things like mental properties and human persons with 
physical things. Indeed, early physicalists like U. T. Place, Herbert Feigel, and J. J. C. Smart 
understood the premise that “everything is physical” to mean that mental features are type-
identical with physical features (Place 1956; Feigel 1958; Smart 1959).25 On this view, a 
mental type (e.g., pain) simply is a physical type (e.g., a particular neural state).26 Thus, 
affirming a very clear relationship between the physical and the apparently non-physical, the 
type-identity theory became the orthodox view in philosophy of mind (Kim 1999).  
Such an ontologically reductionistic view of higher-level realities, though, did not 
remain unchallenged for long, and by the late sixties and early seventies the type-identity 
theory had been abandoned by most philosophers. The reason for this rejection was the 
growing conviction that the kind of identity relationship required by type-identity was too 
strong. In a series of essays, Hilary Putnam convincingly argued that it was quite 
conceivable that mental properties could be realized in a variety of different ways.27 In other 
words, a mental state like pain could be realized in a human by a C-fibre firing,28 in a 
                                                 
25 For more on the nature of the distinction between type- and token-identity see Horgan 1981; Foster 
1994; Latham 2003; Wetzel 2005.  
26 Most of these early identity theorists argued that they were positing an identity relationship that was 
both “strict,” i.e., an identity relationship that an object has only with itself, (Place 1956; Smart 1959), and 
“contingent,” i.e., the mental kinds associated with physical kinds could have been entirely different in some 
nomologically different possible world, (Smart 1959; D. Lewis 1966). Kripke, however, famously responded 
by arguing that strict identity relationships are necessary and non-contingent (1971). Although his arguments 
have not convinced everyone, most philosophers have followed Kripke on this point.   
27 See Putnam 1975 for a collection of his papers published during this time. For an overview of 
arguments related to multiple realizability see Bickle 2002.  
28 “C-fibre” should be understood to refer to whatever complex physical state is involved in realizing 
the relevant pain state.   
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mollusk by a D-fibre firing, or in a Martian by some other mechanism entirely. Pain could 
then be seen to be multiply realizable. But, if mental states can be realized by multiple 
physical states, it would appear that there can be no strict identity relationship between 
them.29 The multiple realization argument, as this argument has come to be known, seemed 
to establish clearly the impossibility of type-identifying mental properties with physical 
properties.30
                                                 
29 Gene Witmer summarizes the multiple realizability argument against identity as follows (2004):  
1. There exists at least one mental property M such that there is a set of distinct physical 
properties {P1 v P2 v ... Pn}, no one of which realizes M on every occasion, while each 
realizes it on some occasion. 
2. If M is identical with any physical property, it is identical with one of {P1 v P2 v ... Pn}. 
3. M can't be identical with any of {P1 v P2 v ... Pn} because there is no member of it with 
which it is coextensive. 
4. There is no physical property with which M is coextensive, and hence none with which it 
is identical. 
30 As Block points out, multiple realizability has not been without its critics (1978). According to Kim 
multiple realizability defeats global type-reduction but has nothing to say about local type-reduction 
(1993c:180-181; 273-275). In other words, there is nothing in multiple realizability that precludes one from 
arguing that even though pain could be multiply realized across species, pain could be singly realized within a 
given species (assuming that we allow for the inevitable variations among particular members of that species). 
But, Kim argues, species-specific or local reduction of this kind is all that we need to establish reductionism. 
Horgan agrees and contends that local reduction of this kind is incompatible with NRP (1993b).  
Even more significantly, Kim argues, against Fodor (1974) and Putnam (1975), that disjunctive 
physical types can be type-identified with mental types and that denying this possibility calls into question the 
nomological consistency of mental kinds (cf. Van Inwagen 2002; Block 2002; Sawyer 2003). Putnam and 
Fodor both argued that multiple realizability could not be defeated by positing a disjunctive physical type that 
would include all the possible realizers of a given mental type. Such “wildly disjunctive” physical types are not 
nomologically related to one another and thus not proper members of a set. In response, Kim has argued that if 
this is true and if mental tokens stand in nomologically consistent causal relationship with their physical 
tokens, then mental kinds likewise are “wildly disjunctive” and nonnomic (1993c:316-325).  
Kim’s arguments have not been universally accepted (see Melnyk 2003; Horgan 1993a). L. Antony 
(2003) helpfully points out, however, that much of this is extraneous to the question of nonreduction. As we 
will discuss a little later, both token and type identity run into problems with respect to causal reduction. The 
main issue for nonreductivists, then, is not whether mental kinds can be identified with physical kinds, but 
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In place of type-identity, many philosophers have argued for a weaker identity theory 
known as token-identity. Rather than establishing an identity relationship between mental 
and physical kinds, token-identity merely posits the identity of mental and physical 
particulars. In other words, according to token-physicalism, a particular mental event or 
token (e.g., the pain experienced on some occasion by a particular individual) is identical 
with a particular physical event or token (e.g., a C-fibre firing on some occasion in a 
particular individual), but that there is no identity relationship between these two kinds of 
events (i.e., a C-fibre firing is not required for the instantiation of pain states in general). 
This approach became quite popular with philosophers looking for a way to maintain their 
physicalist commitments without the perceived drawbacks of the type-identity theory.  
There is a third option, however. Some physicalists reject both type- and token-
physicalism by asserting that higher-level entities and properties are constituted by but not 
identical to the lower-level entities and properties that constitute them (cf. Pereboom and 
Kornblith 1991; Cocoran 1998; 2001b; 2005; L. Baker 1997; 2001).31 For example, macro-
entities like statues, dollar bills, and persons are constituted by but distinct from their 
copper, paper, and biological constituents. That this should not be understood as an identity 
relationship, according to constitution theorists, is established by the fact such macro-entities 
have different properties than their constituent elements (L. Baker 1997). According to one 
famous example, then, a statue and the bronze that constitutes it can be distinguished by the 
fact that the lump of bronze possesses properties (e.g., malleability) not possessed by the 
statue (i.e., if the bronze were melted down, the statue would cease to exist but the bronze 
would not). Given the property of the indiscernibility of identicals, constitution theorists 
argue, the differences in properties entails the non-identity of the statue and the lump of 
bronze constituting it. On this view, then, mental properties should be viewed as constituted 
by but not identical to the physical properties that constitute them.  
                                                                                                                                                      
whether mental properties stand over-and-above their physical realizers (whether types or tokens) sufficiently 
to facilitate causal nonreduction.   
31 Some prefer to restrict nonreductive physicalism to token-identity theories (e.g., Marras 1994). 
Since constitution theorists maintain the four basic commitments outlined in this chapter, we will consider 
them to be nonreductive physicalists.  
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From the preceding discussions, it seems reasonable to conclude that any physicalist 
ontology that seeks to affirm a nonreductive understanding of mental items will be inclined 
to reject type-identity in favor of either token-identity or constitution theory. In this study, 
then, we will understand the physicalism component of NRP to refer to  some form of either 
of these two approaches.  
 
2.3. The Third Principle of Nonreductive Physicalism: Causal Efficacy of the Mental 
The fourth principle to which NRP is committed is the causal efficacy of the 
mental.32 Since the complex issues surrounding the question of mental causation will be the 
focus of the next section, it will only be mentioned briefly here to complete our discussion 
of NRP’s basic commitments.  
When saying that NRP is committed to mental causation, two opposite ideas must be 
kept in mind. First, as we have already noted, NRP holds a simultaneous commitment to the 
causal completeness of the physical and the existence of mental realities. NPR must, 
therefore, reject any theory inconsistent with these two fundamental commitments. And 
second, by affirming the causal efficacy of mental properties, NRP rejects any form of 
epiphenomenalism—i.e., any theory that posits that mental properties are real but causally 
irrelevant.33
As we will see in the next section, NRP’s commitment to mental causation within a 
physicalist framework committed to the causal completion of the physical universe is highly 
                                                 
32 Except when necessary for addressing particular arguments, we will not concern ourselves with the 
question of whether mental causation is best understood in terms of mental states, properties, or events. This 
chapter will largely focus on mental causation in terms of the causal efficacy of mental properties but it seems 
unlikely that any of the arguments would be significantly affected if mental states or events were in view.  
33 Many have pointed out that epiphenomenalism, understood as affirming real but causally irrelevant 
mental properties, is incoherent in that there seems to be no reason to affirm the existence of causally impotent 
properties (cf. Kim 1993b; McLaughlin 1993). A less effective argument used by some is to contend that 
epiphenomenal properties make no sense in an evolutionary scheme because there is no way to explain why 
such ‘empty’ properties would have been selected (e.g, Midgley 2000; Elder 2001). It would seem entirely 
possible, though, to view such epiphenomenal properties as merely resultant aspects of biological selection 
rather than as specifically selected themselves.  
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contentious and marks one of the most significant objections to NRP as a coherent 
mind/body theory.  
 
2.4. The Fourth Principle of Nonreductive Physicalism: Asymmetric Psychophysical 
Dependence 
The epistemological and ontological irreducibility of mental features to physical 
features, however, is an inadequate basis upon which to develop a mind/body theory. As 
Kim points out, NRP needs to complement this negative thesis with a positive account of a 
nonreductive understanding the mind/body relationship (1993b:194). Nonreductivists often 
seek to do this utilizing some set of terms that indicates an irreducible asymmetric 
dependence of the mental on the physical.34 In this way the physical is accorded 
epistemological and ontological primacy, but not ultimacy.   
 
2.4.1. The Realization Relationship 
The first of these terms, realization, was originally introduced by functionalist 
thinkers to refer to the physical realization of functional states (cf. Kim 1998a).35 Kim 
defines realization as:  
 
When P is said to ‘realize’ M in system s, P must specify a micro-
structural property of s that provides a causal mechanism for the 
implementation of M in s. (Kim 1993b:197) 
 
                                                 
34 Kim suggests that dependence and determination are the two key ideas of the nonreductive theory 
(1993b:194). For now we will not address whether asymmetrical psychophysical dependence entails some 
form of psychophysical determination, leaving that question for our later discussion of mental causation.  
35 Functionalism, often referred to as the “reigning presumption” (Dennett 2001) in contemporary 
philosophy of mind (c.f., Kim 1998a; Honderich 2001), is the view that mental states are functional states 
which should be defined in terms of their causal inputs, outputs, and relations to other functional states (see D. 
Lewis 1966; Armstrong 1968; Putnam 1967; Fodor 1981, 1983; Shoemaker 1975, 1981).  
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On this definition we can see that the realization thesis is intended to affirm the 
asymmetrical dependency of M on P in s.36
The usefulness of realization-language for nonreductive thinkers, though, is limited 
for three reasons. First, realization-language has come to be associated primarily with 
functionalism (Kim 1993c, 1998a). Though many nonreductive physicalists use functionalist 
ideas in developing their theories (e.g., Van Gulick 1992; Meyering 2002), NRP is not 
committed to functionalism, nor is functionalism necessarily consistent with NRP as we 
have defined it here (see Pereboom 2002; Block 2004).37 Second, many have argued that 
realization-language actually generates such a strong psychophysical dependency relation 
that it may actually be incompatible NRP’s basic commitments, especially its commitment 
to mental causation (cf. Kim 1993b, 1993c:363-367; Melnyk 1995; Bielfeldt 2001; Bontly 
2001). And third, as Kim suggests, the concept of realization has been used in ways “that are 
neither uniform nor clear,” thus reducing its usefulness (1998a:72; cf. Kim 2003:166). 
Possibly for reasons like these, realization-language, though used by nonreductive 
physicalists, tends not to be the primary way in which they express themselves.  
  
                                                 
36 For a broader analysis of realization and its role in mind-body theories, see Shoemaker 2003.  
37 Functionalism is often developed as a nonreductive mind/body theory itself. We will not be 
addressing it in this chapter, however, because it does not seem to be clearly committed to physical monism or 
the causal efficacy of mental properties. Although it is usually formulated in ways that indicate a commitment 
to both principles, many have pointed out that functionalism is at least theoretically compatible with dualistic 
ontologies (e.g., Putnam 1967), while others have argued that it is best construed as a fully reductive theory 
(e.g., Honderich 1994; Kim 1993c), with the possible implication that mental properties are causally 
inefficacious (Block 1990). Additionally, Block points out that functionalism can be used in support of or 
against the phenomenological realism that we will see is a necessary part of the nonreductive program (2002; 
cf. Block 1978 for more general arguments against functionalism). Thus, although nonreductive physicalists 
often use functionalistic ideas in developing their systems, we will consider them distinct approaches and not 
deal with functionalism as a form of NRP.  
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2.4.2. The Supervenience Relationship 
The term supervenience rose to popularity in the 1980s as a result of its perceived 
ability to affirm three important tenets of NRP:38 (a) the covariance of mental and physical 
properties; (b) the dependence of mental properties on physical properties; and (c) the 
nonreducibility of mental properties to physical properties (Savellos and Yalcin 1995; Kim 
1993c). It was thus thought by many that supervenience was the ideal term for espousing 
NRP. It came under heavy criticism, however, and, though still used extensively by 
nonreductive physicalists, no longer bears the explanatory weight that it once did.  
The core idea of supervenience, according to Kim is that “mental properties or states 
of something are dependent on its physical, or bodily, properties, in the sense that once its 
physical properties are fixed, its mental properties are thereby fixed” (1998a:7). More 
explicitly, we can say that supervenience entails that higher-level properties or states (A 
facts) supervene on lower-level properties or states (B facts) if and only if (1) A facts are real 
(i.e., they are not merely conceptual); (2) A and B facts are distinct (i.e., they are not simply 
different ways of referring to the same properties or states); and (3) there is some objective 
dependency relationship between A and B facts such that A facts cannot change without a 
corresponding change with respect to B facts (cf. Horgan 1993a; Lynch and Glasgow 2003; 
Wilson 1999).39  
For two reasons, though, supervenience-language is now widely regarded as being 
inadequate by itself to articulate a nonreductive position. First, attempts to clarify the 
supervenience relationship beyond the general definition offered above have produced such 
a wealth of different definitions as to limit its practical usefulness.40 Second, despite the fact 
                                                 
38 The term rose to prominence in philosophy through its use by the British emergentists and moral 
philosophers like R. M. Hare in the first part of the twentieth century (Kim 1993c; Horgan 1993a), but did not 
become significant in philosophy of mind until the 1980s when it was introduced by Donald Davidson 
(1980:214).  
39 Although supervenience can be understood as dealing exclusively with facts intrinsic to the 
subvenient bases, several thinkers have argued convincingly that supervenient properties require a broader base 
that includes extrinsic factors like relations and relational properties (L. Baker 1993; Horgan 1993a).  
40 Philosophers commonly distinguish different supervenience concepts based on their scope and 
strength (Lynch and Glasgow 2003).  As to scope, we can distinguish between global, local, and regional 
supervenience depending on whether the supervenience relationship in view is directed at entire worlds, 
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that supervenience-language was originally introduced as a way of affirming the 
asymmetrical dependency of the psychophysical relationship, it is now widely accepted that 
it fails to do so (Horgan 1993a; Kim 1993c; Goetz 1994; Wilson 1999; Schouten 2001; 
Melnyk 2003). The concern is that supervenience merely establishes the necessary 
covariation of A and B facts without establishing either how or why this covariation takes 
place.41 But covariation by itself is insufficient to ground a properly physical mind-body 
theory. Kim rightly argues that mind-body covariation is a theory that could be supported by 
reductive physicalists, nonreductive physicalists, epiphenomenalists, and even some dualists 
(1998b:12). 
                                                                                                                                                      
specific regions, or particular individuals. Some thinkers have argued for an additional distinction between 
strong and weak forms of global supervenience (e.g., McLaughlin 1995 and Stalnaker 1996), but Bennett 
convincingly demonstrates that the strong form is not interestingly different from strong supervenience and 
that weaker forms are insufficient to establish a significant dependency relationship (2004). These distinctions 
will, therefore, not come into our discussion. 
With respect to strength, supervenience is commonly divided into strong and weak forms (Haugeland 
1982; Kim 1993c, 1994; Horgan 1982, 1993a, 1995; McLaughlin 1995; Savellos and Yalcin 1995; Stalnaker 
1996; Bielfeldt 2000).  Surveying the extensive literature on this distinction would take us too far afield. The 
basic distinction between them is that weak supervenience holds that A-facts only supervene on B-facts with 
nomological necessity whereas strong supervenience maintains that the relationship holds with metaphysical 
necessity. They thus differ with respect to whether or not the relationship holds in nomologically different 
worlds (on these modal issues see Chalmers 1996; Schouten 2001, Lynch and Glasgow 2003).  
Noting the tremendous number of different theories of supervenience and their correspondingly 
diverse applications, Kim nonetheless argues that the term still usefully expresses its “core idea,” i.e., “No 
difference of one kind without a difference of another kind,” even though we must now recognize the many 
different ways in which this core idea can be expressed (1993c:155). 
41Thus, Kim correctly argues that even strong supervenience does not entail asymmetrical dependence 
(1993c:67). The failure of supervenience to ground dependence can be clearly seen in the general definitions of 
supervenience that have been offered. For example Davidson describes his position on supervenience as: “a 
predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot 
be distinguished by S” (1993:4). Similarly, Lynch and Glasgow define supervenience as entailing that “the B-
facts supervene on the A-facts if and only if there are not two possible situations that are identical in A-facts, 
but different in B-facts” (2003).  Despite the fact that supervenience is often taken as almost synonymous with 
the dependence of A-facts on B-facts, neither of these definitions even suggests such a dependence relation.     
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Kim is probably correct to view supervenience not as “a metaphysically deep, 
explanatory relation,” but as “a phenomenological relation about patterns of property 
covariation” (Kim 1998a:10).42 Thus, supervenience can play a useful role in articulating an 
important NRP commitment, the asymmetrical dependency relationship between mental and 
physical properties, but is not by itself a sufficient principle of a physicalist ontology 
(Horgan 1993a; Kim 1998b; Hansen 2000; Melnyk 2003). 
 
2.4.3. The Emergence Relationship 
A third term often used in NRP, emergence, needs to be carefully distinguished from 
its use in other contexts.43 As we will see in the next chapter, emergent dualism uses 
emergence-language to affirm the emergence of non-physical substances. This, however, is 
clearly inconsistent with NRP’s commitment to physical monism. But NRP must also be 
distinguished from a form of emergent monism that espouses emergent causal powers in a 
manner that is inconsistent with NRP’s commitment to the causal completeness of the 
physical universe (e.g., Crane 1995, 2001; Clayton 2000, 2004, 2005; O’Conner 2001, 
2003).44 Searle (1992) suggests that we should distinguish between emergent theories that 
espouse autonomous emergent causal powers that violate the causal completeness principle 
(emergent2) and those that do not (emergent1).45 As we will see later in the chapter, NRP is 
                                                 
42 Kim thus argues that much of the literature on supervenience is misdirected since it focuses 
primarily on the question of reduction when the real issue is whether or not supervenience can serve as a mind-
body theory at all (1998a). 
43 For good studies of the concept of emergence and its historical development see van Cleve 1990, 
Stephan 1992, McLaughlin 1992, and Clayton 2005).  
44 Brüntrup argues that emergent monism can be understood as consistent with the causal closure 
principle if it is understood as a form of dual-aspect theory (1998). While this may be true, it seems clear that 
at least some (if not most) forms of emergent monism operate largely outside the framework established by 
causal completeness .   
45 McGinn draws a similar distinction between properties that are “conservatively emergent” and 
those that are “radical or brute” (2003:154).  
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strongly committed to the causal efficacy of mental properties, but it seeks to explicate this 
causal efficacy within the framework of physical causal completeness.46  
With these two distinctions in mind, emergent-language still has a role to play in 
articulating NRP.47 Specifically, since emergence-language is widely viewed as the opposite 
of reduction-language, nonreductive physicalists have found emergence to be a useful 
concept for articulating its commitment to epistemological and causal nonreduction (e.g., 
Peacock 1986, 1990; Searle 1992; Polkinghorne 1994; Murphy 1998c, 2005;W. Brown 
2004; cf. D. Newman 2001). Emergence is thus used to express the conviction that higher-
level realities come “to exhibit novel properties that in some sense transcend the properties 
of their constituent parts, and behave in ways that cannot be predicted on the basis of the 
laws governing simpler systems” (Kim 199:3).  
Thus, emergence-language can serve a useful role in developing NRP so long as it is 
kept distinct from other proposals that use such language in ways that would undermine 
NRP’s commitment to the asymmetrical dependence of the mental on the physical.  
 
2.4.4. The Constitution Relationship 
We have already discussed briefly the fourth term that is often used to articulate a 
nonreductive understanding of the psychophysical relationship. According to the 
constitution theory, higher-level features are asymmetrically dependent on lower-level 
features in that they are constituted by them. Using the example of the statue again, 
constitution theory holds that the statue is distinct from the bronze that constitutes it but that 
the statue depends on the bronze, which thus has a certain ontological primacy.  
 
NRP has thus tended to rely on four different terms in an effort to express its 
commitment to the primacy of the physical and the asymmetrical dependency of the mental 
on the physical, while still maintaining that the mental is not in any way reducible to the 
                                                 
46 Kim has argued that nonreductive materialism is merely a contemporary version of emergent-theory 
and that the two are roughly synonymous (1999). Differences between them regarding the nature and status of 
mental causal powers, though, would seem to be sufficient to establish that they are distinct theories (cf. 
Pereboom 2002).   
47 See especially the useful set of essays in Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim 1992.  
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physical. We have seen that the four terms express various aspects of the basic commitments 
held by nonreductive physicalists, but that each has significant limitations. As Kim notes,  
 
We have learned from work on causation and causal modal logic the 
hard lesson that the idea of causal dependence or determination is not so 
easily or directly obtained from straightforward modal notions alone....Ideas 
of dependence and determination, whether causal, supervenient, or of other 
sorts, stubbornly resist capture in simpler and more transparent terms. (Kim 
1993c:67) 
 
These four terms, then, should be viewed as helpful but limited attempts to express 
basic commitments held by any NRP theory.  
 
3. Christology and Coherence: The Viability of Nonreductive forms of Physicalism 
As we saw in the previous chapter, viewing the human person from the vantage point 
provided by the person and work of Jesus Christ has important implications for 
understanding human ontology. Specifically, we saw how Barth’s christological ontology 
can be understood as providing an ontological framework within which any christologically 
adequate anthropological theory must operate. At first glance, NRP appears to fare rather 
well with respect to this framework. Its physicalist approach allows NRP to affirm the 
importance of embodiment, while its nonreductive stance accords well with the commitment 
to the subjective and mental aspects of human life. NRP seems well positioned, then, to 
provide an account of human ontology that addresses the full range of concerns posited by 
Barth’s christological framework. 
The evaluative task is not so easy, however, when we look a little more closely and 
consider some of the many criticisms that have been raised regarding the nonreductive 
position. Specifically, many feel that the attempt to mediate between irreducible mental 
properties and fundamentally physical realities results in some level of incoherence. Tim 
Crane speaks for many when he asks, “If the mind is not physical, then how can it have 
effects in the physical world; but if it is physical, how can we explain consciousness” (Crane 
2003:234)? In this section, then, we will evaluate NRP more closely on three specific issues, 
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regarding which it has been subject to some criticism: (1) mental causation, (2) 
consciousness, and (3) the continuity of personal identity through death and resurrection. As 
we have seen, all three are required for a christologically valid ontology. Each is its own 
field of study with an impressively large body of literature. We will, therefore, not attempt 
to do more than simply survey some of the key arguments as we seek to establish whether or 
not NRP has coherent and christologically adequate responses to these concerns.48
 
3.1. Descartes’ Revenge: The Problem of Mental Causation 
As we will see in the next chapter, the problem of mental causation constitutes one 
of the primary objections to dualist ontologies. It might seem somewhat surprising, then, to 
discover that it is no less problematic for physicalists.49 Unlike the dualist problem of 
accounting for the causal interaction of two disparate substances, NRP bears the burden of 
establishing the causal relevance of mental properties in a physical universe (Kim 1998b; 
Robb and Heil 2005). This becomes critical when we realize that some account of such 
causal relevance seems necessary for grounding personal agency, moral responsibility, and 
rational mental processes (Hornsby 1993; Kim 1998b; Midgley 2000; Harre 2001; A. 
Torrance 2003; E. Lowe 2003).  
Most thinkers recognize that there are actually several problems for a physicalist 
account of mental causation.50 They can be divided broadly into two categories. In the first 
fall those arguments that question whether the nature of mental properties themselves rules 
out their causally efficacy (the suitability argument). In the second we can place those 
arguments to the effect that even if mental properties are suited as causes, there is no room 
                                                 
48 Consequently, none of the following sections will attempt to engage all of the arguments and 
responses that have been offered. Rather, each section will selectively adopt several important arguments and 
note the ways in which NRP proponents have responded as a way of testing its coherence and adequacy.  
49 Kim refers to this intriguing situation as “Descartes’s Revenge” (1998d:38). For a good survey of 
different ways of understanding causation see Tooley 2003.  
50 Robb and Heil note that the physicalist problem of mental causation can actually be divided into 
four separate issues: property dualism, anomalous monism, exclusion, and externalism (2005). Since all four 
arguments are closely related and since the problem of exclusion has received the most attention, we will focus 
our discussion on that issue and address the other problems as necessary.  
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for them in the causal structure of the physical universe (the exclusion argument). Although 
the causal suitability of mental properties has been called into question by a number of 
important arguments,51 they are highly contentious. Most philosophers thus affirm that there 
is no reason to believe mental properties to be intrinsically inadequate as causal properties. 
We will, therefore, focus our attention on the second category. Specifically, we will 
concentrate on the influential form of the argument developed by Jaegwon Kim (cf. esp. 
1993b, 1998b, 2003).   
 
3.1.1. The Exclusion Argument52 
Kim contends that NRP fails to establish a coherent account of mental causation 
because it cannot do so without either violating the causal completeness of the physical or 
appealing to overdetermination. Since, he argues, neither option is available to the proponent 
                                                 
51 The primary objections to the causal suitability of mental properties have been advanced in two 
ways. From one direction, Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism theory contended that there are no strict 
laws governing the relationship between mental and physical events and, therefore, no strict causal 
relationships (1980, 1993). Mental properties are causally relevant in that they are individuating properties of 
causally efficacious physical events (1993). Davidson’s argument has been widely criticized for providing at 
least tacit support for epiphenomenalism (Kim 1993a; McLaughlin 1993; Sosa 1993) and is no longer widely 
followed (though cf. LePore and Loewer 1989 ).  
A second set of objections stems from the externalist conception of mental states. According to this 
theory, most, if not all, mental states have extrinsic (i.e., relational properties) that are essential to them (see 
Burge 1979; Putnam 1981; Heil 1987; Curtis Brown 2002; Lau 2004). For example, a belief that Paris is the 
capital of France is at least partly determined by extrinsic geo-political criteria. But, the argument goes, if the 
extrinsic properties of mental states include such distant and causally irrelevant relations, how can they have 
any immediate causal relevance themselves (see Hansen 2000)? The issues involved here are complex and turn 
on whether externalism about mental properties is true and, if so, whether extrinsic properties are a problem for 
causation (cf. Yablo 2003).   
52 Kim prefers to label this the “supervenience argument” (1998a). But, as Kim himself points out, the 
exclusion problem is a problem for any theory that posits mind-body dependence, not just those that espouse 
supervenience (2003:155). The prominence of the idea of overdetermination in the following argument has led 
some to contend that it is better understood as the “overdetermination problem” (e.g., Hansen 2000). While 
there is some validity to this observation, we will follow the more commonly used label in this section.  
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of NRP, it fails with respect to mental realism. He thus concludes that a reductive account of 
mental causation is the only coherent one available for a physicalist.  
The first step in Kim’s argument is to contend that NRP is committed to the principle 
of downward causation—i.e., that mental events and/or properties are causally efficacious 
with respect to physical events and/or properties. Given that NRP proponents have 
consistently affirmed their commitment to this position (see below), it would not seem to 
require much argument. A brief summary of Kim’s argument, however, will help clarify the 
nature of his overall point.  
Kim argues that NRP’s commitment to the causal efficacy of the mental requires, at 
least, that some mental event (M) can cause some other mental event (M*). And, given the 
physical primacy thesis, M* is instantiated in a subvenient physical base (P*). But, if M* 
comes about because it is instantiated in P*, what role does M play in bringing it about? 
According to Kim, “To cause a supervenient property to be instantiated, you must cause its 
base property (or one of its base properties) to be instantiated” (1998b:42). In other words, 
for M to cause M* it must do so in virtue of causing P*. So, Kim concludes, any form of 
mental-to-mental causation requires some form of mental-to-physical causation.  
The second step in Kim’s argument, though, is to contend that mental-to-physical 
causation is incoherent within a nonreductive framework given the causal completeness of 
the physical (CCP): “for each and every physical event that has a cause at some time t 
necessarily has a physical cause at t” (Kim 1993c:280). Or, as Horgan describes it: 
 
Metaphysical naturalism includes the view that physics is causally 
and explanatorily complete, within its own domain: i.e., every fact or 
phenomenon describable in the language of physics is fully explainable (to 
the extent that it is explainable at all) entirely on the basis of facts and laws of 
physics itself. There are no causal 'gaps', in the nexus of physically 
describable events and processes, that get 'filled in' by causes that are not 
themselves physically describable; and there are no explanatory gaps. 
(1993b:301) 
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Any physical event must therefore have a physical cause. But this raises the question 
of the extent to which M can be seen to cause M* in virtue of its causing P*.  
Remember that M is itself instantiated in its own subvenient base P. The question 
then becomes, what is the causal relationship of M and P to P*? Whether causal relations are 
formulated in terms of nomological sufficiency (e.g., the cause of an effect is that which is 
nomologically sufficient for its instantiation) or counterfactuals (e.g., the cause of an effect 
is that without which the effect would not, or might not, have taken place),53 it would seem 
that P qualifies as a cause of P*—i.e., it is nomologically sufficient for P* as the instantiator 
of M and as that without which P* might not have come about (assuming no other 
concurrent subvenient base). This conclusion is in turn supported by CCP which requires 
that P* have some physical cause, P. 
But, if P qualifies as a cause of P*, how do we understand the proposition that both 
P and M are causes of P*? Kim lays out the following options (1993c:250-252):  
(1) they are actually the same event (i.e., P = M) 
(2) M is reducible to P (M >P) 
(3) M and P constitute two parts of a single, sufficient cause (M+P)54  
(4) M and P are two segments in a causal chain (P → M) 
(5) M and P are distinct and are both sufficient causes of P* (P…M) 
 
Immediately, though, we can see that CCP raises problems with (3), (4), and (5) 
since each of them appeals to a nonphysical element as an essential causal aspect of a 
physical event. Kim raises some additional objections as well. He rejects (3) because P 
seems to be causally sufficient for M* by itself and, therefore, the combination of M and P 
seems to add little to the overall causal effect. Kim also argues against (4) because most 
thinkers agree that the relationship between a supervenient property and its subvenient 
realizer should not be construed as a causal relationship (see also Bennett 2003; though cf. 
Searle 1992). The only options that remain are (1) the elimination of M, (2) the reduction to 
                                                 
53 For a good overview of some of the difficulties involved in establishing the proper understanding of 
causation see Field 2005.  
54 As an alternative to (3), Kim also lists the possibility that M could be understood as a proper part of 
P.  
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M to P, and (5) and the causal overdetermination of P*, leaving the nonreductive 
physicalists in the difficult position of having to accept the elimination or reduction of 
mental properties, deny causal completion, or affirm the highly unintuitive position that all 
events involving mental causes are systematically overdetermined (cf. Sturgeon 1998; Elder 
2001; Witmer 2003; Bennett 2003; Ehring 2003; Kim 2003).  
Hansen helpfully summarizes the main steps in Kim’s argument as follows: 
 
(1) Suppose that a mental property instantiation M causes P*. 
(2) M has a physical supervenience base P. 
(3) On the standard accounts of causation, P qualifies as a cause of P*. 
(4) Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties. 
(5) M and P are distinct (simultaneous) sufficient causes of P*. 
(6) Overdetermination is unintelligible. 
 
Conclusion: Mental-to-physical causation is unintelligible given non-
reductive 
physicalism. (2000:470) 
 
According to Kim, then, the best way to account for mental causation is to recognize 
mental causes as epiphenomenal “parasites” that are causally efficacious inasmuch as they 
are strongly supervenient on physical causes. Any other solution allows the ostensible 
mental causes to become “causal danglers” that serve no purpose and “are an acute 
embarrassment to the physicalist view of the world” (1993c:100). 55
 
                                                 
55 Since a reductive approach can simply type-identify mental properties with physical properties, 
reductivists have no problem with affirming that mental properties are causally efficacious (Kim 1993c). Thus, 
contrary to what some thinkers have argued (e.g., E. Lowe 1993), mind-body reduction does not constitute a 
problem for mental causation. Of course, the price that they pay for this solution is a form of 
epiphenomenalism where mental properties are causally efficacious only insofar as they are identical to 
physical properties and, consequently, play no independent role in causal explanations (Rockwell 2004).   
 150
3.1.2. Responding to the Exclusion Argument 
Unsurprisingly, nonreductive thinkers reject Kim’s arguments against the causal 
efficacy of mental properties, though they have tended to do so in several different ways. 
OPTION #1: UNDERMINING THE BASIS OF THE EXCLUSION ARGUMENT.  One way of 
responding to this argument is to undermine its strength in some way. One common 
approach is to criticize Kim’s argument as having unacceptable consequences for our entire 
understanding of reality. These thinkers contend that the exclusion argument generalizes 
into a problem for the causal efficacy of all higher-level properties and processes. In other 
words, if mental causes can only play an epiphenomenal role piggy-backing on the micro-
causal powers of its subvenient constituents, then all higher-level entities and properties, and 
possibly even some lower-level properties and processes, are similarly constrained (e.g., 
Pereboom and Kornblith 1991; Van Gulick 1993b; Burge 1993; Hansen 2000; Bontly 2002; 
Schröder 2002). Thus, Van Gulick contends, “If the proponent of the Exclusion Argument 
takes such a hard line, he will have to concede that none of the properties of the special 
sciences are causally potent” (1993b:249).56 However, although the generalization argument 
thus indicates that Kim’s argument has significant implications with which most thinkers are 
uncomfortable, and may provide some epistemic warrant for questioning the cogency of 
Kim’s argument, it does not constitute an actual defeater for Kim’s argument (Kim 
2003:165). To formulate an adequate response, NRP must provide a positive argument for 
the coherence of its own position.  
Another strategy for undermining Kim’s argument is to suggest that it proceeds on 
an invalid understanding of the relationship between explanations and causality (e.g., L. 
Baker 1993; Burge 1993). These thinkers contend that our causal framework should follow 
                                                 
56 Kim, however, denies that his arguments against mental causation can be generalized in this manner 
(1997; 1998b). His basic contention is that his mental causation argument does not generalize because mental 
causation is an intra-level relation while the special sciences deal with inter-level relations. He also argues for a 
broader understanding of ‘physical’ that would incorporate the processes and entities studied in the special 
sciences and preclude the possibility that they involve non-physical causes. As Hansen points out, however, the 
distinction between intra- and inter-level relations is not as clear as he supposes them to be and his redefinition 
of ‘physical’ has significant implications for his mental causation argument (2000; cf. also Bontly 2002). Thus, 
although we will not be considering the generalization argument in detail here, there seems to be a continuing 
concern to the cogency of Kim’s argument. 
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from our epistemic processes. Since we can provide successful explanations of the world in 
terms of higher-level properties, we should recognize these as causally legitimate. 
According to this argument, to contend, as Kim does, that causality should determine our 
explanatory framework gets it entirely backwards. However, Kim rightly argues that this 
approach misses the heart of the problem (1998b; cf. also Leiter and Miller 1998). Kim’s 
argument does not call into question the efficacy of our mental properties in a manner that 
would violate our epistemic explanatory practices as this approach contends. Rather, Kim 
fully agrees that we should assume the causal efficacy of the mental but, at the same time, 
seek a metaphysical theory that can provide an adequate explanation for this state of affairs. 
Kim’s argument is a challenge for NRP to offer its own explanation and defend its 
coherence.57
A third response that could be offered is explicitly theological. This argument points 
out that any theological system that allows divine causal action in the physical universe 
already requires some form of nonphysical causation (cf. Bielfeldt 2001). If God can act in 
the physical universe, then at least some physical events cannot be reduced to merely 
physical explanations. Even without entering into a discussion of divine causality and its 
implications for physicalism, it seems that this response is inadequate. At the least, we 
should be very careful about positing an analogy between supernatural/natural causation and 
mind/body causation.58 More to the point, however, is that this response does not seem to be 
available to the physicalist who remains committed to the principle of casual completeness.  
OPTION #2: SYSTEMIC INFLUENCE. A second way of responding to Kim’s argument is 
to affirm the validity of his basic premises, but to develop nonreductive explanations of 
                                                 
57 Ned Block has another way of undermining the validity of the exclusion argument based on a 
reductio ad absurdum. According to Block, if the causal powers of higher level properties all “drain away” to 
the causal powers of their determinate bases and if, as may be suggested by contemporary quantum physics, 
“there is no bottom level of physics,” then it would seem that there can be no causal powers of any kind in the 
universe (2003:138). Kim, however, rightly points out that this argument (1) fails to recognize that the 
exclusion argument (reasonably?) presupposes the existence of just such a physical “bottom level” and (2) 
implies the nonreducibility of even physical entities (e.g., molecules, atoms, etc.) about whose reducibility 
philosophers are generally agreed (2003). 
58 This argument does suggest, though, that the implications of principles like CCP need to be 
carefully considered before they are adopted wholesale into a christologically adequate ontology. 
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mental causation that avoid Kim’s reductive conclusions. A variety of different ways have 
been offered to account for mental causation within a physical framework. We shall 
consider two.  
One common approach has been to appeal to the properties of complex physical 
systems (cf. Jackson and Pettit 1990). From this perspective, higher-level properties can be 
seen as casually efficacious in that the way in which the constituent elements of a system 
are organized must be included in any causal account. It is, therefore, impossible to account 
for the behavior of the system in terms of its constituent elements alone. Thus, Van Gulick 
argues: 
 
The events and objects picked out by the special sciences are 
admittedly composites of physical constituents. But the causal powers of such 
an object are not determined solely by the physical properties of its 
constituents and the laws of physics, but also by the organization of those 
constituents within the composite. And it is just such patterns of organization 
that are picked out by the predicates of the special sciences. (1993b:250) 
 
 The causal influence of the higher-level properties of complex systems is 
typically depicted in terms of their ability to activate selectively the causal powers of lower-
level systems (Van Gulick 1992, 1993b; Meyering 2000, 2002). In any given situation the 
micro-particulars of complex systems are understood to have a range of causal powers. But, 
understanding which of those causal powers gets activated in any particular situation 
requires that the “circumstances” (Van Gulick 1993b; Murphy 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b, 
2002a, 2002c), “environment,” (Peacocke 1986, Searle 1992) or “initial boundary 
conditions” (Van Gulick 1993b) of the system as a whole be taken into account.59
The same argument is then applied to higher-level mental properties. Though they 
do not operate with the same kind of ‘direct’ causality associated with micro-physical 
                                                 
59 On this point, some nonreductive physicalists appeal to the notion of multiple supervenience—i.e., 
the idea that not only can higher-level properties be instantiated by multiple physical bases (i.e., multiple 
realization), but particular physical bases can instantiate multiple higher-level properties depending on the 
broader circumstances (Meyering 2000, 2002; Murphy 1999b; cf. also Yablo 1992). 
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causality, they are causally efficacious in that they play a “structuring” (Dretske 1993), 
“facilitating” (E. Lowe 1993), or “sustaining” (Audi 1993) role in the “selective activation” 
(Van Gulick 1993b; cf. also Murphy 1998c, 2002c, 2005) of physical causal powers.60 In 
other words, mental states can be thought of as providing the relevant background 
information for causal explanations involving conscious beings. From this perspective, then, 
mental causes are not in competition with physical causes. Rather, they play a different role 
in the total causal process.  
We thus seem to have an account of mental causation in nonreductive terms that 
does not violate the basic principles of physicalism. However, several concerns could be 
offered to such an account. First, one might well wonder if this approach properly construes 
the reductive program. Their emphasis on the complexity of total systems could almost lead 
one to believe the reductionists entirely eschewed such reasoning (Cullen 2001; Wacome 
2004). But this is not the case. Reductionists are entirely aware that any valid causal 
explanation must account for both the relevant particulars and their extrinsic relationships. 
Indeed, Kim states, “Clearly then macroproperties can, and in general do, have their own 
causal powers, powers that go beyond the causal powers of their microconstituents 
(1998b:85, emphasis his). The reductive argument is not that higher-level properties are 
causally irrelevant but that their causal relevance is established by their reducibility. Thus, it 
is up to the nonreductive physicalist to establish that their system-explanations are 
sufficiently distinct from reductive system-explanations as to constitute a significant 
advance with respect to systemic causal explanations.61  
                                                 
60 Though all of these thinkers present their ideas in slightly different ways, the basic idea of mental 
properties as background states that enable the selective activation of physical properties is common to all of 
them. Jackson and Pettit have offered a similar argument in which they concede that mental properties are not 
causally efficacious but assert that they are causally relevant in that they “program for” or “ensure” the 
presence of the causally efficacious property (1990). It is hard to see, though, that this is any improvement on 
Davidson’s problematic “anomalous monism” (see note 41). Thus, Kim rightly argues that causal relevance 
without causal efficacy is an empty concept (1998b:75).   
61 Murphy contends, however, that the reductionist cannot accommodate circumstances within his 
system (1998c). According to her, the multiple realizability argument and problem of disjunctive subvenient 
sets (see note 31) demonstrate the nonreducibility of at least some of the causally relevant circumstances. But, 
if the circumstances are irreducible and are causally relevant, then any causal explanation that appeals to 
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Second, as nonreductive physicalists are well aware, one could argue that these 
broader contextual considerations are themselves reductively determined (c.f., Bielfeldt 
2000). That is, NRP seems to entail that these broad macro-systems are themselves 
asymmetrically dependent on their microphysical bases. If that is the case, any systemic 
influence these mental properties have is simply a larger part of the whole microphysical 
causal process. 
And third, even if we hold that higher-level properties have sufficient autonomy to 
be causally effective, the nonreductive argument still requires some mechanism by which 
they can causally effect lower-level properties (Horgan 1993b). But if this is the case, the 
system-explanation simply shifts the focus from mental-physical causation to system-
physical causation. At the very least it would seem that such influence would require the 
transmission of some kind of information (Peacocke 1986; Polkinghorne 1994).62 But 
information transfer in any sense currently available to us requires some form of causal 
interaction and fails to avoid the problem (Bielfeldt 2001; Sharpe and Walgate 2003). Burge 
rejects the requirement for a physical causal mechanism stating that such a requirement 
simply presumes the kind of physicalistic model of causation that NRP seeks to overturn 
(1993). But, if this is true, then NRP owes us an explanation of how systemic properties 
activate or otherwise influence physical properties in a way that is consistent with causal 
completion. Although appeals to explanatory practice and counterfactual analysis may 
provide epistemic warrant for speaking of systemic causes in this manner (e.g., Burge 1993; 
L. Baker 1993, van Gulick 1993b), they do little to provide a coherent account of how this 
causal interaction takes place.63
OPTION #3: CAUSAL COMPATIBILISM. Another option for responding to Kim’s 
argument is to contend that there is a sufficiently close relationship between the physical 
and the mental that they do not compete as causal factors (e.g., Pereboom and Kornblith 
                                                                                                                                                      
circumstances will be irreducible. Though her argument is valid, it remains questionable in that (1) it is still an 
open question whether reductionism is actually defeated by the multiple realizability argument and (2) it odes 
not address the concerns raised by such an externalist understanding of mental properties.  
62 The same objection can be raised to Murphy’s argument for “complex feedback loops” as an 
explanation of mental causation (cf. 1998c, 2002c, 2005).  
63 Thus, it could be argued that NRP needs to spend more time working on the metaphysics of 
causation itself before addressing the metaphysics of mental causation.  
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1991; Yablo 1992, 2003; Pereboom 2002; Witmer 2003).64 Two arguments have been 
particularly influential.65 Pereboom and Kornblith argue for a constitutional view of causal 
powers—that is, a mental token has its causal powers in virtue of the causal powers of the 
micro-physical particulars that constitute it (1991). Pereboom thus rejects Kim’s argument 
that psychophysical realization entails that the causal powers of mental properties be 
identical to those of their physical bases (2002; cf. Kim 1993c:326). According to 
Pereboom, this is sufficient to avoid overdetermination: 
 
Just as Kim claims that no competition between explanations arises 
in the case of reduction and identity, I propose that no competition arises in 
the case of mere constitution either. For if the token of a higher-level causal 
power is currently wholly constituted by a complex of microphysical causal 
powers, there are two sets of causal powers at work that are constituted from 
precisely the same stuff (supposing that the most basic microphysical entities 
are constituted of themselves), and in this sense we might say that they 
coincide constitutionally. (1991: 8).  
 
Thus, rather than competing for causal primacy, different causal explanations pick 
out different sides of the constitutor/constituted relationship.  
Yablo has made a similar argument based on the distinction between determinate 
and determinable properties (1992). According to Yablo, a determination relationship of this 
kind is established when some property necessarily entails the instantiation of some other 
property but that one could have the latter without the former. So, for instance, he suggests, 
“crimson is a determinate of the determinable red, red is a determinate of colored, and so 
on” (ibid., 252). Based on this principle, he identifies mental properties as determinables of 
physical determinates.  
                                                 
64 This kind of approach is often referred to as ‘causal compatibilism’ in that it construes mental and 
physical causes as being entirely compatible with one another. Another version of causal compatibilism that 
we will not be considering has been espoused by Terence Horgan based on a counterfactual analysis of causal 
relationships (1994, 1997).  
65 For a discussion of other options that have received attention in recent literature, see Ritchie 2005. 
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This becomes significant for the issue of mental causation when we consider the 
relationship between determinates and determinables with respect to causation. According 
to his argument, we cannot distinguish between determinables and determinates with respect 
to causal relevance.66 Any form of the exclusion argument that would render the violence of 
an earthquake or the suddenness of a bolt breaking causally irrelevant, as though they could 
be construed as “causal rivals” (ibid., 272-273), must be suspect (see also Yablo 2003). “As 
a rule, determinates are tolerant, indeed supportive, of the causal aspirations of their 
determinables. Why should it be different, if the determinate is physical and the 
determinable mental” (ibid., 260)? 
However, even though determinates and determinables cannot compete with respect 
to causal influence, Yablo contends that they can compete for the role of cause (ibid., 273-
274). This is because we expect proper causes to be both adequate and commensurate to 
their effects. But Yablo presents a number of cases in which it appears that the determinable 
property is more causally commensurate, based on a counterfactual analysis, than the 
corresponding determinate property. Thus, we can “attribute effects to mental 
causes…when we believe…that the effect is relatively insensitive to the finer details of m’s 
physical implementation” (ibid., 278)—that is, when the mental causal explanation is more 
commensurate with the given effect.  
These two approaches certainly offer a convincing way of construing mental causal 
powers in such a way that they can be viewed as having real causal influence but without 
identifying them with physical causal powers in any way. The way in which this is done, 
though, raises the question of whether they have avoided the problem by tightening the 
psychophysical relationship to the extent that it offers no real help in establishing the kind of 
mental efficacy required for establishing human agency and free will. Constitution theorists 
often note that “constitution is as close as one can get to identity without identity” (Corcoran 
2005:159). But is this too close for real mental causation when Pereboom is willing to affirm 
that mental causal powers are “nothing over and above” their physical constituents such that 
they can be described as being “absorbed” or “swallowed up” by physical causal powers 
(2002:6-7)? A similar concern arises when we consider that Yablo can compare the 
                                                 
66 Leiter and Miller, however, point out that he does very little in his argument to establish this point, 
merely assuming it to be true (1998).  
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psychophysical relation to the relationship between rectangles and their squareness, colors 
and their hues (1992). With such a tight relationship, it becomes difficult to see how mental 
causal explanations can be anything more than pragmatic conceptual necessities that offer 
no real help in establishing human agency.67
 
3.1.3. Mentality, Causality, and Moral Freedom: Continuing Difficulties for 
Nonreductive Physcialism 
Having offered a rather quick survey of NRP responses to Kim’s argument, what can 
we conclude about their christological adequacy? First, given NRP’s commitment to the 
physicalist program, we can say that there does not seem to be any easy way to escape the 
basic premises of the argument (option 1). An appropriate NRP response, therefore, will 
have to be along the lines pursued by the two alternate explanations offered above (options 
2 and 3).  
With respect to those arguments, it does seem that they offer coherent accounts of 
mental causation within a physicalist framework while still retaining their commitment to 
epistemological nonreduction. Though a number of significant difficulties remain to be 
addressed, particularly with respect to systems-explanations, they are both worth exploring. 
To that extent they must be considered successful accounts of mental causation.  
The problems arise when we consider the price that has been paid for these 
solutions. We have seen that both of them raise concerns with respect to their ability to 
account for free human agency. Although free will remains a contentious philosophical 
issue (cf. Van Inwagen 1983; Hasker 1999; Flanagan 2002; Dennett 2003; O’Conner and 
Wong 2005), we have seen that some account of free human agency is required for a 
christologically adequate ontology. To lift these concerns, a systems-explanation must be 
able to establish that its appeal to circumstances does not necessitate environmental 
                                                 
67 Crane offers another objection to this line of argument; he contends that this approach infelicitously 
allows for mental causation only by denying that it is a cause “in the same way” as physical causation 
(1995:232-233). By thus rejecting “the homogeneity of mental and physical causation,” according to Crane, 
this approach robs mentality of any significant causal involvement. Although Witmer dismisses this argument 
as “just fallacious” (2003:210), his concern seems legitimate. Indeed, one wonders if any real advance has been 
made if mental causation can only be construed in such a ‘parasitic’ manner.  
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determination; but, it must do this without violating its own commitment to causal 
completion. Similarly, causal compatibilists need to be able to show that the tight 
psychophysical relationship entailed by their account of causality does not preclude free 
agency without opening up so much space between physical and mental causes that the 
overdetermination argument comes back into play (Ritchie 2005). Leiter and Miller have 
argued that these solutions only succeed to the extent that they import dualistic ideas into 
their physicalist systems (1998). Corcoran, similarly argues that such explanations can only 
succeed if they rely on a more robust notion of emergent causation (2005; cf. Clayton 2005). 
Both arguments suggest that these explanations, by themselves, fail to establish a robust 
sense of mental causation without appealing to notions that are incompatible with the NRP 
system.68
It would seem, then, that NRP offers some interesting but still incomplete answers to 
the question of mental causation. Until it shows itself able to address these concerns, it will 
be difficult for it to serve as the backbone of a christologically adequate ontology.  
 
3.2. Experiencing Subjectivity: The Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness 
Although the term ‘consciousness’ can be used in a variety of different ways, indeed 
it is often used to encompass the entire range of mental phenomena,69 the aspect we will 
address in this section is that which is often referred to as “phenomenal consciousness” 
(Block 1995a).70 This aspect of consciousness focuses on those mental states that consist of 
                                                 
68 Additionally, to the extent that NRP relies on functionalist accounts of human mentality, they run 
afoul of what Ruper calls “the problem of metaphysically necessary effects” (2006). That is, since 
functionalism defines a mental property in terms of it being the kind of state that causes e, any functionalist 
account of mental causation appears to argue that the state of being that which causes e, causes e. 
69 Although consciousness can be used in this broader sense (e.g., Searle 1992), most agree that 
consciousness and mind should not be conflated since there seem to be certain intentional mental states (e.g., 
beliefs, desires, etc.) that continue to exist even when we are in completely unconscious states (Rosenthal 
2002a).  
70 Block distinguishes between phenomenal consciousness, which is characterized by qualitative 
experiences, and access consciousness, which involves mental states that are available for conscious reflection 
(1995a). Though he also posits a third category, reflexive consciousness, involving mental states that reflect on 
one another, this distinction will not be necessary for our discussion (2001). Block’s taxonomy has not been 
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“inner, qualitative, subjective states” (Searle 1999)—i.e., they have a particular “feel.”71  In 
other words, it refers to that which it is like to undergo certain kinds of experiences (e.g., hit 
your thumb with a hammer, see a bright color, or smell burnt food).72 These phenomenal 
aspects of human experience are commonly referred to as phenomenal properties or qualia 
(singular quale).73
Accounting for phenomenal properties, however, has long been regarded as one of 
the most significant problems for any physicalist ontology (cf. Chalmers 1995). How is it 
that “brain processes, which are objective, third person biological, chemical and electrical 
processes produce subjective states of feeling and thinking” (Searle 1999)? It does not seem 
conceivable that there is anything it is like to be an atom or a chemical process, so how does 
it come about that organisms solely constituted by atoms and chemical processes are 
characterized by vital subjective lives? There thus seems to be an “explanatory gap” 
between our subjective experiences and our ability to explain them (Levine 1983). 
According to Chalmers, then, the “hard problem” in philosophy of mind is to explain how a 
physical universe can give rise to subjective qualities (1996).74
Given the importance of the subjective life of human persons for any adequate 
christological anthropology, an ontological theory must be able to provide some account of 
                                                                                                                                                      
without criticism (e.g., Rosenthal 2002b), but it is widely used and usefully distinguishes the concepts 
addressed in this section.  
71 Although distinctions are possible between terms like subjectivity, phenomenal experiences, qualia, 
and raw feels (cf. van Gulick 2004), they will be used interchangeably in this section.  
72 Tye suggests that a list of mental states characterized by such phenomenal qualities should at least 
include perceptions, those associated with bodily states, emotions, and moods (2003). According to this 
understanding of consciousness, it ends when someone is in certain bodily states (e.g., a coma, dreamless 
sleep, etc.; cf. Searle 1999). This, of course, does not mean that all aspects of consciousness cease in such 
states but only those that have a phenomenal aspect.  
73 Determining what phenomenal properties are properties of is itself a contentious issue. The 
traditional position is to view them as properties of subjects or mental states. Alternately, one could view them 
as properties of experiences that are then represented in mental states or as higher-order properties (i.e., 
properties of properties). For a good discussion see Chalmers 2004.  
74 Or, more specifically: “The hard problem is one of explaining why the neural basis of a phenomenal 
quality is the neural basis of that phenomenal quality rather than another phenomenal quality or no 
phenomenal quality at all” (Block 2002:394). 
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these subjective qualities. The task of this section, then, is to consider whether NRP is able 
to offer an understanding of human subjectivity that is both coherent within its physicalist 
framework and christologically adequate.  
 
3.2.1. Phenomenal Properties without Reductionism 
According to Block (2003) there are basically four approaches that a physicalist, 
broadly conceived, could take to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. The first two 
correspond roughly to what we have been calling the eliminative and reductive positions. An 
eliminativist argues that qualia, understood as irreducible experiential properties, simply do 
not exist (Dennett 1979; Patricia Churchland 1983; Rey 1997).75 Although we certainly 
have experiences, the properties of those experiences are fully physical properties and the 
“folk psychology” that we use to describe them in non-physical terms should (ultimately) be 
eliminated in favor of more ‘scientific’ explanations (Paul Churchland 1981). Reductionism, 
or “phenomenal deflationism” (Block 2003) by contrast, allows the existence of 
consciousness but analyzes it in non-phenomenal (e.g., behavioral, functional, 
representational, etc.) terms. Currently, the two most popular candidates for such a reductive 
account are representationalism (Lycan 1987; Tye 1995; Shoemaker 1994; Dretske 1995; 
Crane 2001) and higher-order thought (HOT) theories (Lycan 1996; Rosenthal 2002a; 
Carruthers 2001a, 2001b, 2005). Both of these positions view consciousness in terms of the 
representation of experiential properties. Although they differ from one another in 
understanding the precise manner in which this representation takes place,76 they generally 
agree that phenomenally conscious states are identical to the content and manner of the 
intentional representation of experiential properties. According to both of these perspectives, 
                                                 
75 Eliminativist positions like that espoused by Dennett and Churchland have often been misconstrued 
as a simple denial of consciousness in general (e.g., Searle 1997). Eliminativists, though, do not reject the idea 
that human persons have certain phenomenal experiences. What they deny is that qualia should be understood 
as ineffable and incorrigible subjective states that are accessible only through first-person introspections of 
experiential properties (cf. Sousa 1996; Byrne 1997; Tye 2003).  
76 They differ primarily in terms of whether consciousness should be understood as the first-order 
representation of experiential properties or higher-order reflection on such first-order states.  
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then, there is no “hard problem” involving an irreducible explanatory gap since phenomenal 
properties are given non-phenomenal explanations (e.g., Papineau 1998).   
Such nonphenomenological accounts of phenomenal consciousness, though, have 
left many unconvinced. The standard objection is to contend that no matter how carefully a 
non-phenomenal depiction of consciousness is formulated, it still fails to account for the 
nature of the experience—i.e., the phenomenon itself. Two famous arguments along these 
lines have been presented by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson.  Nagel proposes that we try 
to imagine what it is like to be a bat (1974). Though we may be able to imagine what it is 
like for a human to be a bat, he argues that we cannot conceive of what it is like for a bat to 
be a bat. This is because our ability to explain the nature of a particular form of existence is 
necessarily related to our possessing certain conceptual categories that are themselves 
dependent on having the relevant form of experience. Even if we were able to provide an 
exhaustive physical account of the bat’s neurophysiological state, we would still be 
incapable of explaining its phenomenological states without already having the requisite 
concepts that can only be acquired through the relevant bat-experiences.  
Jackson offers a similar argument positing the existence of Mary, a brilliant color 
scientist who has been imprisoned in a black and white room for her entire life (1982, 1986). 
Although unable to experience color, she performs extensive research and develops an 
exhaustive knowledge of the physical aspects of color and vision. In fact, she becomes the 
world’s leading expert on the physics of color and understands all of the relevant physical 
facts. Upon being released from prison, she steps outside and discovers what it is like to 
experience red. Therefore, according to Jackson, despite knowing all of the relevant physical 
facts regarding the color red, she still lacked the knowledge of the corresponding experience. 
Both the Nagel and Jackson arguments, then, contend that consciousness cannot be reduced 
to physical facts.77
From thought experiments like these, nonreductive thinkers conclude that any 
attempt to provide a nonphenomenological explanation of phenomenal properties simply 
misses the point. As McLaughlin argues, “There is no a priori sufficient condition for 
phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (noncircularly) in nonphenomenal terms. 
                                                 
77 For a good recent discussion of these arguments and recent attempts to block them by positing 
important differences between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts, see Stoljar 2005.  
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Replacing our concepts of consciousness with ‘deflationary’ purely functional concepts that 
have such a priori sufficient conditions…would not change that. It would only change the 
subject” (McLaughlin 2003). Nonreductive thinkers have long contended that phenomenal 
properties resist any attempt to ‘functionalize’ them—i.e., define them solely according to 
their causal role (Levine 1983; Pereboom and Kornblith 1991; Humphrey 2000; Pereboom 
2002).78 Nonreductive thinkers are thus concerned to maintain the phenomenological ‘feel’ 
of experiential properties and contend that no attempt to depict the structure or function of 
consciousness can adequately account for that experience.  
Of course, reductive thinkers reject thought experiments like those offered by Nagel 
and Jackson (cf. Levin 1986; Loar 1990; Lycan 1995; Tye 1995) and contend that the 
nonreductivist sets the standard for explaining consciousness too high (Tye 1999; Carruthers 
2001b; Lycan 2001).79 Thus Carruthers argues, “We just need to have good reason to think 
that the explained properties are constituted by the explaining ones, in such a way that 
nothing else needed to be added to the world once the explaining properties were present, in 
order for the world to contain the target phenomenon” (2001b). But this simply reflects the 
divide between reductive and nonreductive thinkers. Reductivists contend that phenomenal 
properties can be exhaustively explained in terms of what they do while nonreductivists and 
dualists both insist that such an account misses important aspects of what they are.  
 
3.2.2. Phenomenal Properties without Dualism 
This does not mean, however, that NRP simply affirms a dualistic account of 
phenomenal properties. Although these two ontologies agree regarding the reality of 
phenomenal properties, they disagree substantially on the ontological implications of this 
position. Substance dualists contend that the only way to adequately account for such 
phenomenal properties is to recognize them as properties of nonphysical substances (e.g., 
Swinburne 1986; Foster 1991; Moreland and Rae 2000). Even some philosophers who do 
not affirm substance dualism argue that the conceptual irreducibility of phenomenal 
                                                 
78 Even a reductive philosopher like Kim recognizes that qualia might resist attempts to functionalize 
them (2004). His concern, though, is that such non-functional qualia can only be epiphenomenal. Since we 
addressed this in the previous section, we will not go into it again here.  
79 For a very helpful discussion, see the collection of essays in Ludlow, Nagasawa, and Stoljar 2004.  
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properties entails their ontological irreducibility (cf. T. Nagel 1974; Chalmers 1996, 2002, 
2003; Chalmers and Jackson 2001). According to these philosophers, then, we should 
recognize a basic duality in the fundamental structures of the universe. This could be 
construed in terms of (1) ‘panpsychism’, or the theory that all physical entities have intrinsic 
phenomenal properties, (2) ‘protophenomenal properties’, or the theory that all physical 
entities have properties that are disposed toward the production of phenomenal properties, or 
(3) ‘neutral monism’, that is, the idea that physical and mental properties are properties of 
some fundamental substance that is itself neither mental nor physical (see Chalmers 1996, 
2003; Stubenberg 2005). In any of these three ways, mental properties are understood to be 
fundamental properties of the universe in a form of ‘naturalistic dualism’ (Chalmers 
1996).80
Nonreductive physicalists reject such dualistic approaches, though, by denying the 
principle that the conceptual irreducibility of phenomenal properties entails some form of 
fundamental dualism (e.g., van Gulick 1992; Wacome 2004). Indeed, as we discussed in our 
first section, one of the basic commitments of NRP is that you can have physical monism 
without epistemological reduction based on the rejection of psychophysical type- and 
possibly even token-identity. Although many nonreductive physicalists can be properly 
understood as ‘property dualists’ (i.e., they espouse both mental and physical properties), 
this is distinctly different from the form of fundamental property dualism espoused by such 
‘naturalistic dualists’ (Chalmers 1996). Thus, Block and Stalnaker argue that, even though 
phenomenological properties are resistant to conceptual analyses of the sort often presumed 
necessary for nomological reduction, this does not establish ontological dualism, nor does it 
even defeat epistemological reduction (1999; for a reply see Chalmers and Jackson 2001). 
                                                 
80 It is not clear, though, that such a theory really provides a significant advance over earlier emergent 
theories. If the properties of the basic substrate (whatever that might be) are phenomenal properties, then 
panpsychism would seem to be committed to the idea that things like quarks and atoms have some form of 
phenomenal consciousness (Searle 1997; McGinn 1999). If, as is more likely, these are protophenomenal 
properties that are not themselves phenomenally conscious but can give rise to phenomenal properties, then it 
does not seem to have really solved the problem. For now we must give an account of how protophenomenal 
properties give rise to phenomenal properties (Van Gulick 2005). It would thus seem that panpsychism must 
ultimately appeal to some form of emergence based on latent protophenomenal powers (Seager and Allen-
Hermanson 2005) and thus surrender its status as a distinct theory of consciousness. 
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For example, ‘life’, they argue, similarly resists conceptual analysis and yet we have no 
difficulty affirming that it does in fact have a neurophysiological basis. Indeed, many 
nonreductive thinkers have responded to the argument that subjective phenomenal properties 
are intrinsically incompatible with objective physical properties by arguing that subjectivity 
and objectivity are properties of concepts rather than properties of properties (Loar 1990; 
Searle 1992; van Gulick 1993a; Block 2003). The irreducible subjectivity associated with 
qualia is, therefore, a result of how we think about them rather than how they are in 
themselves.  
 
3.2.3. Phenomenal Properties and Phenomenal Realism 
Most nonreductive physicalists, then, opt for Block’s fourth position, phenomenal 
realism (McGinn 1991; Searle 1992, 1997, 1999; Block 1995a, 1995b, 2002, 2005; 
Flanagan 1992, 2002; Loar 1997; McLaughlin 2003). This approach rejects the ontological 
implications of the dualists as well as the reductivism of phenomenal deflationists. Thus, 
though conceding the epistemological force of the Explanatory Gap argument, they deny 
that it amounts to anything more than a denial of reductionism and a support for the 
“plurality of theoretical frameworks” posited by the nonreductive approach (van Gulick 
1992:172).  
A nonreductive view of consciousness would thus seem to be committed to three 
ideas. Ontologically, NRP should affirm the asymmetrical dependence of phenomenal 
features on physical features, whether in terms of supervenience (Block 2002), emergence 
(Searle 1992), or some other dependency relationship.81 Epistemologically, NRP denies the 
possibility of fully explaining the essence of phenomenal properties in strictly 
                                                 
81 Chalmers has argued that zombie thought experiments establish that phenomenal features do not 
supervene on physical features (1996). Many nonreductive physicalists, though, have responded to this by 
calling into question the realizability of such conceivability arguments, Chalmers’ understanding of identity 
relationships, and his characterization of possible worlds (Balog 1999; Block and Stalnaker 1999; Loar 1999, 
Yablo 1999; Gertler 2002; for more on arguments from conceivability see van Cleve 1983; Stoljar 2001a; 
Barnes 2002; Gendler and O’Leary-Hawthorne 2002; Marcus 2004). In general, it would seem that NRP must 
reject zombie arguments with their implication that microphysically indistinguishable creatures could have 
radically different phenomenological states.  
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nonphenomenological terms. Functionally, however, NRP can allow the possibility that 
nonphenomenological analyses of phenomenal properties may be useful for understanding 
the role of consciousness in human life so long as this functional role remains distinct from 
its phenomenological essence.82 Indeed, several philosophers inclined toward nonreductive 
thinking are actively exploring representational or HOT approaches to consciousness (e.g., 
van Gulick 1992, 2000; Shoemaker 1994).83 While such an approach may well be fruitful 
and certainly bears further consideration, nonreductive thinkers will continue to argue that 
they will ultimately be unsuccessful in uncovering the essence of what’s-it-likeness.84
 
3.2.4. A Nonreductive Understanding of Phenomenal Consciousness 
The question, then, is whether NRP and phenomenal realism offers a coherent and 
christologically adequate account of phenomenal consciousness. As to coherence, it would 
seem that NRP’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness is fully consistent with its 
basic commitments. It acknowledges phenomenal properties to be fully subjective, internal 
aspects of human mental life while rejecting any move toward dualism. At the same time it 
affirms their physical basis without succumbing to reductionism. So long as it is successful 
in maintaining this balancing act, it would appear to be capable of articulating a view of 
consciousness that is sufficiently robust to support a christological ontology.  
                                                 
82 Block thus contends that access consciousness is functionalizable but not phenomenal 
consciousness. (2003).  
83 Chalmers has recently argued that reduction is not a necessary aspect of representationalism and 
that a nonreductive formulation is perfectly feasible (2004). He contends that representationalism requires an 
account of both the intentional content and the manner of the representation. Nonreductive representationalism, 
then, could simply argue that conscious states are representational but that the manner of the representation is 
itself phenomenological. Whether such a nonreductive understanding of representationalism succeeds and 
whether a similar argument can be made for higher-order theories remains to be seen. But Chalmers offers a 
convincing case that such an avenue is worth exploring. 
84 A complete discussion of the ontology of phenomenal properties would need to address those 
projects exploring other cognitive (e.g., Dennett 1991), neural (e.g., Crick and Koch 1990; Crick 1994), or 
quantum (e.g., Penrose 1989) bases. The literature on these projects is vast and will not concern us here (cf., 
van Gulick 2000).  
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The key question, then, is whether or not this mental balancing act is successful. 
Both dualists and reductionists argue that it is not and that it either needs to affirm the 
fundamental irreducibility of phenomenal properties or acknowledge their ultimate 
functionalization. To a large degree, though, this argument comes down to a contest of basic 
intuitions. According to the dualist intuition, phenomenality is so distinct from physicality as 
to preclude any possibility of bridging the divide. The reductionist intuition, on the other 
hand, is that consciousness is simply a functionalizable state of a highly complex 
neurophysiological being. The nonreductive intuition is to maintain that both are partly 
right.85 This clash of basic intuitions has so far produced no widely accepted account of 
phenomenal consciousness other than the simple acknowledgement that consciousness 
remains a mystery.86
It would seem, then, that so long as NRP’s account of consciousness is consistent 
with its basic principles, coherent within its own framework, and adequate to sustain a 
christological ontology, there is no outstanding reason to reject it, barring future 
philosophical or scientific developments.   
 
3.3. I Am I, But Am I the Same ‘I’ that I Was Yesterday?: The Problem of Personal 
Identity 
One final issue that has often been raised as a problem for any physicalist ontology 
deals with the continuity of personal identity. In a theological context, the question usually 
arises around the need to explain the continuity of personal identity both before and after 
                                                 
85 This clash of basic intuitions is revealed most clearly in the arguments surrounding what is 
conceivable about phenomenal properties. Such thought experiments seem most effective in revealing basic 
intuitions and the points at which they differ. 
86 Indeed, several philosophers have made ‘mystery’ the central aspect of their position regarding 
consciousness (e.g., McGinn 1989, 1991; Chalmers 1995; Searle 1997). For such thinkers, the mystery of 
consciousness stems from (1) a limitation in our current knowledge that may be addressed by future scientific 
developments (Searle 1997), (2) a fundamental limitation in the structure of human knowledge (McGinn 
1989), or (3) a fundamental limitation in the nature of physicalist explanation (Maxwell 2000). Some, like 
Daniel Stoljar (2005), have argued that the mystery stems from an anemic understanding of the physical 
universe, which refuses to accept the possibility that the physical is a far broader concept than we have been 
willing to accept up to this point.  
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that resurrection.87 As we saw in chapter 4, a Christological anthropology requires that an 
adequate ontological theory be able to account for both embodiment and persistent 
identity.88 For NRP to be considered an adequate ontological theory, then, it must have 
resources for addressing this issue.  
The question has been repeatedly raised, however, whether any physicalist ontology 
can adequately account for the continuity of personal identity through such a radical 
experience as death and resurrection.89 If the human person is a bodily organism and, 
therefore, cannot survive bodily death, how could a post-resurrection bodily organism of any 
kind be numerically identical with a pre-resurrection bodily organism? As Flew asked, 
“How is the reconstituted person on the last day to be identified as the original me, as 
opposed to a mere replica, an appropriately brilliant forgery” (1967:140).90 Similarly, 
Cooper thinks that physicalist ontologies raise the worry that we are really dealing with “two 
distinct people rather than one and the same human being” (1988:26). Any physicalist 
ontology must demonstrate itself capable of meeting this objection.  
 
3.3.1. The Nature of Personal Identity 
To understand the various proposals we need to begin with a few preliminary 
comments on the persistence of personal identity. First, as Olson rightly notes, the 
                                                 
87 We will, therefore, be concerned in this section with diachronic identity (i.e., the identity of persons 
through time) as opposed to synchronic identity (i.e., the identity of persons at a given time).  
88 A number of philosophers have argued that we should not be overly concerned about identity 
questions and should simply focus on what establishes the greatest amount of continuity between yourself and 
any future persons (e.g., Nozick 1981; Parfit 1986, 1995; Martin 1995). Given that the Christian view of the 
resurrection seems to require the identity of pre- and post-resurrection persons, we will not address these 
arguments and, instead, simply assume that the identity question is neither trivial nor empty (cf. D. Lewis 
1983; Sosa 1990).  
89 This problem is made even more difficult by the fact that the Christian doctrine of resurrection 
requires some significant transformation of the pre-mortem person; consequently, a viable theory cannot lean 
strongly on qualitative similarities (Davis 1986).    
90 Flew’s objection was primarily aimed at Hick’s notorious “replica” theory where the post-mortem 
person is simply a divinely created replica of the pre-mortem person (see Hick 1976). For a useful survey of 
the debate around Hick’s theory see Loughlin 1985.  
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persistence question is a question about numerical rather than qualitative identity (2003b). 
Two things are qualitatively identical only when they are exactly indistinguishable. No 
person, then, is qualitatively identical with the person she was five years ago or will be five 
years from now. Numerical identity, on the other hand, cannot change. If two things are 
numerically identical, they simply are the same thing and cannot become two different 
things (Olson 2003b).91 The question with which we are concerned, then, is properly 
understood as a question about the persistence of numerical identity through time.92 We can, 
therefore, formulate the persistence question as follows: Under what circumstances is some 
person who exists at one time, a, numerically identical with something that exists at another 
time, b (Olson 2003b)? 
But how do we go about answering such a question? What determines whether a 
person at one time is identical with something that exists at another time? It would seem that 
to answer such a question requires that we posit certain criteria by which personal identity 
can be established. Such criteria will also need to transcend the merely epistemic issues 
involved in recognizing continuous personal identity, but will need to be “nontrivial 
metaphysical truths about conditions necessary for personal identity through time” (Quinn 
1978).  
While it would seem reasonable to expect that physicalist ontologies would require 
physical criteria for establishing personal identity, this is not actually the case. A number of 
different criteria have been offered and each leads to a slightly different way of accounting 
for personal identity through resurrection.  
Before moving on to discuss those criteria, though, we must also consider the nature 
of the resurrection itself as one of the factors contributing to this problem. First, we must 
acknowledge that the resurrection is an essentially mysterious event. Consequently, we 
cannot expect any theory to do more than posit hypothetical examples of how an identity 
                                                 
91 Any talk about one thing “becoming” another thing, then, must either be a metaphorical reference to 
qualitative change without loss of numerical identity, or it actually involves the cessation of the first thing and 
the beginning of some new thing.  
92 Whenever “personal identity” is used in this discussion, then, “numerical personal identity” is 
understood. For the sake of our discussion, we will simply assume that persistence of numerical identity is 
possible and will not address theories to the effect that human persons do not persist, as Hume famously argued 
(MacDonald 2003).  
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theory might be constructed. Thus, difficulties raised regarding the believability of a 
particular identity theory must be set aside in the face of something as inscrutable as the 
resurrection. We will focus instead on questions of coherence and adequacy. Second, some 
of the proposals posit divine involvement as a solution to the problems raised. While it is 
generally recognized that one should avoid such deus ex machina devices, since the 
resurrection necessarily entails divine agency, we should assume that it is appropriate to 
invoke divine involvement to a certain extent (cf. L. Baker 1995).93  
 
3.3.2. Understanding Personal Identity through a Physical Lens 
THE BIOLOGICAL-CONTINUITY CRITERION. As expected, many philosophers have 
argued that personal identity is closely connected to the human body (e.g., B. Williams 
1970, 1973; van Inwagen 1978, 1997; Corcoran 1998, 2001b, 2005; Olson 2003a, 2003b). 
But, ‘body’ according to these thinkers means more than a mere collection of physical parts, 
the persistent identity of which would be notoriously difficult to establish (cf. van Inwagen 
1990, 2001).94 Rather, these philosophers assert material continuity in virtue of their 
understanding of the human body as a self-sustaining living organism.95 According to the 
                                                 
93 Although the intermediate state often factors into the discussion at this point, Lynn Baker rightly 
argues that an intermediate state by itself does not raise any issues for physicalist ontologies that do not already 
arise with respect to resurrection in general (1995). We will, therefore, postpone our consideration of this issue 
until the next chapter.  
94  A number of philosophers have argued that a material (rather than biological) criterion of personal 
identity fails in the case of the resurrection because it is impossible for a material object to maintain its identity 
without spatio-temporal continuity (e.g., Flew 1967; Penelhum 1970). After surveying a number of these 
arguments, Mavrodes concludes that, if they are successful, they raise problems for any diachronic theory of 
human identity (1977). But this is precisely what reductive identity theorists argue in contending that identity is 
either a matter of identifying the “closest continuer” of an individual (e.g., Nozick 1981) or simply a matter of 
convention (e.g., Penelhum 1970). Some have suggested brain-continuity as the proper criterion (T. Nagel 
1986; Unger 1990). Since this proposal seems to be merely a subset of either the body- or biological-continuity 
theories, we will not discuss it separately. 
95 By rejecting the possibility that the body as a materially composite entity could be the ground of 
personal identity, these thinkers all reject the classic “reassembly” version of the resurrection (e.g., Corcoran 
2001b). They also tend to reject the possibility of a human person having “temporal gaps” in its existence (cf. 
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“somatic view” (Olson 2003b), a and b are identical just in case b is simply a later temporal 
stage in a continuous biological organism of which a was an earlier stage (Corcoran 
2001b).96  
A problem arises for such an account, however, when we consider the resurrection. 
If continuous personal identity requires the continuity of a living organism, how can you 
have any continuous personal identity after death? One possibility would be to argue that the 
causal connections necessary to depict an organism as a continuous biological organism are 
able to cross temporal gaps such that b could be part of the same biological organism as a 
even though there was a time when the biological organism of which they are temporal 
stages did not exist. The possibility of such a temporally ‘gappy’ existence, however, has 
been rejected by most philosophers as being incoherent within a physicalist framework (cf. 
van Inwagen 1978, 1990; though cf. Davis 1986).  
The primary alternative to such an account is to suggest that although there can be no 
biological continuity beyond the death of the biological organism and although it seems that 
all biological organisms do in fact die, it is at least conceivable that God could intervene at 
the death of the person so at to miraculously continue her biological life despite the 
appearance of death. At least two different ways have been suggested for how God might 
accomplish this. According to van Inwagen, God could create a simulacrum in place of the 
person’s corpse, which God whisks away to be miraculously preserved until the resurrection 
(1978).97 Corcoran, on the other hand, suggests that a better, and less theologically 
disturbing, proposal would be to imagine that God copies a person’s “simples” (i.e., the 
basic microphysical components of the human body) such that one set becomes a corpse and 
                                                                                                                                                      
van Inwagen 1990). Some, who reject the biological continuity theory, however, have presented arguments 
suggesting that this traditional view should not be set aside so quickly (L. Baker 1995; Davis 2001).   
96 Chisholm has argued that it is impossible for even living organisms to have any persistent identity 
since, according to him, nothing can have different parts at different times and yet retain identity (1976). 
Chisholm’s view, though, is not only contrary to our strongest intuitions about living creatures, but also fails to 
stand up to the substantial arguments developed by van Inwagen for the identity of living beings (1990, 2001). 
97 Van Inwagen’s theory is thus distinct from Hick’s “replica” theory (at least) in that Hick posits no 
real continuity between a and b, whereas van Inwagen’s theory requires direct biological continuity. The 
continuity of the human person, then, is sustained in that the person’s life is suspended rather than disrupted 
(van Inwagen 1992).  
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the second set continues the biological life of the person (Corcoran 1998, 2001b).98 Either 
way, the basic premise remains the same. Despite the difficulties of establishing biological 
continuity, it is conceivably within God’s power to intervene and sustain biological identity. 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-CONTINUITY CRITERION. For a long time, the most common 
way of establishing the persistence of human identity over time was through an appeal to 
some form of psychological continuity (D. Lewis 1983; Shoemaker 1984b; Parfit 1986, 
1995). Using thought experiments like transferring a mind from one body to another or 
gradually replacing a human person’s biological parts with entirely synthetic parts, these 
thinkers argue that the identity of the human person is most closely associated with her 
mental states and that even a total lack of spatio-temporal material continuity would not 
preclude continuity of identity. From this perspective a and b are identical just in case there 
is mental continuity between them that is appropriately connected.99 On this view a theory 
of the resurrection could simply be constructed around the conceivability of God 
transferring the relevant mental states from one body to another. 
Many philosophers have called the psychological-continuity criterion into question 
because of the problem of duplication (cf. Merricks 1999). In other words, if mental states 
are transferable and if identity coincides with mental continuity, what is to prevent the 
conceivability that a given set of mental states could be transferred into multiple physical 
organisms? We seem to have a situation in which multiple individuals would have equal 
                                                 
98 Corcoran also has to posit this as an answer to the objection that this allows the possibility that God 
could create multiple biological organisms who are all biologically continuous with the same person (e.g., 
Zimmerman 1999). Since such an account would render Corcoran’s identity theory untenable, he must respond 
and does so by simply stating that God would not participate in such an action (2001b). Though this certainly 
seems reasonable, it is not clear that he has sufficiently addressed the problem that his solution raises for the 
Kripkean notion of strict identity (cf. Kripke 1971). Van Inwagen’s solution, though problematic as well, at 
least avoids this problem.   
99 Early forms of the psychological argument, often associated with John Locke, appealed to 
continuity of memory (Martin and Barresi 2003). This quickly ran into objections from thinkers like Thomas 
Reid who pointed out the problems that memory gaps and non-mental states raise for any such theory (Olson 
2003b). Though some have tried to reformulate the memory criterion to handle such objections (e.g., 
Shoemaker 1970), most now recognize that continuity of memory is insufficient to ground personal identity 
(cf. van Inwagen 1990:183-188).  
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claim to being the same person.100 Shoemaker responds to this objection by stipulating that 
identity is only sustained in cases where there is no such duplication (1984). The duplication 
of mental states necessarily results in the destruction of the original person and the creation 
of multiple new persons. Such a response, however, requires that we view strict identity 
relationships as both contingent and extrinsically dependent; neither of which are appealing 
positions for most philosophers. Reductive thinkers like Parfit and Lewis argue that the 
duplication argument simply establishes that our concern should not be with identity but 
with significant continuity (cf. Martin and Barresi 2003). The denial of identity, though, 
seems entirely inadequate to account for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.  
  Van Inwagen goes even further and argues that the very nature of the 
psychological-continuity theory is inconsistent with a physicalist ontology. He constructs a 
reductio argument to show that mind-transfer thought experiments imply that a human 
person, which is identical to some physical thing, could suddenly become identical with 
some other physical thing by the mere transfer of information (2001:144-161). But, 
according to van Inwagen, on any realistic view of identity this is simply absurd. Since 
many proponents of psychological-continuity are also constitution theorists (e.g., Shoemaker 
1984b; Parfit 1986, 1995), one could try to block the argument by denying that human 
persons are ever identical to their physical bodies. As van Inwagen argues, though, for a 
mind/body theory to be a materialist theory, it must maintain that human persons are 
identical to some material thing (otherwise, what are they?).101
A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL PROPOSAL. A third option that we will only discuss briefly 
relies on an alternate conception of time. According to four-dimensionalism, material objects 
are temporally as well as spatially extended (cf. Sider 1997, 2001; Rea 2003). From this 
perspective, then, a and b are understood to be temporal components of a single, temporally 
extended human person, f. That is, a refers to that temporal segment of f that is f-at-a and b 
                                                 
100 Note that the same objection has been raised with respect to certain forms of the biological-
continuity theory. It seems to be considered more of a problem for psychological-continuity because there is no 
way to establish the kind of causal relationship between mental states that is characteristic in a self-sustaining 
biological organism.  
101 Lynn Rudder Baker notes, though, that this argument does not touch her version of the constitution 
theory because she contends that “human person is a material-object category” (2000:144). 
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refers to that temporal segment that is f-at-b. Thus, a and b are identical in that they are 
temporal parts of a temporally extended human person.  
The view of the resurrection that arises from such a theory would seem to be rather 
straightforward. The pre-resurrection person, a, is identical with the post-resurrection 
person, b, inasmuch as they are temporal parts of the same human person irrespective of any 
‘intervening’ temporal gaps.  
Four-dimensionalism, though, is a highly contentious theory of human identity with 
significant metaphysical implications that has attracted much criticism (e.g., van Inwagen 
2001:75-123; Barker and Dowe 2003, 2005). Thus, it would seem that more work needs to 
be done before it is sufficiently well-established to serve as a theory of resurrection identity.   
THE NO-CRITERION SOLUTION. A fourth possibility is to agree that personal identity 
persists, but argue that there are no criteria of identity (Merricks 1998, 1999, 2001a). 
Merricks asserts, “Because criteria must be informative, criterion-based worries about 
temporal gaps are closely related to the suspicion that nothing could explain what makes a 
person in the distant future identical with a person who, long before, died, decayed, and 
disintegrated” (2001a:186).102 Similarly, Lynn Rudder Baker argues, “I doubt that there are 
any noncircular, informative, plausible criteria of personal identity to be stated” (2000:132). 
This does not mean that it is never possible to explain how a could be identical with b, it 
may in fact be possible to do this in many cases, but Merrick’s anti-criterialism argument 
rejects the possibility that we could devise metaphysical criteria that would establish the 
identity of a and b in every case. Though we can affirm that identity persists, we will, on this 
argument, not always be able to explain it.  
This approach also lends itself to two other ways of understanding identity. 
According to Baker, the lack of substantial criteria suggests that a more useful approach is to 
ground personal identity in the “sameness of first-person perspective” over time (2000:132-
141). On this view, then, although there are no strong criteria of identity, it can be known 
intuitively through the self-representation of a coherent narrative (cf. MacIntyre 1989; Peters 
                                                 
102 Reichenbach seems to make a similar argument by contending that there are criteria by which we 
can be justified in identifying b with a; a judgment that apparently leaves us in the dark about whether a and b 
are actually identical (1978).  
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2002; Schechtman 2003; J. Green 2004a; Gutenson 2004). Thus, a and b are identical just in 
case there is a coherent narrative connecting them.103
It would also seem that this would be the best place to categorize some attempts to 
develop a multiple-criteria model for understanding identity. Murphy posits such an 
approach when she argues that there is no one criterion of identity but it is instead grounded 
in some combination of material, psychological, narratival, moral, and relational issues 
(2002b). Although it might seem at first that this is actually an all-criteria solution, 
Murphy’s argument would seem to be more consistent with the suggestion that none of these 
are necessary in every situation, but that some combination of them will prove to be 
sufficient to ground identity in any particular case.104
From this perspective, then, the continuity of personal identity through death and 
resurrection is possible, but there are no non-trivial criteria on which we can base it. At best 
we can suggest that the identity of the person is grounded either in a narratival self-
representation or in some undeterminable but jointly sufficient set of criteria. The theory of 
the resurrection that results from such an account would seem to affirm the post-resurrection 
identity of the human person, but deny that there are any apriori criteria for its 
establishment.  
 
3.3.3. Continuous Physical Persons: The Prospects of Nonreductive Solution to the 
Identity Problem 
It would seem that each of these four ways of understanding the identity of human 
persons through death and resurrection at least presents itself in such a way as to be 
                                                 
103 Capitalizing on this approach to understanding human identity, Madell argues that monism is 
fundamentally inadequate for grounding such identity as a result of its inability to account adequately for the 
kind of first-person subjectivity that this approach entails (1989). Since we have seen that NRP is not without 
resources for addressing the problem of phenomenal consciousness, this is not necessarily the decisive 
argument that it might first appear.  
104 Her approach would thus be distinct from a multiple-criteria approach that posited that all the 
criteria were necessary and that they were jointly sufficient (e.g., Davis 1986).  
 175
christologically adequate.105 In addition, assuming that we reject the reductive solution 
espoused by Parfit and others, it would seem that are all consistent with a nonreductive view 
of the human person.  
The real question comes when we consider the extent to which these various options 
can be coherently maintained within a physicalist framework. As we have seen, a number of 
significant arguments have been raised against the psychological-continuity theory that must 
be addressed before it can be considered a viable identity-theory for nonreductive 
physicalists. The same concerns could be raised against narratival approaches to identity, 
since the continuity of a first-person narratival framework seems almost entirely dependent 
on a mental-continuity criterion. Without that or some other criterion of identity, would we 
not simply conclude that the individual is deluded about the coherence of her narratival 
framework? The same objection might also be raised against multiple-criteria arguments that 
include mental and narrative aspects, although the strength of the objection would be 
diminished somewhat in that a multiple-criteria approach is not dependent on these 
psychological factors alone.106  
Although the other theories have their weaknesses and their detractors, it does seem 
that they present viable and coherent theories of personal identity through death and 
resurrection that maintains the commitments of physicalism.107 Not everyone will find these 
various suggestions believable but, as we saw earlier, believability is not the most useful 
criterion in discussions regarding the resurrection.  
 
4. Is There Hope for Nonreductive Forms of Physicalism: Problems and Prospects 
We have seen that nonreductive materialism is a physicalist theory that views the 
mind as asymmetrically dependent on its microphysical base in such a way that it can 
neither be reduced to that base (reductivism) nor regarded as possessing autonomous causal 
                                                 
105 One final account of identity that could be drawn into this discussion is that of relative identity (cf. 
Geach 1967, 1968; Harry 2002). This approach, though, has not found wide acceptance and we will not 
address it here.  
106 For a more sustained critique of the no-criteria solution see Zimmerman 1998.  
107 For other thinkers who argue that the various physicalist theories of personal identity through death 
and resurrection are coherent and viable see Quinn 1978, L. Baker 1995, and Davis 2001.    
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powers (strong emergence). Whether it can be viewed as a christologically adequate 
ontology depends on how we evaluate its answers to the three questions raised in the last 
half of the chapter: (1) Can a physicalist ontology with a commitment to causal completion 
coherently account for mental causation in a way that supports a belief in human agency, 
personal freedom and moral responsibility? (2) Can NRP affirm a realist position on 
phenomenal properties that remains consistent with its physical commitments? And, (3) are 
the options available for developing a physicalist theory of personal identity adequate to 
establishing the continuity of personal identity through death and resurrection?  
On each of these questions we have seen that NRP has developed substantive 
positions that need to be taken seriously. Each, though, also manifests some significant 
weaknesses that must be addressed if NRP is to be viewed as a viable christological 
ontology. With respect to mental causation, although nonreductive physicalists have devoted 
considerable attention to articulating a nonreductive view of causation that can operate 
within a physicalist framework, they seem to have paid insufficient attention to the question 
of whether their answers accord with a commitment to agency and freedom. The NRP 
account of phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, offers a coherent account of 
phenomenal properties. The extent to which this argument is deemed successful, seems to 
turn largely on intuitive convictions regarding the nature of ‘subjectivity’ and its 
compatibility with physical properties. It is on the third question, personal identity, that NRP 
seems to have the strongest answers. Regardless of whether one finds the various proposals 
plausible, they seem coherent and christologically adequate.  
In general, then, it seems that we can conclude that NRP should be considered a 
viable candidate for use as a mind/body theory within a christologically adequate 
anthropology, but that there are a number of unresolved issues that must still be addressed. 
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Chapter 6 
Across the Cartesian Divide 
Christological Adequacy and Holistic forms of Dualism 
 
1. Moving Beyond the Cartesian Critique: Contemporary Substance Dualism                
Having considered in the previous chapter the Christological implications for 
developing a physicalist ontology of the human person, we now turn our attention to a 
similar analysis of dualist theories. The prospect of developing any such account, 
however, seems dim in light of Barth’s clear pronouncements against any form of 
substance dualism. He argues, 
 
In general, the character and result of this anthropology are 
marked by a separation of soul and body, an exaltation of the soul over 
the body, a humiliation of the body under the soul, in which both really 
become not merely abstractions but in fact two ‘co-existing’ figments—a 
picture in which no real man ever recognised himself, and with which one 
cannot possibly do justice to the biblical view and concept of man. (p. 
382) 
 
Thus, as long as theology insists on taking the dual nature of humanity as its 
starting point, “no real insight is possible” (p. 393).  
 Many contemporary philosophers agree, viewing substance dualism as an 
inadequate theory of human ontology; and a decisively refuted theory at that.1 Thus, 
some philosophers contend that we should no longer consider substance dualism to be a 
serious option in the mind/body debate (e.g., Dennett 1983).2 According to Himma, then, 
“Substance dualism is almost universally rejected among people who work in philosophy 
                                                 
1 In philosophy of mind, ‘dualism’ can be used with reference to a duality of substances (as here), 
properties (i.e., distinct mental and physical properties of a single substance), or predicates (i.e., semantic 
duality that is not reflected ontologically) (cf. Levin 1979; H. Robinson 2004). In this chapter, we will use 
the term ‘dualism’ to refer to a dualism of substances in the human person.  
 2 Indeed, Moreland and Rae complain, “most contemporary philosophers and scientists 
dismiss substance dualism without much serious consideration of the notion and with very little 
argumentation against it” (2000:98).   
 178
of mind and the cognitive sciences” (2005:81). As Taliaferro indicates, this widespread 
rejection of mind-body dualism stems from a variety of different criticisms:  
 
Dualism appears to face intractable problems accounting for 
mind-body interaction, for the individuation of nonphysical beings, and 
for our knowledge of the mental life of other persons. Dualism seems 
vulnerable to private language arguments…and dualism is often 
considered a prime target for Ockham's razor. Moreover, dualism is often 
considered public enemy number one on religious and ethical grounds. It 
faces the charge of promoting a life-threatening, body-denigrating 
asceticism, of encouraging homocentric approaches to the environment, 
and of favoring an ethic of individualism more generally. It has also been 
accused of advancing a sexist agenda that privileges a male bias in 
matters of inquiry and substance. (1995:567)3
 
Dualism, therefore, is often dismissed as a theory that stems from a simple 
category mistake (Ryle 1949) resulting in an unfortunate tendency to reify those 
properties of human persons that we associate with mentality (Murphy 1998a; Herbert 
1998).4
Despite this strong consensus, however, Corcoran is able to claim that “the mind-
body problem remains wide open” (2001b:11). Indeed, discussions of dualism abound in 
the literature.5 This may be at least partially because of the continued pervasiveness of 
dualistic thinking at the popular level.6 But, it may also stem from a growing realization 
                                                 
3 For similar summaries of arguments against dualism see Swinburne 1986; Foster 1989, 1991, 
2001; Moreland and Rae 2000; Moreland 2002.  
4 Similarly, Harre argues that social and linguistic structures have a significant impact on 
ontologies (1987).  
5 Thus, introductions to philosophy of mind still routinely devote considerable attention to 
substance dualism (e.g., Graham 1998; E. Lowe 2000; Cockburn 2001; Crane 2001; Maslin 2001; Heil 
2004a).  
6 Even many non-dualist philosophers affirm that some form of dualism is the common-sense 
view of most people (e.g., Levin 1979; Shoemaker 1984a; J. Green 2005). Others, though, argue that 
human persons have an equally strong intuition of our essential physicality and wholeness (van Inwagen 
1995; Corcoran 2005). To a large degree, then, we are dealing here with a conflict of basic intuitions that 
makes negotiating the various arguments quite difficult (cf. E. Lowe 2000:32).  
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that dualism actually comprises a family of theories, many of which are resistant to some 
of the standard criticisms. Historically, dualism has included Platonic, Aristotelian,7 
Thomistic, Cartesian,8 and Hobbesian dualism.9 Corresponding to the rapid development 
of philosophy of mind in the latter part of the twentieth century, these historic forms of 
dualism have recently been supplemented by more recent formulations. Modern dualist 
systems thus include basically Cartesian approaches (e.g., H. Lewis, W. Hart, Foster, 
Robison)10 along with theories like naturalistic dualism (e.g., Chalmers), emergent 
dualism (e.g., Hasker, Zimmerman), Thomistic dualism (e.g., Moreland, Stump), and 
more holistic forms of Cartesian dualism (e.g., Cooper, Goetz, Taliaferro).11  
This spectrum of positions suggests that any adequate criticism of dualism must 
engage with more than the Platonic/Cartesian perspective.12 Unfortunately, much of 
what passes for a refutation of substance dualism focuses exclusively on this one 
approach and fails to consider other dualist theories that might be more resistant to 
criticism. Thus, Taliaferro, contests that “a fairminded, reasoned case against dualism 
must take seriously the ways in which a version of dualism may do justice to the unified 
nature of embodied life” (1994:568).   
Given these newer forms of substance dualism which seek to “do justice” to the 
psychophysical nature of the human person, it seems reasonable to engage the question 
of whether it is possible to formulate a form of substance dualism that is compatible with 
Barth’s christological framework despite Barth’s own disavowals. To do this, we will 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that Aristotle himself was a dualist, but that his philosophy has, at times, been 
used to support dualist ontologies.  
8 As a subset under Cartesian dualism we would also have to list the parallelistic theories 
espoused by Leibniz and Malebranch.  
9 Although criticisms have tended to focus on the more Platonic and Cartesian strands of dualism, 
the Aristotelian and Thomistic branches have actually been far more prominent in much Western 
philosophy and theology (cf. Crane and Patterson 2000; MacDonald 2003). 
10 Although Foster and Robinson have presented significant defenses of substance dualism (Foster 
1989, 1991, 2001; H. Robinson 1989, 2003, 2004), both prefer an idealist approach to human ontology 
(see esp. Foster 1982). 
11 Locating Swinburne within this spectrum of approaches can be somewhat challenging. As 
Hasker points out, although his emphasis on evolutionary development would seem to suggest an emergent 
theory of substance dualism, his creationist perspective on the origin of the soul and some of his language 
regarding the mind/body relationship suggests a more Cartesian orientation (Hasker 1999).  
12 Barth himself was well aware of many of these distinctions and took care to comment on 
several distinct forms of Cartesian and Thomistic dualism (cf. III/2, 383-390). 
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first survey the form of substance dualism that is most often presented in the literature 
and in response to which most forms of modern dualism have developed—i.e., Cartesian 
dualism. Having offered a definition of Cartesian dualism and a quick survey of the key 
objections to this ontology, we will look at three significant types of substance dualism 
that have recently been offered as providing a more holistic view of the human person. 
Finally, as in the previous chapter, we will consider this more holistic form of substance 
dualism against the requirements of Barth’s christological framework. Specifically, we 
will look at whether or not even this more holistic approach offers a viable ontology in 
light of problems surrounding mental causation, embodiment, and contingent 
personhood.  
 
2. What is Holistic Dualism? 
To understand holistic dualism (HD) and the resources that it offers for 
developing a christologically adequate ontology, it will be helpful to consider briefly the 
more traditional Cartesian dualism (CD) that serves as the backdrop against which HD 
developed. There is an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which what is often called 
“Cartesian” dualism actually represents the position espoused by Descartes (cf. G. Baker 
and Morris 1996). That debate need not concern us at this point. Rather, our focus will 
remain primarily on CD as it has come to be understood by most philosophers.  
 
2.1. Understanding the Cartesian Divide 
2.1.1. The Basic Tenets of Cartesian Dualism 
Substance dualism, at its most basic level, involves three claims:  
 
(a) There is a mental realm and a physical realm;  
(b) The mental and physical realms are both fundamental; and  
(c) The mental and physical realms are ontologically distinct.13  
 
To understand CD, we will need to unpack each of these further. 
According to substance dualists, it is simply evident that any explanation of 
human persons must account for both physical and mental realities. The recognition of 
                                                 
13 This is adapted from Foster’s list of basic dualist assertions (1991:1).  
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such a basic duality, according to many dualists, has been the common view of human 
persons throughout history and in all cultures (Foster 1991:206; Moreland and Rae 
2000:17; Goetz 2005:35). Given the pervasiveness of this viewpoint, dualists contend 
that ontological dialog must begin from this point and that the burden of proof lies on 
anyone who seeks to deny the reality of either aspect (Foster 1991:150; Goetz 2005:43). 
Furthermore, not only must we acknowledge both realms, but also, substance 
dualists argue, we must affirm that both are fundamental and, therefore “not reducible to 
something else” (Foster 1991:2). Though property dualists are willing to affirm the 
epistemological nonreduction of mental states, substance dualists argue that mental states 
must be regarded as completely irreducible if we are to account for their unique 
properties.  
Typically, dualists contend that an examination of these two realms demonstrates 
that they are so intuitively different from one another that the only plausible option is to 
conclude that they constitute distinct and irreducible substances (e.g., Swinburne 1984; 
Taliaferro 1994). A brief look at these differences will help establish exactly what 
dualists have in mind.  
First, as we saw in the previous chapter, dualists affirm the qualia of conscious 
experiences. As Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument sought to demonstrate (1986), 
these qualia seem very different from the physical properties of human persons. 
Although the physicalist could respond that these phenomenological experiences only 
seem to be distinct from their physical realizers, Taliaferro rightly points out that even 
this admission causes problems for the physicalist since the existence of a 
phenomenological seeming is itself a phenomenon in need of explanation (1994:70). 
Physicalist attempts to functionalize mental states have similarly failed to convince 
dualists given the widespread rejection of any attempt to functionalize qualia (cf. Foster 
1991; Moreland and Rae 2000; Zimmerman 2004). Thus, we may be able to design a 
mechanical system that can perform mental functions, but not one that can have 
phenomenological experiences (Vendler 1994:319).14
                                                 
14 As Swinburne argues, attempts to provide reductive explanations of qualia merely separate 
phenomenality from causality and explain the latter; but, it is the former that is key (1994:191). Thus, 
some physicalists, like Kim, agree that qualia cannot be reduced to physical states but argue instead that 
they must be viewed as the epiphenomenal productions of physical states (cf. Kim 1993c; 2004).  
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Second, mental states can be about something—i.e., they can be intentional (cf. 
Crane 1998, 2005).15 According to Crane, “Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, 
hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or 
at, something” (2005). Physical states, on the other hand, simply are, they cannot be 
about anything (Crane 1998; though cf. Bontly 2001).16 Although many physicalists 
contend that intentional states can be functionally reduced and, therefore, exhibited in 
complex physical systems (e.g., Fodor 1987), dualists typically reject any attempt to 
naturalize intentionality in this way, arguing instead that the very nature of intentionality 
precludes the possibility of its realization in physical states (Moreland 2002; cf. Searle 
1983).  
And, third, mental states are accessible through first-person introspection and are, 
therefore, private—i.e., only available to the person having them (see Myro 1994). 
However, physical states are largely thought to be necessarily open and available to 
analysis from a third-person perspective—i.e., they are publicly available to all 
persons.17
As we saw in the previous chapter, though, many physicalists agree with 
substance dualists on these unique properties of mental states. The difference lies in the 
nature of the substance underlying the properties. While physicalists contend that one 
need only posit a single, physical substance in all of its complex forms to account for the 
existence of mental properties (even if we are not able to provide an explanation of how 
this actually works), dualists argue that the disparate nature of the properties involved 
requires two, distinct substances, each with different sets of properties. Thus, dualists 
often favorably cite McGinn’s arguments for the essentially mysterious nature of 
mentality, though disagreeing with his physicalist presuppositions (e.g., Taliaferro 
1994:193). It is important to note, then, that the disagreement does not center on the 
                                                 
15 Whether all mental states exhibit intentionality is an open discussion (cf. Pierre 2003). Crane 
suggestively argues, though, that all mental states have some intentional content even if they cannot all be 
exhaustively explained in intentional terms (2005).  
16 Functionalists, though, contend that intentionality can be functionally reduced and, therefore, 
exhibited in complex physical systems (cf. Fodor 1987).  
17 Several other dualist arguments which could be placed here include the unity-of-consciousness 
(cf. Hasker 1995, 1999, 2001; E. Lowe 1993, 2004; Goetz 2005) argument and the modal-properties 
argument (cf. Taliaferro 1994; Moreland 2002). Each of these identifies ways in which the properties of 
mental states are irreconcilably different from those of physical states.  
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existence or non-existence of mental properties but on the best possible explanation of 
those properties (W. Hart 1988:29; Foster 1989:8; Hasker 1999:69; Taliaferro 2001).18  
In addition to dualism’s affirmation of distinct substances, CD also affirms that 
they are (at least) conceivably separable. Indeed, so strongly is the notion of separability 
linked to substance dualism that many affirm this as its defining characteristic (e.g., W. 
Hart 1988; L. Baker 2004; Barnes 2004). Thus, one of the primary arguments 
traditionally used in defense of substance dualism relies entirely on the conceivability of 
mind/body separation.19
We must emphasize, though, that CD need only affirm the conceivability of such 
ontological separation and not necessarily its actuality. Thus, Swinburne argues, “By 
saying that the person ‘can’ continue if the body is destroyed I mean only that it is 
logically possible, that there is no contradiction in supposing the soul to continue to exist 
without its present body or indeed any body at all” (Swinburne and Padgett 1994:146). 
Similarly, E. J. Lowe asserts, “though we have to regard [the self] as distinct from its 
body, we are not required to think of the two as separable (except perhaps purely 
conceptually, or purely in imagination)” (2004:853). Consequently, a dualist like Popper 
can remain agnostic about the actuality of the mind surviving the death of the body (see 
Popper and Eccles 1977).20  
And, finally, according to CD, the mental and physical substances are 
capable of entering into causal relationships with one another. The soul possesses a 
peculiar causal relation with its body such that it is able to act directly upon the body 
and be acted upon by the body. Although there are forms of substance dualism that 
                                                 
18 As Levin rightly points out, the differences between these two sets of properties do not, then, 
constitute a decisive argument for substance dualism (1979). Instead, they comprise a data set that needs 
explanation. Whether the dualist or the physicalist argument represents a better explanation of the data set 
is what remains to be decided.  
19 Simply stated, the modal argument, in use at least since Descartes, moves from conceivability 
to metaphysical possibility (see van Cleve 1983; Swinburne 1984, 1998; Bealer 1994; G. Baker and Morris 
1995; Plantinga 2003). In the context of the mind/body debate, the modal argument contends that the 
conceivable separability of mind and body entails the metaphysical possibility of such separability and 
their corresponding non-identity. An analysis of the extensive literature on this argument lies beyond our 
reach at this point, but see Shoemaker 1984a; Alston and Smythe 1994; Hasker 1998; Goetz 2001.  
20 Of course, Popper does not consider himself to be a dualist because he actually posits the 
existence of three separate worlds (1994). Regardless, though, his position is entirely consistent with 
substance dualism.  
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do not entail such psychophysical interaction, affirming instead some from of 
psychophysical parallelism (e.g., pre-established harmony, epiphenomenalism, etc.), 
most forms of substance dualism support causal transactions between the two 
substances.21  
 
2.1.2. The Cartesian Soul 
Given these two fundamentally distinct and conceivably separable substances 
in the human person, what does CD believe about the nature of the human soul? For 
our purposes, we can summarize CD’s view of the soul in six assertions. 
 
(a) The soul is simple. The soul is not a composite entity constructed out 
of particles that are more basic.22  
(b) The soul is primitive. That is, the soul is not an emergent entity. 
Rather, it is a fundamental substance not derivable from any other 
substance.23  
(c) The soul is non-spatial. The soul is a non-physical substance and is, 
therefore non-spatial and non-extended. Instead, it is an immaterial 
substance, which does not inhabit physical space in any way.  
(d) The soul is immortal. By nature the soul is immortal and incapable of 
destruction.24  
(e) The soul is rational. By this, the Cartesian means that the soul is the 
substance with which all of the rational faculties of the person are 
associated. Thus, the soul alone is what thinks, wills, and chooses, 
even if it must use the body (i.e., the brain) to accomplish this (at least 
during its embodied state).   
                                                 
21 We will address this causal relationship later in the chapter.  
22 For good discussions on this point see Zimmerman 2003 and E. Lowe 2001. 
23 Although some speak of the soul as though it were made out of some generic immaterial 
substance, it is more correct to speak of the dualist soul as a simple substance that is not constructed from 
any other substance. 
24 Although a variety of arguments have been put forward in support of this position, the most 
common is that since the soul is a simple substance, it cannot be broken down into its constituent elements 
(cf. Hasker 1999). But, for something to be destroyed is for it to be broken down in this way. Therefore, 
the soul cannot be destroyed. 
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(f) The soul is the person. The person is the soul. The body is merely the 
mechanism by which the person acts and expresses herself in the 
world. The continuity of the person, therefore, involves only the 
continuation of the immaterial soul; bodily continuity is not required.  
 
2.1.3. Criticizing Cartesian Dualism 
The substantial objections that can be raised against substance dualism have been 
thoroughly addressed many times in the history of philosophy and do not need to be 
rehearsed again at this point. In this section, then, we will merely list some of the more 
prominent arguments as a means of understanding the problems that gave rise to more 
holistic forms of substance dualism.  
CD’s struggles with mental causation are widely known and often constitute the 
primary objection against substance dualism.25 As we will see later in this chapter, 
dualism’s view of mental causation is criticized both for its inability to explain how a 
causal relation could obtain between such disparate substances and for its alleged 
scientific inadequacy.   
 A similar problem is raised by thinkers who contend that CD is unable to 
account for the extensive psychophysical dependence established by the modern 
sciences. Recent developments in modern science clearly establish the pervasive link 
between physical states and mental states like emotions, personality, reasoning, morality, 
religious experience,  and, of course, consciousness itself (cf. Gazzaniga 1992, 1997; 
Damasio 1994, 1999; LeDoux 2002a, 2002b; Ayala 1998; Libet, Freeman, and 
Sutherland 1999; Feinberg 2001). Such evidence leads many to conclude that substance 
dualism, with its premise that body and souls are “two quite disparate things…each 
having almost nothing in common and only the flimsiest connection with the other” (R. 
Taylor 1983:13), is simply untenable (e.g., Jantzen 1984; Pannenberg 1991). After a 
brief survey of several different ways substance dualism has tried to affirm 
psychophysical interdependence (possession, occupancy, use, and causal interaction), 
                                                 
25 Several forms of substance dualism view the mental and physical substances as completely 
independent such that they do not even interact causally—i.e., parallelism, occasionalism, and 
epiphenomenalism (cf. Foster 1989; van Inwagen 2002:170). These forms of dualism, however, have been 
much less popular than the traditional Cartesian approach, which maintains the distinctness of the mental 
and physical substances while still arguing for some level of interaction. 
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Richard Taylor concludes that substance dualism is simply unable to articulate an 
ontology that is adequate to these tight psychophysical links (1983:13-22). Despite 
substance dualism’s appeals to the contrary, critics contend that this approach inevitably 
leads to an undue separation of the two substances and the ultimate disparagement and 
devaluation of the principle of embodiment (e.g., Ryle 1949; Armstrong 1968; Jantzen 
1984; Thatcher 1987). 
Along the same lines, many argue that CD is generally inconsistent with the 
modern understanding of the physical universe. As we saw in the previous chapter, most 
contemporary philosophers hold to some form of physicalism with its commitment to the 
causal and explanatory completeness of the physical universe.26 Since dualism clearly 
stands outside this framework, many conclude that it is scientifically unacceptable.27  
Another problem is raised by those who argue that the Cartesian principle that 
souls are non-spatial and non-extended would make it impossible to individuate one soul 
from another.28 As Shoemaker points out, Cartesian souls cannot be individuated on the 
basis of their non-relational properties since they are particulars rather than universals 
and could, therefore, share their non-relational properties with another particular (1978). 
Moreover, the possibility of individuating them on the basis of their relational properties 
is severely weakened by the fact that they are non-spatial and thus cannot be individuated 
                                                 
26 Thus Atkins affirms that “science is all competent” and that any appeal to an explanation that 
lies ostensibly outside the reach of the physical sciences is unacceptable (1987:13).  
27 Some, like Murphy, offer a softer form of this argument which concedes that science does not 
actually refute substance dualism, but that the physicalist program has, nonetheless, been more successful 
and progressive (2002b). Therefore, according to this argument, dualism should be rejected as an 
unnecessary postulate (e.g., Aune 1985; Crick 1994).  
28 See esp. P. Strawson 1959; for a more recent presentation of the argument see Carruthers 2004. 
Taliaferro offers three responses to this argument (1994:207-209). First, he contends that nonphysical 
entities could be individuated in terms of their qualitative properties. Second, even if such qualitative 
properties are insufficient for individuation, one could still appeal to some metaphysically deep, though 
epistemologically unavailable, brute property that individuates such entities, i.e., haecceity. Finally, even if 
these two arguments fail, it is not clear that the dualist has any more difficulty individuating nonphysical 
entities than the physicalist has individuating physical entities (cf. Swartz 1991; Hoffman and Rosencrantz 
1991). 
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on spatial terms as physical objects typically are. Although the dualist could posit some 
non-spatial relation to individuate souls, it is not clear what such a relation would be.29
Finally, since CD affirms a non-physical substance that is completely unavailable 
to empirical observation, many contend that CD entails that human persons can only be 
confident in their own mentality and must remain completely agnostic with respect to the 
existence of other minds (cf. Hyslop 2005).30 In other words, whether the person across 
the table is actually a zombie with no mental life at all is something we can never know 
confidently. This argument, though, is routinely dismissed by dualists, who argue that 
even though dualism entails that we cannot have indubitable knowledge of other 
people’s mental states, this does not entail that we must, therefore, be skeptical about 
their existence (cf. H. Lewis 1982; Foster 1989; Moreland 2002).31
Needless to say, dualists have not been silent on these matters and have offered a 
number of significant responses to each of these objections (see esp. H. Lewis 1982; W. 
Hart 1988; Swinburne and Padgett 1994; Foster 1991; Taliaferro 1994; Hasker 1999; 
Moreland 1992, 2002; Moreland and Rae 2000). Generally such responses have fallen 
into one of two categories. Some dualists argue that these objections can all be 
overcome. Consequently, they affirm the coherence of a largely Cartesian ontology (e.g., 
H. Lewis 1982; W. Hart 1988; Foster 1991). Others argue that although these objections 
to Cartesian dualism are not decisive, they do suggest some weaknesses in the Cartesian 
model, but ones that can be countered by offering an alternate form of dualism (e.g., 
                                                 
29 Shoemaker actually affirms the conceivability of such “quasi-spatial relationships,” though he 
concedes that the notion is problematic (1978).  
30 A similar argument, the private language argument presented by Wittgenstein, on the other 
hand, asserts that private access to mental states causes a problem for understanding the language that we 
use to refer to them (see Candlish 2004). If such language is based on ostensive reference to completely 
private mental events, then it would seem to be a “private language” understandable only to the user. But, 
according to Wittgenstein, such a language would be incomprehensible to the user herself since the 
meaningfulness of all language is grounded in particular forms of common life (cf. Philosophical 
Investigations §244-271). Given the incredibly complex nature of the debate surrounding the proper 
interpretation and evaluation of Wittgenstein’s arguments and the fact that the private language argument, 
though typically addressed to substance dualists, actually touches on any ontology that affirms private 
access to mental events (including many forms of NRP), we will not address this argument in this study 
(but see Taliaferro’s very helpful account of ostension and private-access [1994]).  
31 Taliaferro thus lays out at least five ways that the problem from other minds can be met 
(1994:154-158). 
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Taliaferro 1994; Hasker 1999; Moreland and Rae 2000). The rest of this paper will focus 
on the second response and will consider whether the more holistic forms of substance 
dualism offered by these thinkers offers a tenable basis upon which to explicate a 
christologically acceptable anthropological ontology.  
 
2.2. Understanding the Holistic Alternative  
Despite these significant criticisms, then, many dualists have responded by 
agreeing with many of the concerns that they raise, but denying that they affect all forms 
of dualism.32 By affirming a holistic understanding of human persons, HD seeks an 
ontology that can maintain the basic commitments of CD (i.e., two ontologically distinct 
substances that are conceivably separable), while still affirming the functional 
interdependence of the entire person. Thus, according to Cooper 
 
Holism…affirms the functional unity of some entity in its totality, 
the integration and interrelation of all the parts in the existence and proper 
operation of the whole. It views an entity as a single primary functional 
system, not as a compound system constructed by linking two or more 
primary functional systems. It recognizes entities as phenomenological 
and existential unities. It implies that the parts do not operate 
independently within the whole, and that they would not necessarily 
continue to have all the same properties and functions if the whole were 
broken up. (2000:45).  
 
On this understanding, rather than viewing body and soul as disparate ontological 
‘pieces’ and identifying the human person with one ‘piece’, HD views the human person 
as one functional whole. Although it is conceivable that the person could survive the 
death of the body, it would be a truncated existence limited by the demise of the 
functional psychophysical union. We will, therefore, understand holistic dualism to refer 
                                                 
 32 Hasker argues that all forms of substance dualism are theoretically consistent with the 
kind of holistic approach argued for by him and others (1999:149). Taliaferro similarly states that his 
version of dualism is entirely consistent with the more traditional forms of substance dualism offered by 
thinkers like Foster or W. Hart; it simply places a greater emphasis on a “unified understanding” of the 
person (1994:115-116).Whether this is actually the case, lies outside the scope of this chapter.  
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to any ontology that affirms the basic commitments of Cartesian dualism while arguing 
for a deeper and more integrated body/soul relationship.  
 
2.2.1. Different Brands of Holistic Dualism 
CARTESIAN HOLISM. Holistic dualists typically seek to unpack this 
psychophysical unity in one of three ways. Some simply retain the Cartesian system but 
place a greater emphasis on psychophysical interdependence. This would seem to be the 
best way to understand Taliaferro’s ‘integrative dualism’ (1994, 1995; cf. Cooper 2000; 
Goetz 2005). Taliaferro describes his position as an attempt “to articulate how a dualist 
may view the person and body as profoundly unified, while still remaining 
metaphysically distinct” (1994:115).33 Although he thinks that the picture of “an 
excessively fragmented version of dualism” has been perpetuated primarily by dualism’s 
critics, he nonetheless maintains that traditional dualism has tended toward an 
unfortunate overemphasis on the disparity between the two substances (ibid., 115-116). 
According to this view, substance dualism is entirely compatible with the idea that 
persons and bodies “exist in a profoundly integral union” and, therefore, that they can be 
treated “as a single unit in ethical, social, political, and aesthetic contexts, as well as most 
scientific ones” (ibid., 16).34 He even goes so far as to state “the body and person form a 
substantial unity” (ibid., 120).  
EMERGENT DUALISM. Another approach that has recently received significant 
attention is the idea that minds and bodies are integrally related because minds are 
emergent entities—i.e., mental substances emerge from properly configured physical 
systems (cf. Popper 1977, 1994; Swinburne 1984; Hasker 1999, 2001, 2005; Zimmerman 
2004).35 Thus, Hasker argues that we should view the human mind as something that is 
                                                 
33 Taliaferro is, therefore, rightly critical of philosophers like Dennett and Ryle who lampoon 
substance dualism as entailing a ghostly self floating around the body (1994:115).  
34 The mere fact that ontological separation exists as a possibility under the extreme condition of 
physical death, according to Taliaferro, does not preclude the reality of functional unity (1994:116).  
35 Like other forms of dualism, though, emergent dualism has come under criticism for being 
unable to explain this emergent relationship. This is because it seems to leave us with the conclusion that 
either the physical substrate possesses the properties and capacities of the emergent substance, at least in a 
protoemergent state, or that the properties and capacities of the emergent substance are completely 
unrelated to its substrate. If the former, we seem to be dealing with some form of proto-panpsychism 
(Hasker suggests this as the primary cost of an emergent dualism [1999:194]); if the latter, the relationship 
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“produced by the human brain and is not a separate element ‘added to’ the brain from 
outside” (1999:189). Such properties are emergent in that  
 
they manifest themselves when the appropriate material 
constituents are placed in special, highly complex relationships, but these 
properties are not observable in simpler configurations nor are they 
derivable from the laws which describe the properties of matter as it 
behaves in these simpler configurations. (Hasker 1999:189-190).  
 
While we saw in the previous chapter that there is a form of emergentism that is 
broadly compatible with physicalist commitments, emergent dualism transcends this 
framework by arguing that what emerges from the physical substrate are not merely 
emergent properties, but emergent substances.36 Thus, although emergent dualists argue 
for on ontologically deep relation between the mental and physical substances, once the 
mental substance emerges, it is a distinct substance that is at least conceivably divisible 
from its physical counterpart (see Hasker 1999).37  
THOMISTIC DUALISM. Finally, a renewed interest in Aristotelian and Thomistic 
ontologies has generated a number of proposals for understanding substance dualism in 
terms of the soul as the form of the body (Braine 1992; Stump 1995; Moreland and Rae 
2000; Leftow 2001). We will not be concerned in this chapter with the ontologies of 
Aristotle or Aquinas themselves, and we certainly will not attempt to resolve the long-
standing disagreement about whether they are properly understood as physicalists or 
dualists.38 Rather, we will direct our attention to the way in which their philosophy has 
been used recently to construct a form of HD.  
                                                                                                                                                
is brute and inexplicable (Lockwood 2003). Thus, Clayton (2005) notes that one of the primary concerns 
about emergence is that it is often portrayed as a purely negative ontological thesis with few positive 
contributions to make to the explanatory task. While neither of these constitutes an insurmountable 
objection to emergent dualism, they certainly raise some concerns.  
36 Emergent dualists eschew limiting emergence to emergent properties for largely the same 
reasons that they reject physicalism as a whole, i.e., they do not believe that any form of physicalistic 
monism is adequate for explaining the data provided by humanity’s mental life (cf. Hasker 1999).  
37 Hasker appeals to the analogy of a magnetic field to illustrate this (1999; 2005).  
38 With respect to Aristotle, van der Eijk points out that scholarly consensus on his view of the 
soul has “proved impossible” to this point and that this may well stem both from Aristotle’s varied 
philosophical background and from tensions within his philosophy (2000). Similarly, Aquinas’ 
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According to Aquinas, as is widely known, the soul is the form of the body.39 
Thus, for thomistic ontologies, all material objects comprise a material composite (i.e., 
the matter from which the person derives) and a substantial form, which determines the 
essential nature of the object.40 For the human person, then, the soul is “the substantial 
form…in virtue of which the matter informed by it…constitutes a living human body” 
(Stump 1995:508).41 Thomists thus view the soul as “an individuated essence that makes 
the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies and 
grounds the biological functions of its body” (Moreland and Rae 2000:202).42 
Additionally, thomists generally agree that it is (at least) conceivable that the soul could 
survive the death of the body, though its existence would be sharply limited (see Stump 
1995; Leftow 2001).  
Although some might prefer to view this more thomistic approach as a non-
dualistic understanding of the human person, it fits the general parameters for HD that 
we have established here—i.e., they affirm two ontologically fundamental aspects in the 
human person that are conceivably divisible such that the soul could continue to exist 
                                                                                                                                                
understanding of human ontology has generated significant debate, with some thinkers concluding that his 
view is simply incoherent (e.g., Hasker 1999, 2005).  
39 Summa Theologica Ia.76.1.  
40 There is some ambiguity in the thomistic approach regarding the nature of the soul as an 
individuating principle. From one perspective it seems that the soul is an abstract universal (Leftow seems 
more inclined in this direction [2001]). Since the soul is that which determines the nature of an object, it 
seems to be something shared by all members of a species. But, thomists generally regard the soul as a 
particular that serves to individuate the human person (Stump 1995; Moreland and Rae 2000).  
41 It is important, then, not to confuse form with shape. The form is that which determines the 
essential nature of the entity, which certainly has a bearing on its shape, while the shape is a function of its 
material elements (Stump 1995).  
42 There seems to be some ambiguity regarding how the soul originates. Several thomists argue 
that forms can be understood as “configurational states” that emerge from material entities (e.g., Stump 
1995; Leftow 2001). On this view, the material from which human persons are formed, contain the 
potentiality for a soul-form that emerges when they enter into the proper configurational state. This seems 
to conflict, though, with the more traditional view that souls are specially created by God and infused into 
the material substrate (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia.90.2; cf. Moreland and Rae 2000). Indeed, in a 
manner very similar to Swinburne, Stump seems to affirm that souls are both emergent configurational 
states and that they are specially created by God, without providing any real explanation of how these fit 
together (1995). 
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after physical death, albeit in a limited fashion. Indeed Moreland and Rae explicitly 
affirm the dualistic implications of the thomistic approach (2000).  
 
2.2.2. Not Your Traditional Substance Dualism 
These three forms of HD each represent different ways of affirming the basic 
tenets of CD, while avoiding some of its more negative implications. Of course, since all 
forms of HD are still varieties of substance dualism, they all maintain that body and soul 
are ontologically distinct and at least conceivably separable. Additionally, all forms of 
HD continue to view the soul as ontologically simple and as being that which explains 
the rational capacities (among other things) of the human person.  
There are some marked differences on the other points, however. Thus, Cartesian 
dualism maintains CD’s view that the soul is primitive while emergent dualists and most 
thomistic dualists depict the soul as at least somewhat derivative (though cf. Moreland 
and Rae 2000). Similarly, Cartesian dualists are more inclined to retain CD’s view of the 
person as identical with the soul, while the other two tend to assert that the person is a 
composite entity (though again see Moreland and Rae 2000).  
The different forms of HD, though, are united in affirming several key 
differences with the more traditional Cartesian view. First, all three affirm that the soul 
has a spatial locus.43 Although the various proposals differ with respect to the precise 
nature of this spatiality, they all agree that the body provides a spatial locus for the soul 
in a way that is markedly lacking in CD.44 Second, holists are united in affirming that, 
while the soul accounts for the rational capacities of the person, it must be expanded to 
account for emotional, phenomenal, and sub-conscious factors as well (see especially 
Taliaferro 1994). Holists are, therefore, careful to present a much broader picture of the 
soul than is typically associated with CD. And, finally, as we will discuss later, holists 
are united in affirming that the soul is not naturally immortal.  
These three different kinds of holistic dualism go a long way toward easing some 
of the concerns expressed with respect to substance dualism. All three approaches offer a 
                                                 
43 This means that HD is more resistant than CD to the problem of individuation (i.e., that souls 
cannot be individuated because they are non-spatial).  
44 This spatiality is easier to affirm for emergent and thomistic dualists with their emphasis on the 
soul as deriving from a particular physical system. Although Cartesian holists tend to affirm that the soul 
has a unique spatial relation to its body, it is harder to understand why this is the case.  
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slightly different understanding of the mind or soul and its relationship to the body, but 
each contends that its version of dualism maintains their integral union while still 
affirming their ontological distinctiveness. Thinkers from each camp thus argue that 
some form of HD is superior to CD in its ability to handle the standard criticisms (Stump 
1995:522-523; Hasker 1999:317; Moreland and Rae 2000:200-201). While we cannot 
consider this claim in depth, we will look in the following section at the extent to which 
HD presents an anthropological ontology that is adequate to Barth’s christological 
criteria.  
 
3. Christology and Coherence: The Viability of Holistic Forms of Dualism 
We saw in the previous chapter how the ontological criteria of a christological 
anthropology could be used to evaluate the adequacy of mind/body theories that rely on 
some from of nonreductive physicalism. In this section, we will apply the same 
methodology to determine the viability of HD for developing an anthropological 
ontology that can operate effectively within this christological framework.  
For the purposes of this chapter, we shall focus our discussion on the three 
ontological criteria that seem most vulnerable on a dualist account of the human person: 
mental causation, embodiment, and contingent personhood. This is not to say that HD is 
not susceptible to critiques with respect to the other criteria, but that these are the ones 
most commonly noted. 
 
3.1. Making Things Happen: The Problem of Mental Causation (Again) 
Since psychophysical causal interaction is part of the very definition of the type 
of dualism that we are considering in this chapter, questions related to the coherence of 
its account of mental causation will be critical for determining its overall adequacy. As 
we noted earlier, however, the problem of providing an adequate account of the causal 
relationship between the mental and the physical has long plagued Cartesian dualism. 
Many philosophers have thus concluded that, despite dualism’s long efforts to overcome 
the problem, the “scandal of Cartesian Interactionism” (B. Williams 1978:287; cf. 
Richardson 1982) remains a decisive objection (e.g., Armstrong 1968; Levin 1979; 
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Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996; Kim 2001, 2004; Murphy 2002a).45 Thus Murphy 
states, “the failure of three hundred years of attempts to solve the problem of mind-body 
interaction gives good grounds for saying that the problem is essentially insoluble” 
(2002b:203).46
We cannot possibly hope to resolve such a long-standing debate in this short 
section. Instead, we will survey the arguments and relevant responses to evaluate the 
resources that HD has for addressing this problem.  
 
3.1.1. The Dissimilarity & Spatiality Problems 
Among the oldest and most frequently cited objections to dualist causation, is the 
claim that the mental and physical substances, according to dualism, are simply so 
different from one another as to disallow any possibility of causal interaction. 
Richardson calls this “the problem of heterogeneity” (1982). In her letter to Descartes, 
Princess Elizabeth thus noted that causation in the physical realm seems necessarily to 
involve properties like motion, spatiality, and extension.47 And, yet, these are the very 
properties that are excluded by CD.48 Similarly, Richard Taylor argues: 
 
However natural it may seem to conceive a person in such terms, 
as a dual complex of two wholly disparate things, body and mind, it is 
nonetheless an impossible conception, on the simplest metaphysical 
grounds. For on this view, the body and the mind are wholly disparate 
things, so that any bodily change wrought by the mind or by some 
                                                 
45 Indeed, this objection to substance dualism has been so well established in the minds of many 
philosophers that Foster complains, “many philosophers regard the problem as self-evident and not calling 
for further elucidation: they take it as just obvious that there is something deeply puzzling, perhaps even 
incoherent” in the dualism account of causation” (1991:159).  
46 One common response offered by dualists to physicalist criticisms of its account of 
psychophysical causation is to contend that psychophysical causation is a basic datum of human 
experience that cannot be simply set aside (Swinburne 1984; Foster 1991; Taliafferro 1994). As we saw in 
the last chapter, though, physicalist in no way exclude or ignore this basic datum but take it as an important 
aspect of any adequate ontology.   
47  Cited in Himma 2005. 
48 We will deal with a specific form of this objection based on the non-spatial nature of the soul in 
CD a little later when we discuss the causal pairing problem.  
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nonphysical occurrence transpiring therein is a change that lies quite 
outside the realm of physical law. This means that human behavior is 
veritably miraculous. (1983:18) 
 
It is simply inconceivable, according to Taylor, that an idea can cause a physical 
event to occur: “Try, I say, to form a conception of this, and then confess that, as soon as 
the smallest attempt at any description is made, the description becomes unintelligible 
and the conception an impossible one” (ibid., 21).49  
Holistic dualists are at one with traditional Cartesian dualists, though, in arguing 
that this particular objection is clearly inadequate for refuting dualism. Descartes 
responded to this objection in two ways (Richardson 1982). First, Descartes argued that 
this objection makes an illegitimate comparison between mental and physical causation. 
Since mental substances are significantly different from their physical counterparts, there 
is simply no reason to assume that mental causation will be comparable to physical 
causation. Descartes’ second response, was to argue that the psychophysical causal 
relationship was utterly mysterious and that its ultimate resolution lay beyond our ability 
to achieve satisfactorily.  
These two responses continue to characterize large strands of dualist philosophy. 
Thus, many dualists similarly contend that mental causation is distinct from physical 
causation and that physicalist arguments against mental causation are, therefore, invalid 
(e.g., Richardson 1982).50 Indeed, Hasker quips, “The dualist besieged by arguments of 
this sort would do well to repeat to herself, from time to time, ‘Psychophysical causation 
is not physical causation” (1999:151). Similarly, dualists often follow Descartes is 
claiming the essentially mysterious nature of psychophysical causation (e.g., H. Lewis 
                                                 
49 Of course, part of the reason that such a concept is unintelligible is because it completely 
ignores the dualist concept of mental substances as ontologically real entities with causal powers, rather 
than merely abstract ideas.  
 50 Indeed, Foster argues that the influence of physicalist models of causation is the very 
root of the problem: “One reason why we may think that there is an a priori problem for the dualist is that 
our conception of the nature of causation tends to be strongly conditioned by the ways in which causality 
operates in the physical realm” (1991:159). Similarly, Lowe contends that dualists should jettison “the 
Cartesian notion that causation is mechanical and must involve setting bodies in motion” and stop thinking 
that minds must influence physical events “by (directly) affecting the state of motion of physical particles” 
(1992:271).  
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1982; Goetz 2005), often arguing that the psychophysical relation is a fundamental (i.e., 
brute) relation that is simply inexplicable on any other terms (e.g., Foster 1991:160).51
Such responses, though, have not tended to impress physicalist philosophers. As 
Richardson notes, these arguments “seem, jointly, to be little more than an insistence that 
the interaction of mind and body be accepted, together with the claim that such 
interaction is inexplicable” (1982:21). As we saw in the previous chapter, though, and as 
dualists frequently point out, the physicalist account of causation runs into an equal 
number of problems (see esp. Himma 2005). Thus, dualists often appeal to Hume’s 
account of causation to point out that all causal relationships are inherently opaque and 
that physicalist causation is no less fundamentally mysterious than mental causation (H. 
Lewis 1982; Swinburne 1984; Foster 1991; E. Lowe 1992, 2000; Hasker 1999). Indeed, 
Kim points out the irony that  
 
abandoning the substantival dualism of Descartes doesn’t get us 
out of the woods as far as mental causation is concerned. Indeed one 
notable development  in the recent philosophy of mind is the return of the 
problem of mental causation as a serious challenge to mainstream 
physicalism, a phenomenon that would have amused Descartes.” 
(1998b:39) 
 
Another form of the dissimilarity problem that deserves mention is the contention 
that spatial relations are necessary for causation in the physical world (cf. E. Lowe 
1992).  Since CD denies that the body is spatial, according to this objection, it cannot 
enter into causal relations with physical substances. Of course, this objection can also be 
responded to as before by arguing that mental and physical causation are different.52 
Additionally, since most forms of holistic dualism posit that the soul is spatially located, 
they do not have a problem at this point (Goetz 1994, 2005; cf. Quinn 1997). 
                                                 
51 For Taliaferro, the mind/body relationship cannot even be understood in terms of some form of 
necessary correlation (1994:128). 
52 Some have argued that modern science makes the idea of “causation at a distance” less 
problematic (e.g., H. Lewis 1973; Heil 2004b:815). The difficulty with this argument, however, is the idea 
of action across a distance presumes the very kind of spatial location that is precluded on the Cartesian 
account of the soul.  
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Finally, the argument from dissimilarity fails to provide any traction on the 
problem because of its failure to provide any defense for its basic intuition. As Kim 
points out, 
 
But as an argument this is incomplete and unsatisfying. As it 
stands, it is not much of an argument—it hardly gets started; rather, it 
only expresses a vague dissatisfaction of the sort that ought to prompt us 
to look for a real argument. Why is it incoherent to think that there can be 
causal relations between ‘diverse substances’? (2001:32).  
 
The other arguments that we will consider, then, seek to provide exactly such an 
explanation for why dualistic causation is either incoherent or, at least, improbable.  
 
3.1.2. The Causal Pairing Problem 
One argument that has recently received significant attention is the contention 
that dualistic causation is incoherent because it cannot provide any explanation for the 
causal relation that obtains between particular souls and the relevant bodies (cf. esp. 
Foster 1968, 1989, 1991; Kim 2001). Suppose that we have a situation in which two 
souls, s1 and s2, interact causally with two bodies, b1 and b2. What is the precise 
relationship which establishes that s1 causally interacts with b1 and not b2? Since causal 
relations are typically understood in terms of the nomological relation of noncausal 
properties (cf. Foster 1991),53 the causal pairing argument is a call for dualists to provide 
just such an account.  
As Foster points out, though, such an account is very difficult to provide on 
dualist terms (1989). Causal laws based on mere temporal correlation are of no use since 
they would not rule out the possibility of an effect on b2 that is temporally correlated with 
the action of s1. Given the non-spatial soul of CD, Foster argues, the dualist is also 
prevented from relying on the spatial relationships utilized to explain physical causal 
                                                 
53 On this understanding of causation, as Foster describes it, “causal relationships between events 
are always constituted by certain non-causal properties of the situation, together with the relevant covering 
laws” (1991:167).  
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pairing.54 The causal pairing argument, therefore, suggests that the dualist has no way of 
accounting for the unique causal relation between a soul and its body.  
Dualists might try to counter this objection, as before, by arguing that the causal 
relation is brute (cf. Richardson 1982; Foster 1989, 1991; Goetz 1994). Theists could 
carry the argument further by simply maintaining that God establishes the proper causal 
relations when a soul comes into being and that no further explanation is necessary. Kim 
rightly argues, however, that this misses the point of the argument (2001). The causal 
pairing argument does not call on dualists to provide an explanation of how the causal 
relation comes into being but what the causal relation is. In other words, regardless of 
how it came into being there must be some causal relation R between a soul and its body. 
The causal pairing argument is a call for dualists to explain what R is.  
Some dualists contend that we should simply reject the premises upon which this 
argument is based. After a rather thorough discussion of the problem—indeed, he seems 
to have introduced the problem (cf. Foster 1968)—Foster contends dualists should either 
reject the demand for a nomological account of causal pairings, or they should reject the 
demand for general covering laws and rely instead on particular laws limited to 
particular body/soul relations (1989, 1991). Other dualists argue that the whole causal 
framework built around ‘event causation’ needs to be discarded in favor of a more 
substantial view of causation (e.g., Goetz 1994; Moreland and Rae 2000).  
The holistic dualist, however, does not need to reconstruct a theory of causality in 
this way. Causal pairing only appears to be a problem for dualists because of the 
Cartesian understanding of souls as non-spatial and non-extended. Since causal pairing 
in a physical system is normally established on the basis of spatial relations, the lack of 
such relations is what makes it difficult for the dualist to handle the problem.55 Thus, the 
causal pairing problem is a problem for dualists only if dualism entails that “we do not 
                                                 
54 The causal pairing argument should, therefore, not be confused with a naïve appeal to physical 
‘connection’ as an explanation of causation, an argument that is easily defeated by dualists. Rather, the 
causal pairing argument simply calls for an explanation of the causal relation and argues that any coherent 
explanation will entail an appeal to spatial relations of some kind. Shoemaker’s argument that the dualist 
can simply appeal to “quasi-spatial” relations to establish causal relations is conceivable, but, as he points 
out, seems less probable than the spatial account (1978).   
55 Kim argues that the causal pairing problem afflicts even soul-to-soul causation on the dualist 
account (2001). That is, on the Cartesian account of souls, there does not seem to be any way of 
establishing causal relations between souls that would make soul-to-soul causal interaction coherent. 
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have the slightest hint of any relation holding” between souls and bodies (Hoffman and 
Rosencrantz 1997:197). But, HD affirms that the soul has precisely such a spatio-causal 
relation to a particular body and, therefore, seems to escape the force of the objection 
(Zimmerman 2004:319).56 Even Cartesian Holism, affirms that the soul has such a 
spatial locus, even if it fails to provide any metaphysically deep explanation for this 
relation (cf. Goetz 1994, 2005; Taliaferro 1994).  
 
3.1.3. The ‘Principles of Science’ Problem 
 The objections most commonly raised to dualist interactionism are those 
stemming from the physicalist framework that predominates among contemporary 
philosophers. As E. J. Lowe notes, “The more serious area of concern is created by the 
suspicion that dualist views of the mind-body relation...are somehow at odds with the 
findings of modern physical science: not only physiology and neurology, but also, more 
fundamentally, physics itself” (1992:263). Along these lines, we can identify objections 
stemming from at least three different principles: causal completeness, explanatory 
exclusion, and conservation of energy.  
The first two objections (causal completeness and explanatory exclusion) should 
already be familiar to us from the previous chapter and we will not rehearse those 
arguments again. Suffice it to say that these arguments are even more pointed when 
directed at dualist philosophers, many of whom explicitly reject both principles (e.g., 
Popper and Eccles 1977; Foster 1991; Hodgson 1991; Hasker 1999). Dualists thus 
contend that although CCP and explanatory exclusion may be valid methodological 
commitments for the physical sciences, we overstep our bounds when we try to make 
them metaphysical theses (Goetz 2005).  
In addition to simply setting aside CCP as a metaphysical thesis, dualists offer a 
number of other responses. Probably the most common is to contend that the objection 
begs the question (e.g., E. Lowe 1993; Hasker 1999; Moreland 2002). On this argument, 
the physicalist presumption that physical events can only be caused by and explained in 
                                                 
56 Goetz disagrees with this causal framework entirely, arguing that causal relations are 
established on the basis of a basic causal ontology, rather than spatial relations (1994). Regardless of 
whether this argument is successful, though, it seems that causal pairing is not as significant a problem for 
HD as for CD.  
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terms of other physical events is precisely what dualism denies. To criticize dualism for 
failing to maintain these principles, then, simply begs the question.  
Some have argued in rejoinder, however, that this counter-argument misses the 
point of the physicalist objection (e.g., Larmer 1986:280-281). Physicalists do not merely 
criticize dualists for failing to maintain the physicalist framework, but primarily for 
positing a theory than has little or no support from the physical sciences. Thus, as Lowe 
rightly points out, “The claim that only the physical can have causal powers—or, at least 
that only the physical can causally affect the physical—may be seen by many not just as 
some question-begging antidualist prejudice, but as a cornerstone of modern physical 
science” (1992:265; cf. Kim 2004). Given science’s superior explanatory track record, 
physicalists argue, we should assume a scientific framework unless and until it is proven 
wrong.  
A dualist might fairly ask, however, what might qualify as proof in this 
argument? It seems likely that the only thing such a physicalist would count a ‘proof’ 
would be those things that qualify as evidence in a physicalist framework. But this would 
seem to predetermine the outcome. Thus, many holistic dualists argue that the physical 
sciences themselves are simply inadequate for addressing the fundamental issues 
involved in this debate (e.g., Moreland and Rae 2000; Swinburne 2003). This does not 
mean that holistic dualists reject science itself; indeed, many of them rely heavily on the 
sciences for informing their understanding of how the psychophysical relationship works 
(e.g., Eccles 1977, 1979; Taliaferro 1994; E. Lowe 2004). But, unlike thinkers who 
affirm that science is “all-competent” (Atkins 1987:13), holistic dualists contend that 
science is inherently limited in its ability to speak to the existence and nature of the soul.  
A second response, however, is to note that the physicalist solution is itself 
untenable. As we saw in the previous chapter, both reductive and nonreductive forms of 
physicalism struggle to explain mental causation in a way that maintains the causal 
significance of the mental while avoiding the problems of physicalistic determinism. 
Consequently, some dualists simply note that given a choice between the two, the dualist 
framework is superior in terms of its ability to affirm the causal efficacy of the mental 
and the free agency of the human person (e.g., E. Lowe 1992; Hasker 1999; Zimmerman 
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2004). As we have seen though, whether the physicalist account of mental causation is as 
untenable as this response contends remains an open question.57  
Another objection commonly encountered in the literature is that dualistic 
psychophysical causation is scientifically untenable because it would violate the 
Principle of the Conservation of Energy (COE).58 In other words, dualist interaction 
entails that mental substances are able to cause changes in physical systems. But, any 
such change seems to entail a change in the total energy of the physical system, thus 
violating COE. As Larmer notes, however, “To many thinkers, this seems too high a 
price to pay, since to deny the Principle of the Conservation of Energy is to deny one of 
the most fundamental scientific laws” (1986:277).   
Popper argues that COE should be understood as a statistical principle and 
suggests that mental causation would not constitute a violation of COE so long as mental 
acts only involved small amounts of energy. Larmer rightly points out, however, that 
even if individual mental acts only involve small amounts of energy, the tremendous 
number of mental acts occurring on a regular basis would certainly constitute a 
statistically significant contribution to the overall state of the system (ibid.).  
Larmer argues instead that science only entails a weak form of COE, one that 
holds only for closed systems (ibid.; cf. Averill 1981). Psychophysical causation, 
therefore, does not violate COE since mental substances lie outside the physical system. 
While Larmer is certainly correct that psychophysical causation would not violate a weak 
form of COE, he does not consider the physicalist’s most likely rejoinder—i.e., that (1) 
the lack of evidence for any mental substances outside the physical system and (2) the 
weight of evidence that the total state of energy of the physical system does not change 
both support the conclusion that a strong form of COE is justified even if not logically 
required.  
                                                 
57 Two other responses that have been offered by dualists, the possibility of pervasive causal 
overdetermination (e.g., Mills 1996) and the contention that theistic causation renders these objections 
untenable (e.g., Zimmerman 2004; Goetz 2005), were mentioned in the previous chapter and, therefore, 
will not be pursued here. 
58 Apparently this objection was first formulated by Leibniz (Averill 1981). Versions of the 
argument can also be found in Armstrong 1968 and Dennett 1983.  
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It would seem, then, that the dualist’s best response to this objection is to argue 
again that psychophysical causation is simply different than physical causation.59 In 
other words, since mental causation differs from physical causation, there is no reason to 
suppose that mental causation requires the transfer of energy. Even though physical-to-
physical causation always requires the transfer of energy, it is not necessary to conclude 
the same for mental-to-mental or mental-to-physical causation. While the physicalist will 
certainly not be convinced by this argument, it is logically consistent with the dualist’s 
own framework.  
The basic dualist rejoinder to objections based on the ‘principles of science’ to its 
understanding of mental causation, then, comprises the claim that psychophysical 
causation is of an inherently different kind than physical causation. Consequently, 
psychophysical causation cannot be fairly criticized on the basis of physicalist criticisms 
stemming from causal completeness, explanatory exclusion, and the conservation of 
energy, since those principles simply do not apply outside the physical realm. 
 
3.1.4. The Explanatory Problem 
One final argument that we should consider is the contention that as long as 
substance dualism is unable to provide an explanation of psychophysical causation it 
should be rejected. “To call one’s dualism ‘integrative’ does not help us much,” 
according to Schouten, “as long as we are kept in the dark as to how this (causal) 
bridging of the corporeal and mental realms takes place” (2001:694). In other words, if 
the mind is able to interact causally with the body and, therefore, cause physical changes 
in the body, we should be able to provide some theory as to how and where this causal 
transaction takes place. Thus, Armstrong argues forcefully that the dualist needs to be 
able to provide some empirically verifiable theory about the locus of causal interaction 
                                                 
59 Larmer also notes that some have suggested that psychophysical causation could be made 
consistent with COE if one posited that any change in energy caused by a mental action would be balanced 
by a corresponding change elsewhere in the system (1986). While this is logically conceivable, Larmer 
rightly questions its plausibility. Additionally, some have argued that quantum science provides support for 
the idea that physical systems are not “hermetically sealed off from ‘outside’ forces” (Taliaferro 
1994:221). Whether such appeals to quantum mechanics can provide the necessary support for dualist 
causation, though, would require a far more extensive understanding and analysis of quantum theory than 
is possible in this chapter and, indeed, than is normally offered by dualists appealing to it (though cf. 
Penrose 1989).  
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(1999). This is, of course, the problem that Descartes was attempting to address with his 
infamous appeal to the pineal gland as the locus of psychophysical interaction (cf. 
Treatise of Man and The Passions of the Soul).   
Dualists have offered two responses to this argument.60 First, one could accept 
the challenge and attempt to provide a specific and testable theory of causal interaction. 
The most famous such attempt was put forward by the neuroscientist Sir John Eccles 
(see esp. Eccles and Popper 1977; Eccles 1979). Eccles’ posited that psychophysical 
interaction could be understood in terms of certain areas of the brain that “potentially are 
capable of being in direct liaison with the self-conscious mind” (1977:358). This “liaison 
brain” is a broadly distributed physical system, only a small portion of which is ever 
actually interacting with the mind at a given moment in time. The self-conscious mind 
affects psychophysical interaction by scanning the relevant modules of the brain (i.e., the 
liaison brain) and selectively modifying “the dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of the 
neuronal events” (1979:227).61 Since this interaction requires very little energy and is 
broadly distributed throughout the brain, it will be difficult to detect.62 Nonetheless, 
Eccles views his theory as “a kind of research programme” that raises many questions 
which demand “detailed theories” (1977:37). Indeed, much of Eccles work involves a 
pursuit of just such a scientific analysis.  
Evaluating the specifics of Eccles’ proposal would take us too far from our task. 
It does seem significant, however, that his research program has failed to generate any 
significant following among neuroscientists in general. While his approach exemplifies 
what a dualist attempt to explicate the locus of psychophysical interaction might look 
like, it does not seem to have provided an adequate basis upon which to develop such an 
explanation.63  
                                                 
60 Thomistic dualism can actually be read in two different ways on the question of causal 
transaction. Some thomistic dualists argue for such tight psychophysical relation within the hylomorphic 
system as to disallow any talk of psychophysical “interaction” (Stump 1995; cf. Machuga 2002). If 
thomistic hylomorphism is understood in this way, however, it results in an ontology that is little different 
from the forms of NRP considered in the previous chapter.  
61 That this account requires both “reading” and “modifying” the physical brain is what prevents 
Eccles’ account from being a form of psychophysical parallelism (Eccles 1979:229).  
62 Lowe also argues that mental causation should be understood in terms of a broadly distributed 
engagement with the mind rather than as a direct cause of a specific neuronal event (1992).  
 63 If nothing else, Eccles’ work demonstrates that those who argue, like Richard Taylor, 
that any attempt to spell out in detail a scientific account of dualist causation will quickly demonstrate 
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A second response, however, simply dismisses the demand for a scientific theory. 
Thus, Goetz argues, “Why, however, think that the dualists needs at all, let alone 
urgently needs, an empirically testable scientific theory about the location of causal 
interaction between a soul and its body?” (2005:53). According to Goetz, the reason 
dualists do not need such an account is because belief in dualism is not grounded on 
empirical arguments of this sort. On the contrary, a belief in dualism is grounded in the 
sorts of intuitively available evidence that we discussed at the beginning of the chapter. 
While the dualist may choose to posit some theory regarding the locus of causal 
interaction, such a theory is not necessary, and the refutation of any particular theory 
would not constitute a decisive refutation of dualism itself (ibid.). Furthermore, it is not 
clear what sort of ‘proof’ the physicalist would accept since, by definition, the physicalist 
is only willing to allow physical causes for physical events.  
 
3.1.5. Mind and Matter: Can Holistic Dualism Cross the Cartesian Divide? 
So, what can we say about the adequacy of HD’s account of mental causation. 
First, substance dualists in general seem justified in rejecting the arguments from 
dissimilarity, causal completeness, and explanatory exclusion. Since their reasons for 
rejecting these arguments are based on a fundamentally different way of viewing the 
world, they are unlikely to convince any physicalists by their arguments, but they are, 
nonetheless, justified in contending that these arguments are inadequate for establishing 
the falsity of dualism. Additionally, given that the soul has a spatial locus in HD, it is 
better positioned than more traditional forms of dualism for handling many of these 
criticisms.64
It would seem that the greatest weakness of all dualistic accounts of causation is 
the pervasive negativity of its arguments. At several points, the dualist position boils 
down to an affirmation that physicalist arguments do not succeed. While this is helpful, 
the dearth of positive dualist arguments regarding the nature of psychophysical causation 
                                                                                                                                                
itself to be unintelligible (1983:22). Surely, even if Eccles’ account was ultimately unsuccessful, there is 
nothing unintelligible about his presentation.  
64 It may be, however, that holistic dualists should be more attentive to concerns raised by Alan 
Sussman (1981) about attributing properties typically associated with material things to nonmaterial 
entities. Although such a move increases the explanatory power of dualistic systems, it runs the risk of 
losing the distinctness of the mental altogether.  
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or the empirical basis of dualist interaction is noticeable (Langsam 2001). All too often, 
one finds the dualist appealing to “mystery” to explain the mind-body relation (e.g., H. 
Lewis 1973:118; Swinburne 1984:195; Hasker 1999:200). Given the significant 
difficulties encountered by physicalists in providing their own account of the 
psychophysical relation, it is difficult to fault dualists overly much on this point. Indeed, 
from one perspective the HD seems to be on much better footing that NRP at this point 
since it is less susceptible to charges that its account of mental causation is simply 
incoherent within its metaphysical system. Nonetheless, even if the dualist rejects the 
demand for an empirically verifiable theory of the mind-body relation, it would seem 
reasonable to ask for more work to be done to establish a positive account of the relation 
that would have some bearing on the data produced by the empirical sciences.   
 
3.2. Chunks of Matter: The Problem of Personal Embodiment 
As we discussed in chapter four, Barth’s christological ontology maintains the 
integral union of body and soul.  
 
Far from existing as the union of two parts or two ‘substances’, He 
is one whole man, embodied soul and besouled body: the one in the other 
and never merely beside it; the one never without the other but only with 
it, and in it present, active and significant; the one with all its attributes 
always to be taken as seriously as the other. (p. 327)  
 
Consequently, one of his greatest concerns about substance dualism is that it 
views body and soul as only tentatively united, even though it often tries to affirm the 
essential unity of the person (p. 380-381). 
Some modern dualists continue to talk about the body/soul relation in ways that 
generate such criticisms. Thus, Hywel Lewis compares the person’s relation to his body 
with his relation to a mechanical object like a car (1978:119). Similarly, Swinburne can 
speak of the body as “a chunk of matter” through which a person acts in the world 
(1984:146). These ways of speaking suggest to some that substance dualism necessarily 
involves a failure to appreciate the psychophysical intimacy that pervades human 
experience. As a result, a whole host of problems and objections has been raised against 
substance dualism. The following concerns, therefore, represent only a sampling of those 
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objections, but they should, nonetheless, serve to raise the kinds of problems the dualist 
must face and the answers they have offered.  
 
3.2.1. The Psychophysical Interdependence Problem 
First, how does a dualist account for the integral relation between physical states 
and such fundamental mental states as consciousness and rationality? According to 
Jeeves,  
 
At every level of neuroscience research, from single cells and their 
interactions to the functioning of whole integrated systems 
coordinating different centers of brain activity, one message is clear. 
There is interdependence between what is happening at the physical 
level of brain processes and at the levels of cognition and behavior. 
On that almost everyone today agrees. (2004b:173) 
 
As Hasker points out, however, CD seems to provide no explanation for this 
psychophysical interdependence: 
 
On the dualistic view, why should consciousness itself be 
interrupted by drugs, or a blow on the head, or the need for sleep? And 
why should reasoning, generally thought of as the distinctive activity of 
the conscious mind, be interrupted by such physical disturbances? The 
natural conclusion from Cartesian dualism would seem to be that 
consciousness should continue unabated during such times - deprived, to 
be sure, of sensory input and the capacity for motor action....by making 
the mind essentially independent of the brain rather than dependent on it, 
Cartesianism deprives itself of a ready explanation for these kinds of 
dependence that we actually find. (1999:154) 
 
 
Despite this apparent weakness, however, substance dualists have long contended 
that a person’s mental life was dependent on bodily operations (e.g., W. Hart 1988; 
Foster 1991:263). Indeed, as Taliaferro points out, “the vulnerability of consciousness to 
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material processes…is precisely what many dualists expect. Obviously, our whole 
mental life is causally bound up with the well-being of our material constitution. But this 
does not mean our mental life is itself material” (1994:75). Similarly, Swinburne affirms, 
“The evidence of neurophysiology and psychology suggests most powerfully that the 
functioning of the soul depends on the operation of the brain” (1984:174). Thus, Hywel 
Lewis, himself a critic of Descartes in many places, points out those who criticize 
Descartes would do well to remember that he was intensely interested in the natural 
sciences and the function of the body (1973:19). 
There is, therefore, nothing to prevent a dualist from affirming psychophysical 
dependence. Critics have long maintained, however, that they have no way of explaining 
it. Given the sharp distinction dualists make between physical and mental substances, 
how can there be any adequate explanation for the intimate connections noted by 
contemporary science?  
At least some forms of HD, however, would seem to fare much better than CD on 
this point. Since emergent dualism explicitly affirms that the generation and function of 
the soul is directly dependent (apart from the miraculous intervention of God) on the 
underlying physical states, it should come as no surprise that damage to one’s body 
would affect one’s mental life (Hasker 1999). Similarly, the tight psychophysical 
connection espoused by thomistic dualism would seem to entail a similarly close 
connection between physical and mental states (Stump 1995). Cartesian holism, on the 
other hand, although it certainly affirms a strong psychophysical connection, has a more 
difficult time providing an adequate account. Thus, although Taliaferro also argues for an 
integral psychophysical unity, even a substantial union, of body and soul, it is not clear 
how this approach really explains the connection. It is not sufficient merely to affirm 
such an integral relation; the dualist must also be able to provide some account of that 
union that fits within his dualist framework. Although the emphasis of the Cartesian 
holist on the tightly integrated unity of body and soul is incoherent, it is difficult to 
harmonize with its Cartesian framework. Thus, as Hasker rightly asserts, “It’s not that 
these phenomena are logically inconsistent with Cartesianism; no doubt they can be 
accommodated” (1999:157).” Nonetheless, he continues, Cartesianism needs to be able 
to address these problems “in a way that exhibits the known facts as plausible 
consequences of the underlying metaphysical view. A string of ad hoc conjectures will 
not suffice” (ibid.). 
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3.2.2. The Biological Continuity Problem 
A second, though related, objection stemming from the biological continuity of 
humans with other animals similarly holds little difficulty for HD (Taliaferro 1995; 
Hasker 1999). According to CD, only human persons have a soul (G. Baker and Morris 
1996). The significant mental life of animals must, therefore, be explained in some other 
way. Such a distinction is, however, very difficult to maintain in light of the growing 
evidence for the lack of any sharp biological divisions between humans and other 
animals. That is, if humans and other animals are remarkably similar biologically, why 
would their mental lives require entirely different explanations?  
Once again, though, we can see that HD offers resources for a more adequate 
response. Both emergent dualism and thomism explicitly incorporate animals in their 
systems (Moreland 2002) and many affirm the theory of evolution as a reasonable way 
of understanding the development of human persons (e.g., Popper and Eccles 1977; 
Swinburne 1984; E. Lowe 1993; Taliaferro 1994; Hasker 1999; though cf. Moreland and 
Rae 2000; Goetz 2005). Thus, continuity between animals and humans is exactly what an 
HD account of human ontology would expect.65  
 
3.2.3. The Disparagement Problem 
Does dualism result in a necessary disparagement of the body and of creation as a 
whole? One of the more common criticisms espoused by contemporary thinkers (e.g., 
Jantzen 1984; Thatcher 1987), this is also the one most likely to be simply dismissed by 
                                                 
65 Hasker argues, though, that some forms of holism struggle on this question because of their 
commitment to a creationist view on the origin of the soul (1994:152). That is, this position would seem to 
entail that God immediately creates a soul, not only for every human person, but for every animal as well 
(cf. Swinburne 1994:199). A dualist could try to affirm an agnostic position on the question of animal 
minds akin to Barth’s (e.g., Foster 1991), but this simply raises the problem of biological continuity all 
over again. As Goetz rightly points out, however, the Cartesian view that God creates each soul 
immediately is no more problematic than the emergent theists’ view that God created the biological world 
in such a way that each animal would generate its own soul (2005). While one might wonder why he 
would operate in such an occasionalist manner (Hasker 1999:153), it is not unintelligible to suppose that he 
does. Taliaferro argues that even if the dualist rejects the idea that animals have substantial souls, he need 
not maintain low view of animal mental life (1994:569). Thus, the dualist could argue that there is 
significant biological and psychological continuity between animals and humans and still maintain that 
there is a decisive ontological difference between them (cf. Machuga 2002). 
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dualists. Thus, many dualists point out that there is no necessary relation between dualist 
ontologies and the disparagement of other aspects of creation (see esp. Taliaferro 1994). 
While this might be true, given the history of such disparagement in the dualist tradition, 
dualists would be wise to provide a much stronger response to this criticism (though see 
Taliaferro 1994).  
Nonetheless, holistic dualists are clear in their emphasis on the importance of the 
body for life of the whole person. Thus, Taliaferro calls on all those affirming an 
“integrative” dualism to “eschew all suggestions that the person is a ‘mere’ attachment to 
an object, as though one’s body were an accessory” (1994:233). Given this more holistic 
emphasis, then, Thatcher is certainly wrong to assume that dualism necessarily 
disparages the body because it is viewed as “inessential to mind and to personal identity” 
(1987:185). Throughout this discussion, we have seen that HD affirms a much higher 
view of the body for understanding the human person than is traditionally associated 
with dualistic ontologies. 
 
3.2.4. The Disembodiment Problem 
The question of embodiment becomes particularly acute when one turns to more 
eschatological considerations, specifically the question of whether there will be an 
“intermediate state” for human persons between their death and eventual resurrection, in 
which one aspect of the self continues to exist in a disembodied state.66 Since dualists all 
affirm the conceivability of the mind functioning, to some extent, independently of the 
body, we must ask what this entails about the mind/body relation.67  
                                                 
66 Following Steven Davis, we will understand the intermediate state to involve a temporary 
disembodiment that corresponds to the following scenario: “We human beings are born, live for a time as 
psycho-physical beings, and then die; after death we exist in an incomplete state as immaterial souls; and 
some time later in the eschaton God miraculously raises our bodies from the ground, transforms them into 
‘glorified bodies’, and reunites them with our souls, thus making us complete and whole again” 
(1989:121).  
67 Dualists have long contended that the Bible clearly teaches a pre-resurrection intermediate state 
and that this teaching entails some form of substance dualism. This position is generally supported by 
holistic dualists as well. Thus Moreland and Rae argue, “The human soul…is capable of entering an 
intermediate disembodied state upon death, however incomplete and unnatural this state may be, and of 
eventually being reunited with a resurrected body” (2000:17). And according to Cooper, “Any doctrine of 
the future life—except the theory that we cease to exist from death until the resurrection, traditionally 
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Indeed, most forms of CD view the mind as retaining most or all of its basic 
functions in its disembodied state (see esp. W Hart 1988). Thus able to perceive, think, 
will, and perform all of the other mental functions of a conscious being, one begins to 
wonder what role the body actually played in the life of the person prior to 
disembodiment. Such a view appears to make the body extraneous and unnecessary to 
the functioning of the person.  
As we have seen, though, HD affirms that the mind would only function in a 
severely truncated manner during such a disembodied state.68 The issue remains, 
however, that the mind is still perceived as functioning in some manner during this time. 
Thus, Stephen Davis argues that although the soul’s existence during this period 
constitutes “a radically attenuated and incomplete form of human existence” (1989:121), 
nonetheless, its mental abilities and properties will survive in some form. Thus, “human 
persons in the interim state can be spoken of as having experiences, beliefs, wishes, 
knowledge, memory, inner (rather than bodily) feelings, thoughts, language (assuming 
memory or earthly existence) - in short, just about everything that makes up what we call 
personality” (ibid., 121). If the mental life of human persons continues without 
interruption during this period of disembodiment, however, this would seem to raise 
significant questions regarding HD’s emphasis on the integral relationship of the soul to 
the body.69
It would seem that the holistic dualist could offer two responses to this argument. 
First, HD could affirm the independent functioning of the mind and simply deny that the 
corresponding implications for understanding the psychophysical relationship constitute 
                                                                                                                                                
rejected as heretical—requires a dualistic anthropology” (2000:13; cf. Vallicella 1998). Since, as we noted 
earlier, the substance dualist need only affirm the conceivability rather than the actuality of mind/body 
separation, we will assume that substance dualism similarly must only affirm the conceivability of an 
intermediate state. 
68 Thus, Davis argues that the abnormality of the intermediate state is “one of the clear 
differences” between his position and the immortality of the soul commonly associated with substance 
dualism (1989:123).  
69 More sensitive than most dualists to this problem, Robinson notes: “We are in something of a 
cleft stick. We want to reconcile the intuition that the mind or self can think and act on the body on its own 
initiative with the fact that even the most abstract thoughts and decisions appear to depend for their 
formulation as well as their execution up on the proper operation of the brain. Moreover, the latter fact 
seems both more certain and more clear in its exact sense that the former intuition. IT is, therefore, the 
dualist's intuition which is most at risk” (1989:46).  
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decisive objections to its account (e.g., Moreland and Rae 2000). Second, HD could deny 
the independent functioning of the mind during the intermediate state. This could be 
accomplished either by arguing that the mind continues to exist but does not continue to 
function during this time (Robinson 1989), or by asserting the possibility that the mind 
could be united with some intermediate physical form in connection with which it can 
continue to function until its eventual resurrection (cf. Harris 1983; Reichenbach 1983; 
L. Baker 1995).  
Neither of these two arguments is entirely satisfying, however. To the extent that 
HD relies on the first approach, it seems to entail a slide back toward CD in that the mind 
is understood to possess a significant degree of independence from its physical 
embodiment. While this would not constitute a decisive move away from HD, it does 
signify that the embodiment relation may not be as close as HD appears to affirm. The 
latter argument, on the other hand, seems to entail a slide in the opposite direction—i.e., 
toward physicalism.70 In other words, if HD abandons its commitment to the conceivable 
separability of body and mind, affirming instead that the mind cannot function in any 
way apart from some form of embodiment, one begins to wonder about the extent to 
which HD can continue to affirm that they are distinguishable substances.71  
It may be, then, that the only way that HD can maintain its commitment to both 
the conceivable separability of the two substances and their integral interdependence is 
to appeal to the possibility that God could miraculously sustain some level of 
functionality for the mind during the intermediate state (e.g., Hasker 1999).  
 
3.2.5.  Explaining Psychophysical Interdependence: The Prospects of a Dualist 
Account of Personal Embodiment 
Once again we can see that HD is in a much better position to address many of 
the standard criticisms of traditional substance dualism. Its clear and consistent 
                                                 
70 There are, of course, significant biblical and theological considerations that would also come 
into play with respect to either soul sleep or intermediate embodiment, which will not be considered in this 
chapter.  
71 Robinson recognizes the viability of this argument, but apparently does not think that it is 
incoherent to assert that something entirely comprised of “unactualized powers” could be understood to 
“constitute a real entity” (1989:56). Given that this constitutes a rejection of the widely held idea that the 
existence of an entity depends on its causal activity (i.e., “Alexander’s Dictum,” see Kim 2003c), though, 
it would seem that any dualist relying on this approach should offer more of an argument.   
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affirmation of the tight psychophysical relations that pervasively characterize every 
aspect of human existence, seems to refute decisively any suggestion that all forms of 
substance dualism necessarily disparage the embodied nature of human persons.  
Nevertheless, it does seem that there are at least two remaining weaknesses in 
HD’s portrayal of embodiment. First, while Cartesian holism makes its commitment to 
human embodiment quite clear, its apparent inability to provide a metaphysically deep 
explanation of this relationship constitutes a significant drawback as compared to the 
other forms of HD. Second, we have seen that HD struggles to affirm the conceivable 
separability of body and soul while still emphasizing the embodiment relation. While 
neither of these objections suffices to defeat HD as a theory of human ontology, they do 
suggest that more work needs to be done on this issue.  
 
3.3. Living Eternally: The Problem of an Immortal Substance 
One final area in which substance dualism could be understood to be 
incompatible with Barth’s ontological framework has to do with the nature of the soul 
and Barth’s emphasis that human persons depend on the preserving work of the Spirit for 
their existence at every moment.72 If this is true, substance dualism’s historic belief in 
the natural immortality of the soul would seem to be completely incompatible with 
Barth’s framework.  
This objection, though, actually holds very little interest for us at this point. 
Holistic dualists, most of whom are explicitly Christian theists, clearly insist that the 
human soul is not inherently immortal and that its existence is fully contingent on God’s 
preserving work.73 Thus, Swinburne argues that the human soul does not have “a nature 
such that it survives ‘under its own steam’” and, therefore, that is can survive death only 
                                                 
72 That this was one of Barth’s primary concerns, if not the primary concern, regarding substance 
dualism is reflected in his statement that the “central affirmation” of a dualist anthropology is “the 
immortality of this rational thing…which does not come to it by the special grace of God, but dwells 
within it by nature” (III/2, 380).  
73 Hasker argues that most forms of dualism hold to the natural immortality of the soul (1999:81). 
He understands this to mean that “the soul, like all created beings, needs the sustaining power of God in 
order to continue its existence. The soul, then, would be annihilated should God cease to sustain it, but 
otherwise it is indestructible” (ibid). While this might have been true for traditional dualists, and may even 
hold for some Cartesian holists, most holistic dualists affirm that the soul would not survive the death of 
the body unless God actively chooses to sustain its independent existence.  
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if God exercises his power to enable it do to so (Swinburne and Padgett 1994:308-
309).74 Holistic dualists thus contend that the soul is “not by nature immortal” (Moreland 
and Rae 2000:17) and that it cannot exist “independently of God’s creative activity” 
(Goetz 2005:35).75  Consequently, there seems to be no reason that we should regard HD 
as inconsistent with Barth’s emphasis on the contingent nature of human persons.  
 
4. Is There Hope for Holistic Forms of Substance Dualism?: Problems and Prospects 
From our discussions in this chapter we have seen that ‘dualism’ is a term that 
covers a broad range of ontological theories. While some forms of dualism seem clearly 
unsupportable given Barth’s christological framework, a number of contemporary 
dualists have developed forms of substance dualism that express a higher appreciation 
for the strong psychophysical links that characterize human experience. This more 
holistic dualism, itself comprising a range of ontological approaches, affirms that human 
persons comprise two fundamentally distinct substances that are intimately united and 
integrally interdependent.  
As with nonreductive physicalism, though, the christological adequacy of HD, 
must be evaluated on the basis of its ability to articulate its anthropological ontology in a 
way that is both consistent with this christological framework and internally coherent. 
Given these requirements, we have seen that the adequacy of HD has been challenged 
with respect to its account of mental causation, embodiment, and contingent personhood. 
On each of these issues, we have also seen that HD is able to offer some serious 
responses that suggest that HD is an ontological approach that bears serious 
consideration.  
As with NRP, however, there are still some weaknesses to HD’s presentation. 
Thus, we have seen that HD (especially Cartesian holism) needs to do more work 
developing its positive account of the embodiment relation, spending less time on 
                                                 
74 Swinburne further argues that this would not be a violation of any natural laws since “there are 
no natural laws which dictate what will happen to a soul after death” (1994:309).  
75 Although the traditional dualist position has been to affirm that the soul is inherently immortal 
because it is simple (i.e., it has no parts) and, therefore, cannot be broken down into any constituent 
elements, it is not at all clear why something should be deemed indestructible merely because it is simple 
(Shoemaker 1978:134). For a nice summary of the philosophical arguments for the natural immortality of 
the soul as well as a brief refutation, see Swinburne 1994:305-306; cf. van Inwagen 2002:171. 
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negative refutations of physicalist arguments. Additionally, we have discussed the 
problems that arise with respect to the continuing functionality of the soul in any 
disembodied state. Despite these weaknesses, though, HD has proven itself sufficiently 
capable of responding to its critics to be considered a christologically viable candidate 
for developing an anthropological ontology.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: 
Sharpening our Christological Vision 
 
1. Making the Christocentric Turn 
The turn toward the centrality of the person and work of Jesus Christ for 
understanding human nature has been a decisive mark of contemporary theological 
anthropology. Thus, many theologians happily affirm some form of Barth’s dictum, “The 
nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the problem of human nature” (p. 136). 
Nonetheless, as we noted in the opening chapter of this study, the content and 
methodology of such a christocentric approach to theological anthropology have been 
inadequately developed. Thus, despite the fact that many of these christocentric 
theologians are keenly aware of the significance of the contemporary mind/body debate, 
little effort has been made to apply the insights derived through a Christological 
understanding of human persons to this ontological discussion.  
We have seen through the course of this study, however, that the implications of 
a carefully formulated christocentric anthropology have a direct bearing on our 
understanding of human ontology and have the potential to shape the mind/body 
discussion in some very useful ways. Our exercise in christocentric anthropology has, 
consequently, focused on (1) analyzing the theological anthropology of Karl Barth as a 
means to clarifying the formal and methodological issues involved in developing a 
christocentric anthropology and (2) determining the implications of such an approach to 
the contemporary mind/body discussion. Each of these tasks has generated its own set of 
insights and opportunities for further study.  
 
2. Clarifying Christocentric Anthropology 
Unlike many theologians, Barth was unsatisfied with merely affirming the 
anthropological centrality of Jesus Christ. Rather, he went on to indicate explicitly the 
ground for this affirmation and the methodological implications involved in drawing 
insights from this perspective. He thus argued that one could only approach real 
knowledge of true human nature because all human persons are ontologically determined 
in Jesus Christ through their participation in his eternal election, through his covenantal 
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faithfulness to the divine purpose for humanity, and through the encounter that all 
humans have with him in the divine summons. By grounding anthropological knowledge 
on this sure Christological foundation, Barth is able to assert that we come to know 
humanity truly in the person of Christ alone.1  
 With a similar rigor, Barth explicates the methodology of a christocentric 
anthropology. Thus, he argues that we must develop anthropology from Christology, but 
always in such a way that anthropology is not reduced to Christology. Although Jesus 
Christ is fully human, he is also fully divine and, therefore, distinct from all other human 
persons by virtue of his unique relation to God and his sinless obedience. Thus, while his 
full humanity means that he provides true insight into human nature, his uniqueness 
entails that we cannot directly infer general anthropological truths from a consideration 
of his person and work. Rather, any christocentric anthropology must involve a two stage 
process that resists any temptation to reduce anthropology to Christology. Utilizing such 
a method, Barth is able to develop a series of key christological principles from which 
anthropological reflection must begin.  
Such an approach, however, raises another methodological issue in that it would 
seem necessarily limited in its ability to engage in significant dialogue with those 
proceeding from other anthropological starting points. Indeed, Barth explicitly rejects the 
possibility that any other vantage point could be capable of providing real insight into 
true humanity. Consequently, should he not simply dismiss alternate perspectives as 
fundamentally misguided efforts that result only in distorted and illusory pictures of 
humanity? As we have seen, though, despite criticisms to the contrary, this is precisely 
what Barth does not do. While he is sharply critical of the anthropologies produced by 
these alternate approaches, he is perfectly willing to view them as legitimate 
anthropological investigations worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, he devotes an 
extensive portion of §44 to considering the contributions and insights of these other 
perspectives for understanding human nature. His contention that they ultimately fail to 
provide knowledge of true humanity does not preclude, nor should it cloud, his 
affirmation of their right to speak and their value for understanding humanity.  
                                                 
1 Thus, if one wanted to disagree with some aspect of Barth’s theological anthropology, this 
cannot be done in isolation from his Christology. That is, if we were to reject Barth’s ontological 
framework for understanding human ontology, it must be done by directly engaging its christological 
ground.   
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In this way, Barth’s theological anthropology helps clarify some of the 
methodological issues involved in developing a christocentric anthropology. Yet it seems 
clear that despite Barth’s impressive accomplishments in this area, more work needs to 
be done. Although Barth provides a useful framework of Christological principles upon 
which to develop a theological anthropology, there is room for developing other 
christological insights which may bear similarly fruitful results for theological 
anthropology. Barth is a remarkably thorough theologian, but his treatment of 
Christology and its implications for theological anthropology was never intended to be 
comprehensive. Rather, Barth’s theology should be viewed as an invitation to carry on 
the theological task in new, and often unexpected, contexts.  
 
3. A Christological View of an Ontological Panorama 
Moving into the substance of Barth’s theological anthropology, we saw how 
Barth’s presentation of a methodologically clear christological anthropology opens the 
door for a fruitful engagement with questions related to human ontology. Building off 
the central affirmations developed from his Christological reflections, Barth presents a 
view of the mind/body relationship in which body and soul are understood to be 
integrally united and constantly interdependent. His presentation, however, does not 
comprise a fully worked out theory of human ontology. Throughout Barth seems more 
interested in presenting what must be affirmed about human ontology on the basis of his 
christological reflections than on developing a theoretically rigorous account of how that 
ontology obtains. Barth’s model of the mind/body relationship, then, is better understood 
as providing an ontological framework within which any particular theory of human 
ontology must function.  
This christological approach, then, should not be understood as constraining the 
range of human inquiry. Determining that a particular theory of human ontology is 
christologically inadequate does not entail the cessation of all attempts to understand the 
human person from that perspective. Barth’s methodology helpfully demonstrates that 
although the christological perspective will forcefully point out the problematic elements 
in any such theories and consistently reject them as false pictures of true humanity, 
nevertheless it will affirm their right to participate in the ongoing dialogue about human 
nature and glean their proposals for useful insights. 
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This ontological framework thus proved to be very useful for identifying and 
addressing the salient issues involved in assessing two contemporary theories of human 
ontology. Nonreductive physicalism seeks to espouse a physicalist view of human 
ontology but in such a way that (1) the mental life of a human person cannot be 
reductively analyzed or understood using the terms, concepts, and theories of lower-level 
sciences, (2) mental events and processes are understood to be causally efficacious, and 
(3) mental events and processes are asymmetrically dependent on physical events and 
processes. But is such an understanding of human ontology christologically adequate? 
Although physicalist ontologies are routinely dismissed by non-physicalist thinkers for 
their ostensible inability to provide any coherent account of continuous personal identity 
and phenomenal consciousness, we have seen that this is not necessarily the case. While 
these are certainly challenging problems for any form of physicalism, physicalist theories 
do have substantial resources for addressing these issues. We could not take the time in 
this project to consider exhaustively all of the available options, but our discussion does 
provide ample reason to believe that these problems may not be unsolvable within the 
framework of a physicalist ontology.  
A more challenging issue presents itself, however, when we turn to the question 
of mental causation. Nonreductive versions of mental causation seem caught in the vise 
created by their commitment both to the principle of a causally closed physical universe 
and the causal efficacy of mental realities. Although our study does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that this problem is unsolvable within the nonreductive framework, it 
does raise substantial questions about whether NRP can resolve this problem without 
either sacrificing its commitment to the causal efficacy of the mental (thus becoming a 
form of reductive physicalism) or to the causal completeness principle (thus sacrificing 
its standing as a physicalist ontology). If it can resolve this tension, there seems to be no 
reason not to consider it a christologically viable anthropological ontology.  
We similarly applied our christological analysis to the tenets of holistic dualism. 
Rejecting the psychophysical interdependence commonly associated with Cartesian 
dualism, HD espouses a more holistic relation sufficient, so its proponents argue, for 
grounding the tight psychophysical interdependence pointed to by the neurosciences. 
Despite this affirmation of psychophysical holism, however, the christological adequacy 
of HD can still be challenged on at least two points: mental causation and the 
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embodiment relation.2 HD defends itself against the former primarily by arguing for the 
essential difference between mental and physical causation, the brute nature of the 
psychophysical causal relation, and the extensive difficulties that any theory of causality 
faces. On all three points, however, HD struggles when it comes to providing any 
positive account of mental causation. That is, with notable exceptions (e.g., Eccles), the 
dualist strategy involves a defensive move (i.e., refuting physicalist charges that the 
dualist account of causation is incoherent or unscientific), an offensive move (i.e., 
pointing out that the physicalist account of causation is at least as problematic), and a 
negative move (i.e., affirming that mental causation is not physical causation), but not 
primarily an explanatory move (i.e., providing a metaphysically deep explanation of the 
causal relation). Indeed, as we have seen, many dualists contend that such an explanation 
is impossible, either because the relation is inherently mysterious or because it is simply 
brute.  
Such an approach, however, though difficult, if not impossible, to refute, should 
only be appealed to as a last resort. Given their affirmation of tight psychophysical 
interaction, one would like to see holistic dualists taking a more active role in developing 
a theoretically rigorous account of the causal relation.  This issue comes to play in the 
question of personal embodiment as well. Although HD provides a superior framework 
to CD in its affirmation of tight psychophysical relations, its position is weakened by the 
lack of an explanatory framework within which to account for those relations. From the 
perspective of a christocentric anthropology, then, it would seem reasonable to conclude 
that there is no reason to exclude HD as a viable anthropological ontology even though 
there seems to be room for more development in its ability to account for causal and 
embodiment relations.  
 
4. Extending Our Christological Vision 
Theologians have long been aware of the need to address the mind/body, or 
body/soul, relationship. Indeed, given its impact on our understanding of the nature of 
human persons, its implications for understanding a broad range of theological issues, 
and its moral significance, the question of human ontology has long been, and should 
continue to be, an important aspect of any fully developed theological anthropology. The 
                                                 
2 As we discussed in the previous chapter, challenges stemming from the contingency of human 
personhood do not need to be taken seriously.  
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tremendous complexity of the philosophical and scientific issues involved in the 
mind/brain debate, however, especially given the advances made by philosophers of 
mind and neuroscientists in the last several decades, make it one of the more difficult 
anthropological issues to resolve.  
In this study, we have not attempted to resolve this theoretical conundrum. In 
fact, the approach developed in the course of this study suggests that theologians should 
resist the temptation to wed Christian theology to any particular theory of human 
ontology. Instead, by proceeding from the person and work of Jesus Christ, this exercise 
in christocentric anthropology has sought to determine that which we must believe about 
human persons. As we have seen, however, although this does not constitute a theory of 
human ontology, it does have decisive implications for the evaluation of any such theory.   
Through the course of this study we have seen that a christological perspective on 
the nature of human persons has decisive implications that range far beyond the realm of 
morality to which its insights are often confined. This in turn suggests that those of us 
who affirm the anthropological centrality of the person and work of Jesus Christ should 
approach theological anthropology with a firm conviction that this will have implications 
for understanding every aspect of human nature and existence.  
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